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INTRODUCTION
The governments of the former Soviet republics have enacted
relatively little consumer protection legislation during the first stages of
economic transformation, and for understandable reasons. Government
officials have been struggling with proposals for reforming a structurally
deficient economy and addressing divisive ethnic, political, and constitu-
tional crises that dominate public discourse and demand prompt action.
In comparison, consumer protection issues will naturally be viewed as
less urgent. They generally draw attention only when citizens begin
complaining, with relative frequency, that commercial entities are abusing
the liberties offered by a market economy. Moreover, consumer
protection laws can increase the costs of business activity by dictating the
boundaries of lawful commercial practice and mandating expensive
remedies for consumers who have been injured by prohibited conduct.
The reform efforts have understandably focused on projects intended to
encourage business activity rather than those which might inhibit
economic growth.'
In 1992, however, the Russian Parliament enacted a law on the
protection of consumer rights, primarily focusing on remedies for the sale
1. Some of the more noteworthy Russian legislative acts and government decrees addressing
issues of economic development include: Resolution on the Establishment of a Russian Bank
of Reconstruction and Development, Dec. 30, 1992; Law on Currency Regulation and Monetary
Control, Oct. 9, 1992; Patent Law of the RSFSR, Oct. 14, 1992; Law of the RSFSR on
Trademarks, Service Marks, and Designations of Place of Origin of Goods, Oct. 17, 1992; Law
of the RSFSR on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs and Data Bases, Sept. 23, 1992;
Decree on Measures for Organization of a Securities Market in the Process of Privatization of
State and Municipal Enterprises, Oct. 7, 1992; Law on Enterprises and Entrepreneurial Activity,
Dec. 25, 1991; Law on Measures Relating to Stimulation of Entrepreneurial Activity in the
RSFSR, May 12, 1991; Statute on Joint Stock Companies, Dec. 25, 1991; Law on Competition
and Limitation of Monopolistic Activity in Goods Markets, March 22, 1991; Decree on the
Basic Principles for Effectuating Foreign Economic Activities on the Territory of the RSFSR,
July 14, 1990; Law on Investment Activity in the RSFSR, June 26, 1991; Law on Foreign
Investments in the RSFSR, July 4, 1991; Decree on the Creation of Free Entrepreneurship
Zones, July 14, 1990; Council of Ministers Decree on Creation of State Structures of
Management of Science, Scientific and Technical Progress, Standardization, Metrology and
Patents in the Territory of the RSFSR, Oct. 9, 1991; Presidential Edict on the Abolition of
Wage Restrictions, Nov. 15, 1991; Decree on the Application of Notes and Bills in the RSFSR
Economy, June 24, 1991; Bill of Exchange and Promissory Note Statute, June 24, 1991; Law
on Ownership of the Territory of the RSFSR, July 14, 1990; Law on Ownership in the RSFSR,
Dec. 24, 1990; Land Code of the RSFSR, Apr. 25, 1991; and Law on Privatization of State and
Municipal Enterprises in the RSFSR, July 3, 1991. For English translations and descriptions
of these legislative developments in general, see RUSSIA AND THE REPUBLICS - LEGAL
MATERIALS (John N. Hazard & Vratislav Pechota eds., 1993)[hereinafter RUSSIA AND THE
REPUBLICS]; WILLIAM BUTLER, BASIC LEGAL DOCUMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
(1992); PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN
THE SOVIET REPUBLICS (1992); USSR LEGAL MATERIALS (Vratislav Pechota & Peter J.
Pettibone eds., 1992 release)[hereinafter LEGAL MATERIALS].
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of defective goods and services.2 Similar legislative projects in other
former Soviet states are either pending or have recently been enacted.3
As international pressure for expanding consumer rights in the region
increases,4 the trend is expected to continue. Although critics may find
the enactment of consumer protection laws premature in the early years
of market reform, or a resurgence of socialist ideals that many hoped
would be buried in the past,5 the acts have come at an opportune time.
Thousands of new, independent producers and sellers of goods and
services have emerged in the former Soviet states over the past two years,
and the numbers and range of commercial activities are expanding at an
accelerating rate.6 As the new breed of entrepreneurs proliferates, the
potential for unfair or deceptive conduct increases. History has shown
that the expansion of free markets invariably yields a familiar pattern of
consumer complaints.7 There is no reason to believe that the experience
2. Law On Consumer Rights, Feb. 7, 1992, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, Apr. 7, 1992, at 4,
translated in RUSSIA AND THE REPUBLICS, supra note 1 [hereinafter Law on Consumer Rights].
3. See, e.g., Latvian Consumer Protection Law, Oct. 28, 1992 (on file with author),
described in Igor Kavass, Consumer Protection in Latvia, SURV. E. EUR. L., Dec. 1992, at 12;
Ukraine Law on Consumer Rights, described in Reform Legislation in the Ukraine, E. EUR.
Bus. L., Feb. 1992; Law on Consumer Protection of Estonia (Draft 1992)(on file with author).
4. On December 16, 1991, representatives of the European Community (EC) signed
"Association Agreements" with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic
to assist in their political and economic transitions and integration into Europe. Among the
areas of law targeted for reform was consumer protection. See Lucyna Tokarczyk, E.C.
Association Agreements with Poland, Hungary and the CSFR, SURv. E. EUR. L., June 1992,
at 1-3.
5. Compare D. Urazhtsev, Buyers Will Receive the Rights. Some Day They'll Receive the
Goods Too, KOMMERSANT, Dec. 2, 1991, at 22, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, SBE File
(criticizing draft consumer act) with Owen Fiss, Capitalism and Democracy, 13 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 908, 919 (1992) (supporting measures in emerging democracies to protect against growing
inequalities of wealth and to curb monopoly power). See also Peter B. Maggs, Consumers'
Rights Confused, But Taken Seriously, SURV. E. EUR. L., June 1992, at 7.
6. See John Kampfner, Russia's Battle Lines Are Drawn Up for the Post-Yeltsin Era, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Mar. 2, 1993, at 16; Entrepreneurship in Russia, ROssIISKIYE VESTI, April 24,
1992, at 7, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, SBE File (private businesses included 111,000
cooperatives, 1,168 joint ventures, 8,902 stock companies, 64,729 partnerships, and 60,000
small enterprises); Staff, America and the Russian Future, Speech to the Embassy of the
Russian Federation, Washington, D.C., reprinted in Capitalism Being Built by Initiative of
Ordinary Russian Citizens, WE/MBI, Feb. 8-21, 1993, at 5 (observing that in 1992 a private
sector larger than the entire gross national product of all but a few dozen countries has emerged
in Russia).
7. See ANTHONY JONES & WILLIAM MOSKOFF, KO-OPS - THE REBIRTH OF ENTREPRE-
NEURSHIP IN THE SOVIET UNION (1991). As one Soviet journalist stated,
[t]he descendants of gold-diggers, adventurers and brawlers are today's Harvard graduates,
computer magnates, and ideologists of social and ecological movements. One can only
hope that as time is moving faster at the end of the 20th century, our "capitalist sharks"
will not take a hundred years to turn into postindustrial entrepreneurs.
Id. at 129-30. For a comparative study of the consumer problems in both developed countries
and less developed nations, see RAJENDRA K. NAYAK, CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW IN INDIA:
Summer 1993]
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in former Soviet states will be any different.8
The need to minimize consumer dissatisfaction with unfair commer-
cial practices is present in all nations, yet it may be particularly acute in
formerly communist states because critics of free enterprise abound and
suspicions of market principles run deep.9 If large numbers of consumers
perceive the new "wild west capitalists"'0 as unfairly taking advantage of
their market autonomy, and if no effective redress exists, the movement
against market reforms may be fueled. This reaction may be especially
strong in the transition years when the benefits of a market economy
seem meager to the majority of citizens, as inflation and unemployment
rates soar, while a rich minority prospers." Effective consumer
protection laws can help counter anti-market attitudes by giving
AN EcO-LEGAL TREATISE ON CONSUMER JUSTICE (1991).
8. Despite legislative mandates of improved product quality, the Soviet system was
notorious for producing poor quality goods. See Zigurds L. Zile, By Command, Bribe and
Cajolery: Soviet Law on Output Quality, in THE IMPACT OF PERESTROIKA ON SOVIET LAW
259, 260-63 (Albert J. Schmidt ed., 1990) [hereinafter THE IMPACT OF
PERESTROIKA](discussing the Law on the State Enterprise). Reliable statistics on accident rates
are difficult to obtain due to inadequate government dissemination of accurate data. Id. at 262.
In a 1989 survey, nearly three-fourths of Russian citizens indicated that their lives were made
difficult by "the poor quality of goods and their distribution systems." Soviet Public Opinion
Polls, NEW OUTLOOK, Summer 1990, at 24. Even with the onset of economic reforms, one
can expect dissatisfaction with product quality, and the corollary need for effective consumer
redress, to continue in Russia for some time. See also infra note 237.
9. Economic hardship in the early stages of reform has intensified the political struggle
between President Yeltsin and the Congress of People's Deputies, which is dominated by
former Communists elected prior to the fall of the Soviet Union. See Hardliners Have Liberals
on the Run, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 22, 1993, at 10; Fred Coleman et al., Deja Vu All
Over Again, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 8, 1993, at 39; Yeltsin Tries Tone of
Conciliation, THE GAZETTE (Montreal), Mar. 7, 1993, at B8. Indeed, at the time of this
writing, the future of market reforms in Russia is uncertain, as concerns about unemployment,
price increases and inequality among social classes become more prevalent. See Valery
Vyzhutovich, The Communist Party Has Not Gone Away, WE/MBI, Mar. 8-21, 1993, at 1; T.
Anthony Jones, The Social Costs of Economic Change East and West, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Aug. 10, 1987, at 12; Gur Ofer, The Distribution Effects of Private Incomes, RADIO
LIBERTY RESEARCH RL 230/87, June 19, 1987, at 1-7; JONES & MOSKOFF, supra note 7, at 132
(observing the public anger at cooperatives in the late 1980s because they charged high prices
for scarce goods); L.o~rd, How Tired I am of Living!, PRAVDA, Oct. 23, 1991, at 2, translated
in XLII CURRENT DIG. SoV. PRESS 22 (1991) ("Low income families have nothing to look
forward to. The market will only exacerbate their poverty and leave them with no prospects
at all."); but cf. BEN EKLOF, SOVIET BRIEFING: GORBACHEV AND THE REFORM PERIOD 124
(1988) (poll showing 61% think it is "fair" that some Russians will receive "very high
incomes").
10. The term has been used often by opponents of wholesale market reform to decry the
excesses of uncontrolled capitalism. The author first recalls it used in this context by a Latvian
Member of Parliament in 1991 who was discussing various measures to permit entrepreneurial
activity under very limiting conditions, such as restrictions on profits and the termination of
employees. Interview with Juris Boyars, in Riga, Latvia (June 4, 1991) (on file with author).
11. On the adverse short-term economic impact of market reforms in socialist economies
generally, see R. CAMPBELL, THE SOCIALIST ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION ch. 10 (1991).
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consumers reason to believe that this aspect of the system, while not
perfect, at least strives to be fair.
12
In addition, consumer protection legislation can support the privatiza-
tion of industry, an essential ingredient in the reform movement, in at
least two ways. Consumer laws can ease concerns about privatizing state
enterprises that currently possess near monopoly economic power. When
an enterprise has no effective competition, there is little economic penalty
for producing inferior (or even unsafe) products, or for engaging in
deceptive and injurious commercial behavior in an effort to maximize
profits.' Unless the product is a luxury, consumers cannot simply choose
to avoid dealing with the monopolist. If effectively enforced, the laws
can give consumers redress against a monopolist's abuse of market power
and enhance consumer welfare until effective competition evolves.
Consumer protection laws can also provide safeguards for privatizing
industries that regulators may perceive as too health-sensitive or safety
related to place in private hands, such as chemical, alcohol, or
pharmaceutical production and processing. 14 They can help assure the
12. The consumer law may be able to serve an important educational function, or what
Lawrence Tribe calls a "channel for the transmission of advancing ethical demands," as well.
LAWRENCE TRIBE, CHANNELING TECHNOLOGY THROUGH LAW 99 (1971). Projecting the
appearance of social justice in the emerging market economy is important in part because
Marxist ideology promised Russian people fair outcomes of economic exchange. Even though
the promise was often breached in practice by, among other things, the evident privilege of the
party elite, the ideal seems firmly rooted in the consciousness of the Russian people. In
contrast, capitalist societies do not promise fair market outcomes but, at most, efficient ones
that maximize wealth. See Michael Ignatieff, Falling Apart and Coming Together: Russia and
Europe in the 1990s, 98 QUEENS Q. 804, 808 (1991). Effective consumer laws can help ease
this ideological, as well as economic, transformation. Public concern about social justice has
been high ever since serious discussion of market reforms began. One publication voicing
these concerns, the conservative weekly Domostroi, included articles entitled, The Laws of the
Market Know No Mercy, and Swindle 2000. Aaron Trehub, Housing Policy in the USSR/CIS:
Perestroika and Beyond, RFE/RL RES. REP., Feb. 7, 1992, at 32, 40. As one Russian writer
reluctantly put it, "we have to get used to the idea that rich people and even legal millionaires
are going to appear in this country." Il (quoting Ordinary Real Estate for Easy Money,
IZVESTIA, July 18, 1991, at 3). See also EKLOF, supra note 9, at 88 ("The introduction of
unemployment, inflation and (aggravated) wage inequalities will also mean rewriting the 'social
contract' existing between people and state").
13. The-experience of India provides a continuing example. Nationalized monopolies in
many sectors and scant competition in others have contributed to widespread food adulteration,
mislabelling of products, and general indifference to the rights of consumers. See NAYAK,
supra note 7, at 58-63, 228-30 (reviewed in 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1297 (1992));
Rajendra K. Nayak, Consumer Protection Act, 1986: Law and Policy in India, 10 J. CONS.
POL'Y 417 (1987).
14. See Aleksandr Aleshkin, Government Representatives Evicted from North Ossetia,
RosSiISKAIA GAZETA, July 18, 1991, at 3, translated in FBIS-USR, July 30, 1991, at 70-71
(commenting that alcohol production should not be allowed in the private sector); V.
Kononenko, Russia Has a Privatization Program, But One Should not Wait For a Miracle,
IZVES'nA, Dec. 27, 1991, at 1, available in LEXIS, WORLD LIBRARY, SBE File
(pharmaceuticals, baby foods, tobacco and alcohol likely to be government produced); Soviet
Summer 19931
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public that the purity and quality of such products will not be compro-
mised by a private owner who may be tempted to seek short-term gain
at the expense of consumer welfare. 5
Although the enactment of the Russian consumer law happened to
coincide with the onset of economic reforms, the initial motivation for the
law was to protect consumers in a centrally planned economy. Long-
standing debate in the former Soviet Union over the need for a consumer
protection act eventually led to the enactment of an all-Union statute in
May 1991.16 When the Union government dissolved later that year the
legislation lapsed, but the Russian Parliament (still dominated by Soviet
era socialists) incorporated many of its central concepts into the current
law.'7 Just as consumer rights can be a low priority for merchants in
market economies when respecting them increases costs, consumer
protection was also given little respect by central planners in government
ministries whose objective was to stay within budgeted guidelines. This
lower status was reflected in numerous government rules and practices
that insulated state-run enterprises from liability and diluted consumer
rights, many of which were recognized in the USSR Constitution and the
Russian Civil Code. 8 The consumer act was originally intended, at least
in part, to ensure that consumer interests would not be overshadowed by
Public Opinion Polls, supra note 8, at 17, 18 (objection to privatization of auto industry,
machine tool industry, and medicine production).
15. Laws like the proposed EC directive on distribution of medicines, for example, can be
useful in privatizing the distribution chain of pharmaceuticals. The directive would introduce
a licensing system for wholesalers, who would be subject to regular monitoring and quality
inspections. Wholesalers would be allowed to sell medicines to authorized buyers only. The
proposal also introduces rules on pharmaceutical labels and outer package disclosures. See
1990 O.J. (C 58) 33. On the benefits of compatibility with EC directives in general, see infra
text accompanying notes 242-51.
16. See Law on the Protection of the Rights of Consumers (May 22, 1991), Vedomosti
SSSR, Issue No. 24, Item No. 689-90, translated in LEGAL MATERIALS, supra note I
[hereinafter USSR Consumer Law].
17. See Maggs, supra note 5, at 7. The law established generous remedies for consumers
who purchase defective products, e.g., a right to demand exchange, price reduction, repair or
cancellation, USSR Consumer Law, supra note 16, art. 7; penalties for delay in remedying
defects, id. art. 7(8); protection against defective services, id. art. 9; liability of sellers and
manufacturers for injuries caused by defects, without proof of fault, id. arts. 10-11; general
product disclosure mandates, id. art. 13; and a prohibition against sellers limiting liability in the
contract, id. art. 15.
18. CIVIL CODE OF THE RSFSR, translated in LAW IN EASTERN EUROPE 11 (Z. Szirmaied
& A.K.R. Kiralfy trans., 1966) (hereinafter RSFSR CIVIL CODE). Separate civil codes of the
Union Republics were promulgated in the early 1960s and are based on the more general
Fundamental Principals of Civil Legislation adopted by the Union government. The republic
civil codes are similar because only laws approved by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme
Soviet and conforming to the Fundamental Principals could be enacted. See OLIMPIAD S.
IOFFE, SOVIET CIVIL LAW 9 (1988). The RSFSR Civil Code principles discussed in this article
apply to contracts of sale in general and are not limited to consumer transactions.
(Vol. 14:739
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competing priorities in the ministries charged with overseeing various
market sectors.' 9
One purpose of this article is to examine how this legislative product
of a declining socialist state will benefit Russian consumers during the
unusual circumstances characterizing the period of market transformation.
Whether the pace of economic reform is rapid or incremental, it seems
clear that Russian commerce will continue to be dominated by large,
state-run monopolists for some time. Nevertheless, an expanding class
of private entrepreneurs is already emerging to serve previously unsatis-
fied consumer needs and, ultimately, to compete with or replace the state
enterprises. Although the consumer law may have originally been
motivated by a desire to protect against the excesses of central govern-
ment power, the law could prove useful to consumers dealing with
privately owned enterprises in this mixed economy. The law is predomi-
nantly concerned with elevating the status of consumers vis a vis sellers
and service providers, and, in this respect, it matters little whether the
merchant is the state or a private entrepreneur. The statute reflects the
central premise of many consumer laws: an individual is not likely to
have the knowledge or economic power to engage in a meaningful
bargaining process with a merchant over many contract terms. This
presumption was accurate in the former planned economy, and is true of
most consumer transactions in market economies as well?"
A second purpose is to familiarize Western consumerists with the
decidedly pro-consumer features of the Russian law. In Europe and
North America, traditional tort and contract doctrine is generally viewed
as inadequate to address many legitimate consumer concerns, and for
decades courts and legislative bodies have been creating rules to correct
the perceived inadequacies.2 ' While these policies continue to evolve,
Russia has adopted a law that, if enforced, can do a fair job of supporting
consumers' legitimate expectations in market transactions. While the
legislation seems misguided, incomplete, or unduly restrictive of merchant
autonomy in some areas, much can be learned from the Russian approach.
This article will explore the probable effects of the law on consumers,
state enterprises, and the emerging private sector.
19. See Maggs, supra note 5, at 7. One of the catalysts for the law was a 1990 decision of
the USSR Constitutional Supervision Committee declaring unconstitutional several ministry
regulations that limited the civil code rights of consumers in the retail trade. See infra text
accompanying notes 101-03.
20. See generally PETER ASCH, CONSUMER SAFETY REGULATION ch. 4 (1988).
21. See generally Edward P. Belobaba, The Resolution of Common Law Contract Doctrinal
Problems Through Legislative and Administrative Intervention, in STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW
423, 443 (Barry J. Reiter & Jon Swan eds., 1980).
Summer 1993]
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Part I analyzes the consumer law's provisions that elevate the legal
status of consumers when they purchase goods and services. The law
essentially sets forth an elaborate "bill of rights" for consumers that
cannot be infringed by contract or administrative dictate. The result is a
generous package of legal protections that meet or exceed those afforded
consumers in more advanced economies, but may unduly impede
merchant activity and increase costs in several instances. Part II
examines the legislation from a different perspective - as a set of legal
norms affecting the operation of consumer markets generally. It focuses
on three areas of consumer protection briefly addressed in the statute.
Two of these areas - product labelling and misleading advertising -
would, if developed further, help Russian consumer markets operate more
efficiently. The third - mandatory product and service standards -
would, if implemented in a manner consistent with past practices, harm
consumers by needlessly restricting consumer choice and inhibiting
entrepreneurial initiative. Part III discusses the enforcement mechanisms
established in the statute and suggests that the promise of the law's
substantive provisions may be undermined unless a more "consumer
friendly" enforcement scheme is introduced. Russian leaders may
eventually wish to take additional steps, such as creating nontraditional
dispute resolution forums, funding the development of consumer
organizations, and designating a consumer ombud to give greater practical
meaning to the rights declared in the act.
I. A DECLARATION OF RIGHTS FOR THE RUSSIAN CONSUMER
A. Ideological Approaches to Consumer Protection
Legislators considering consumer protection programs can, and indeed
should, be torn between the desire to protect individuals against the
potential unfairness of free markets and the need to create an attractive
commercial environment for domestic and foreign businesses. Most
individuals are workers as well as consumers of goods and services.
Economic growth generally benefits consumers as expanding profits
create greater employment opportunities, higher wages, and better quality
goods and services. Nevertheless, the pursuit of economic prosperity and
full employment at the expense of other consumer interests - such as
full compensation for product-related injury, or material disclosures of
product contents - can result in a net reduction in consumer welfare. 22
22. See CLAUS OFFE, CONTRADICTIONS OF THE WELFARE STATE ch. 10 (John Keane ed.,
1984).
[Vol. 14:739
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Throughout this century, governments have sought to balance these
interests by engaging in a familiar struggle between legislative ideologies.
Legislators who resist government interference in private sector transac-
tions favor a theory of consumer protection which, in the neo-classical or
liberal tradition, yields market regulating laws that foster competition but
do not directly dictate the rights or obligations of freely contracting
parties. 3 The liberal model recognizes market failure, and seeks to
increase consumer welfare by improving economic efficiency in consumer
markets.' The Russian statute contains only a few provisions of this
type, perhaps because it was conceived prior to the era of wholesale
economic reform and drafted by many Soviet era politicians.25 Indeed,
parts of the statute may be criticized for encouraging inefficient or
wasteful allocation of resources and thereby undermining efforts to create
a more prosperous market economy. 26
Those espousing a different ideology are less reluctant to prescribe
the substantive terms of consumer transactions. They seek to empower
consumers by conferring a set of legal rights and remedies that bind the
parties.27 The objective is to ensure that the legitimate expectations of the
typical consumer are protected by law when they are not likely to be
protected in the market.2 In common parlance, this means that merchants
23. See generally, THIERRY BOURGOIGNIE & DAVID TRUBEK, CONSUMER LAW, CONSUMER
MARKETS AND FEDERALISM IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 7 (INTEGRATION THROUGH
LAW Vol. 3, Mauro Cappaletti et al. eds., 1987).
24. As a result, much consumer protection is aimed at overcoming information barriers. The
theory is that with information gaps filled, consumer choice will be more rational and the
market will ensure good quality through efficient purchasing decisions. See id. at 9; see also
infra text accompanying notes 151-53.
25. See supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 104-07, 116-22,147-50, 172-75, 184-89, 196-200;
see also Maggs, supra note 5, at 7-8.
27. See generally BOURGOIGNIE & TRUBEK, supra note 23, at 8-9. The notion that
consumers have certain rights or entitlements has been politically popular since President
Kennedy supported a consumer charter that included the right to safety and the right to be
informed. See ASCH, supra note 20, at 64. The categorization of consumer laws as either
market-enhancing or status-elevating is by no means universally accepted, nor are the categories
mutually exclusive. The dichotomy is useful here, however, because it highlights the Russian
law's heavy emphasis on ensuring consumer rights and remedies rather than fostering more
efficient market activity. For a discussion of the traditional economic arguments in support of
consumer protection laws, see id. ch. 3; for a critique, see id. ch. 4; see also lain Ramsay,
Framework for Regulation of the Consumer Marketplace, 8 J. CONS. POL'Y 353 (1985).
28. The notion that consumers are entitled to have their reasonable expectations supported
by law is not often stated by scholars of consumer policy as a justifying rationale for consumer
protection laws, but in legislative practice it is often a principal argument in support of their
enactment. Some critics, of course, would disagree with the premise that the market cannot
adequately protect consumer interests. See George L. Priest, A Theory of Consumer Product
Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297 (1981) (regulation of consumer product warranties is
unnecessary, and courts should respect disclaimers of liability and limitation of remedy
Summer 1993]
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are expected to be honest and stand behind their goods and services;
consumers can expect prompt, satisfactory remedies if something goes
wrong; the contract will not contain surprises hidden in the fine print; and
"legal technicalities" will not get in the way if a consumer has to go to
court to enforce her rights. To further this goal, laws elevate the legal
status of consumers by mandating rights and remedies consumers would
ordinarily expect but are unable to obtain, as a practical matter, through
contract bargaining.
The proponents of a status-elevating approach to consumer protection
are pessimistic about the ability of consumer markets to operate
efficiently merely by fostering increased competition and providing
consumers with more complete and accurate information.29 They see a
large and undeniable imbalance of economic power between producers
and consumers, which justifies a more comprehensive and intrusive role
of the state in regulating consumer transactions. According to this view,
the liberal theorists create only illusory rights and perpetuate the
exploitation of consumers by postulating hypothetical market efficiencies
that can never be attained.3° Those who wish to directly empower
consumers view themselves as realists, if not radicals.3 They see
standardized, non-negotiable consumer "contracts" that invariably benefit
the seller who drafted the papers and often contain terms unreasonably
restrictive of the consumer's rights;32 aggressive marketing campaigns that
distort consumer needs and desires by overinflating the attributes of the
product or service; producers who are insulated from liability by a
network of distributors, middlemen and retailers; and barriers that impede
consumers from access to effective legal advice and adequate forums for
clauses); cf. William C. Whitford, Comment on A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty,
91 YALE L.J. 1371 (1982) (criticizing Priest's thesis).
29. See, e.g., BOURGOIGNIE & TRUBEK, supra note 23, at 8-9; see also NORBERT REICH &
HANS-W. MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 131
(1981) (discussing regulation of safety of products and services)[hereinafter REICH &
MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN GERMANY].
30. See, e.g., Bernd Stauder, Principles of Consumer Protection in Swiss Law, in
COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW FROM AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 389, 395 (Donald
B. King ed., 1986) ("the consumer's position may be compared to that of a sick person whose
physician has completely informed him about the nature of his illness while refusing him all
therapy").
31. See ROBERT N. MAYER, THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT: GUARDIANS OF THE MARKET-
PLACE 70 (1989) (comparing the "reformist" approach to consumer advocacy with the "radical"
approach).
32. See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 629-32 (1943) (discussing contracts in the free enterprise
system); Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 140-44 (1970)
(discussing contracts of adhesion).
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pursuing remedies.33 Moreover, traditional tort and contract doctrines,
which many believe developed with a bias toward encouraging economic
development at the expense of the consumer (or at least indifferent to her
concerns), have tended to support the merchant and frustrate the
consumer at virtually every turn.34
From a political perspective, the status elevating approach has clearly
won the battle. Throughout the second half of this century, governments
in the United States, Canada, and most of Europe have viewed market
regulating mechanisms, standing alone, as inadequate protectors of
consumer interests. Governments enacted laws on a wide range of topics
designed to empower consumers by elevating their status.35 Statutes
made warranty protection mandatory, prohibited unfair contract terms,
expanded quality and safety standards, mandated product and service
liability guarantees, regulated consumer credit terms, and enhanced
opportunities for consumer remedies. 36 Even in less developed countries,
steps have been taken to implement consumer protection laws of this
type. 3
7
B. The Russian Act
The Russian law follows the modern trend by setting forth an array
of government edicts to fulfill, albeit imperfectly, consumers' natural
33. The sentiment was captured by Sen. Gaylord Nelson in 1969:
Once, the consumer was the final arbiter in marketplace decisions, but with our society
becoming more and more complex, due to increased industrialization and specialization,
economic power has shifted gradually away from the American consumer. Madison
Avenue advertising, sophisticated merchandizing techniques, and motivational research
have all increased the vulnerability of the consumer.
Quoted in ASCH, supra note 20, at 63.
34. See Kessler, supra note 32, at 632, 640 (characterizing consumer contracts as "devices
to build up and strengthen industrial empires," contributing to the "innate trend of competitive
capitalism toward monopoly"); Priest, supra note 28, at 1298. The bias of law in favor of the
merchant class is not surprising given that much of the doctrinal seeds were planted during the
period of rapid expansion of Western mercantile activity in the nineteenth century. Many of
the jurisprudential developments in that period reflected a desire to use the law to facilitate
trade, or at least not create inconvenient obstacles. In the United States, the law had been
largely rewritten to the satisfaction of the business class by the 1850s. Grant Gilmore,
Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 441, 444 (1979).
See also MORTON. J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977).
35. Particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, the governments of Europe and North America
began to realize that market mechanisms, competition, and freedom of contract were failing to
protect consumer interests. See BOURGOIGNIE & TRUBEK, supra note 23, at 22.
36. See id.
37. See generally Hans B. Thorelli, Consumer Policy in Developing Countries, in 29TH
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN COUNCIL ON CONSUMER INTERESTS 147 (Karen P.
Goebel ed., 1983). Indeed, in less developed countries the most urgent consumer laws are
likely to be those ensuring the basic safety of foods and health supplies, not laws mandating
information disclosures and other market-regulating devices characteristic of more mature
economies. Id. at 149.
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expectations about the safety and quality of goods and services. In so
doing, the law avoids some of the troublesome legal doctrines that have
hindered consumers in other nations. Most of the law takes a transaction-
al approach, focusing on the rights and remedies of consumers who have
purchased defective products or have engaged the services of a provider
who does not perform satisfactorily. It deals principally with three
concepts familiar to Western consumerists: (1) claims for personal injury
or property damage resulting from the use of a defective product, i.e.,
product liability; (2) claims for the lost value of the defective product
itself, i.e., warranty liability; and (3) liability for the performance of
defective services. In each of these areas, the law promises consumers
a multitude of benefits, but also creates some restrictions on entrepreneur-
ial freedom that may impose costs exceeding any benefits conferred.
1. Product Liability
Under the traditional civil law of most Western nations, an enterprise
was not liable for injuries resulting from its products unless the consumer
proved that the enterprise was reckless or negligent in the design or
manufacture of the article.38 In a world where goods are often mass
produced in complex manufacturing processes involving many individuals
and component parts, consumers often found it difficult to pinpoint the
negligent act or omission that caused the defect. To ease these difficul-
ties, courts in several nations (e.g., Germany, England, Denmark, and the
Netherlands) reversed the burden of proof and began requiring the
producer to prove that it did not act negligently. 39 Despite these reforms,
38. See REICH & MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN GERMANY, supra note 29, at
173-74 (discussing Art. 823 of the German Civil Code). Even worse from the consumer's
perspective, the manufacturer might even have succeeded in passing liability to the individual
worker who caused the defect. Id. Fault-based liability was also the general rule in other
European countries. See NORBERT REICH & HANS-W. MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN
THE EC COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 94 (1980); [hereinafter REICH & MICKLITZ,
CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN THE EC COUNTRIES). See generally L. KRAMER, EEC CONSUMER
LAW 23 (1986); Michael Whincup, Product Liability in the Common Market Countries, 19
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 521 (1982).
39. See, e.g., GORDON BORRIE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY -
BOLD SPIRITS AND TIMOROUS SOULS 23 (1984) (discussing development of strict liability in
Britain and the EC); REICH & MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN THE EC COUNTRIES,
supra note 38, at 96. For a long time courts in France found negligence per se if the producer
violated a safety regulation. Norbert Reich, Product Safety and Product Liability - An
Analysis of the EC Council Directive of 25 July 1985 on the Approximation of the Laws,
Regulations, and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for
Defective Products, 9 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 133, 134 (1986) [hereinafter Reich, Analysis of EEC
Council Directive]. In common law countries the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur effectively
shifted the burden of proof in cases where it seemed that the defect could have arisen only
from the negligence of the producer. See GUSTARO GHIDINI, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN
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however, consumers still found it difficult to succeed on product liability
claims. 40 As a result, legislation and court decisions over the past twenty
years have created no-fault or strict liability as the standard in internation-
al commerce. 4' The consumer must only prove that the product had a
defect and that the defect caused an injury to his person or property.
The Russian civil law governing "obligations resulting from the
infliction of damage" is the analog to tort liability in the West,42 and for
the last thirty years it also made fault the general basis of recovery.43
Although there was a presumption of fault if a defect caused injury, the
producer could overcome this presumption by proving its compliance
with all known safety precautions." Under the new consumer act,
liability can be avoided only when the damage was due to irresistible
force ("force majeure"), or the consumer's misuse of the product.45 As
in other strict liability systems, the law's central issue is causation, not
fault,4 and thus can be viewed as a partial return to the civil law liability
ITALY 47 (1980); Reich, Analysis of EEC Council Directive, supra, at 134.
40. The consumer still had to prove defect and causation as well as bear the full cost of
litigation and expert witnesses. Moreover, the producer could prevail by establishing that the
defect occurred through no fault of its own, e.g., by demonstrating that its workers followed
established procedures that complied with the best available production methods and technology
available at the time. See Reich, Analysis of EEC Council Directive, supra note 39, at 135,
139.
41. In the United States, courts following section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
formed the basis of no-fault liability. See TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY: THE
CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN THE AMERICAN TORT LAW
5-88 to 5-107 (Report to the American Bar Association by the Special Committee on the Tort
Liability System, Marshall S. Shapo, reporter, 1984). In Europe, most strict liability legislation
followed the adoption of the EC product liability directive in 1985. See Council Directive
85/374/EEC, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29. See also infra note 51.
42. See RSFSR CIVIL CODE, supra note 18, ch. XL; IOFFE, supra note 18, at 307; WILLIAM
E. BUTLER, SOVIET LAW 179-80 (1983).
43. RSFSR CIVIL CODE, supra note 18, § 444; IoFFE, supra note 18, at 307.
44. See IoFFE, supra note 18, at 183.
45. Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, art. 12. The law does not explicitly state that
a seller is liable regardless of fault, but the conclusion follows from Article 12(1) ("Damage
to the consumer's life health or property resulting from a product's conceptual, manufacturing,
formulaic, or other defect shall be compensated in full .... ), article 12(4) (liability
"irrespective of whether or not the said production factors' hazardous properties could have
been detected with the help of contemporary expertise in science and technology"), and article
12(5) (not liable if "damage was due to force majeure or the consumer's failure to comply with
instructions for a product's use or storage."). Conspicuously absent is language like that found
in RSFSR CIVIL CODE, supra note 18, § 444 ("The person who caused the harm is not liable
to make it good if he proves that it was not caused by his fault.").
46. Of course, the consumer must prove that the product was defective, defined as a
deviation from mandatory standards, contract terms, routine requirements, or produc-
er/provider/seller information. Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, pmbl. See infra note
77. Russian legal authorities understand "routine requirements" to mean "suitable for ordinary
use or the use provided by the contract." BUTLER, supra note 42, at 178. The Civil Code
defined defect similarly. RSFSR CIVIL CODE, supra note 18, § 168.
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system in place in Russia prior to 1961. The framework now parallels
the special Russian Civil Code liability for harm caused by a "source of
increased danger. '48 That code holds a property owner liable regardless
of intent if the expected activity is inherently dangerous, such as driving
an automobile or operating heavy machinery.49 In the same vein, the
consumer act's liability provisions implicitly acknowledge that if a
defective product causes injury, it was inherently dangerous in its
defective form.
One potentially controversial aspect of the law is that it does not
permit an enterprise to defend on the ground that the product was
manufactured in accordance with the latest scientific and technological
expertise available at the time of production. ° Thus, it rejects the so-
called "state of the art" defense which is available in several Western
countries and was endorsed, to a limited extent, in the 1985 product
liability directive of the European Community (EC). 5' Producers
generally resist elimination of the defense on two grounds: its removal
could discourage research and innovation, and it is simply not fair to
assess damages against a manufacturer who followed all known safety
precautions when the product was made. 2 The first contention, which
has never been supported by empirical proof, is premised on the belief
that businesses would be reluctant to develop new materials, product
designs, and manufacturing processes if the resulting innovation would
47. The 1961 Fundamentals of Civil Legislation explicitly made fault the general basis of
liability. Prior to that time, causation-based liability was imposed under the 1922 Civil Code.
BUTLER, supra note 42, at 179-80. Article 126 of the 1991 revised Fundamentals of Civil
Legislation continued to make fault the basis of liability for many obligations, but article 129
introduced the concept of no-fault liability for injuries resulting from defective products. See
Fundamentals of Civil Legislation of the USSR and the Republics, Vedemosti SSSR, Issue No.
26, Item No. 733 (1991), translated in LEGAL MATERIALS, supra note 1 [hereinafter
Fundamentals of Civil Legislation]. The consumer act implements this no-fault principle.
48. RSFSR CIvIL CODE, supra note 18, § 454; loFFE, supra note 18, at 310.
49. The only exceptions were when the injury was due to irresistible force or was caused
"intentionally" by the victim. RSFSR CIVIL CODE, supra note 18, § 454; IOFFE, supra note
18, at 310-11.
50. Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, art. 12(4).
51. The EC directive requires member states to enact laws that give consumers a remedy
upon proof of a defect and injury caused by the defect. Council Directive 85/374/EEC, supra
note 41, art. 4. Member states have the option of providing that the producer is not liable if
it proves that "the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when [it] put the
product into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of the defect to be discovered."
Id. arts. 7(e) and 15. This would appear to require more than proof that the design and
manufacturing process conformed with the latest scientific knowledge. The focus is on whether
the defect was discoverable by the producer with the use of such knowledge. This may require
consideration of even minority opinions that have not been generally accepted. See Reich,
Analysis of EEC Council Directive, supra note 39, at 144-45.
52. See Reich, Analysis of EEC Council Directive, supra note 39, at 144.
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lend credence to a claim that the previous standard, while the best
available at the time, was shown to be inadequate in hindsight. The
counter-argument, however, seems more intuitively correct: the
possibility of damage awards for product-related injuries should encour-
age businesses to improve the accepted standards and develop safer
products. Thus, absent evidence to the contrary, this first ground
provides little support for retaining the defense.
The fairness issue is more difficult. While it may seem unjust to
punish a firm that faithfully followed industry standards in manufacturing
a product, it is equally unfair to make the innocent consumer absorb all
of the cost. The issue is largely a matter allocating the loss. Removing
the "state-of-the-art" defense means that although the costs resulting from
generally accepted, yet unsafe, industry standards will be borne initially
by producers, these producers can presumably spread the risk through
insurance and increased prices. Its nonavailability is a logical extension
of two central features of the strict liability doctrine - placing the
financial burden on the party who is better able to prevent the injury and
redistributing the loss among those who, collectively, benefit from the
redistribution (i.e., the buying public). 3
Although removing the state-of-the-art defense may be justifiable in
a country with a fully-functioning market economy, it makes less sense
in Russia, which is in a state of transition. Many of the new Russian
producers will be small, undercapitalized entrepreneurs financially
incapable of satisfying large damage awards. Also, until a more
comprehensive liability insurance system has developed, many enterprises
may find it difficult or prohibitively expensive to protect themselves by
purchasing insurance. 54 Damage awards may thus lead to more insolven-
cies, without full compensation to victims, rather than a redistribution of
53. See BORRIE, supra note 39, at 23; Reich, Analysis of EEC Council Directive, supra note
39, at 144-45. The most common way of redistributing the loss is for the producer to purchase
insurance and pass the cost to consumers in the form of higher prices. The higher prices may
make an exporter's products less competitive as compared with domestic firms whose product
liability losses are much less. If the legal system encourages liability recoveries above those
allowed in the country's trade partners, the higher costs can contribute to making an entire
nation of exporters less competitive in international markets. This effect on trade was one of
the motivating forces behind adoption of the EC product liability directive - to create a
uniform tort system so producers in all member nations can compete on a level playing field.
54. Prior to the events of 1991, insurance in the Soviet Union was carried through
Gosstrakh, the state insurer, which has now been dismantled. Ingosstrakh, one of the few joint
stock companies in the old Soviet Union, has continued operations as one of the hundreds of
insurers in Russia. Most of the new private insurers are, however, small and lack experience.
Nye Perran, The Law of Torts in Eastern Europe and the Vital Role of Liability Insurance in
an Emerging Market Economy, 18 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 253, 256 (1992). See also Larisa
Afanasyeva, Insurance and Risk Management of Joint Ventures in the USSR, 22 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 447 (1990).
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costs through higher prices. In addition, traditional production methods
in some economic sectors, developed in the era of central planning, may
lag behind Western standards for many years, and the new producers will
in most instances work in accordance with these current standards for the
foreseeable future. With the state-of-the-art defense removed, liability
could be imposed when those standards are deemed inadequate as
compared to safer materials and methods used in other countries.
Although this potential liability may provide incentives to accelerate the
modernization of Russian enterprises, the short-term cost may be the
failure of businesses that were complying with accepted norms.
The statute also diverges from Western product liability norms in
determining who is liable when a defect causes injury. In much of
Europe, the producer of a product can be held strictly liable in tort on the
theory that the existence of a defect is evidence that some aspect of the
design or manufacturing process was unsafe, but the non-producing retail
seller usually cannot. 55 This is because, in the modern world, a retailer
is usually a mere distributor of the product and has no voice in the design
or manufacturing process. The EC product liability directive incorporates
this view, though a retail seller can be held liable under special circum-
stances, such as when it places its own trade name on the product
(thereby assuming the appearance of a producer) or when it cannot
identify the producer upon inquiry by the consumer.1
6
The Russian consumer act creates an apparently unique, two-tiered
product liability system in which the seller and producer share responsi-
bility. If a product causes injury during a warranty period or before any
stated expiration date (for perishable products), both the seller and the
producer can be held liable.57 If the seller did not offer a warranty and
55. Except for England, Ireland, and Italy, sellers were liable for damages only if they made
an agreement (which could be implied in Germany) to assume liability. See REICH &
MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN THE EC COUNTRIES, supra note 38, at 100; REICH &
MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN GERMANY, supra note 29, at 173, 186. The reason
stems from the fault-based system of liability, and sellers are seldom at fault when merely
distributing a product made by someone else. The EC product liability directive, supra note
41, arts. 3, 7(a), largely carried forward this approach.
56. The directive defines "producer" as the manufacturer of a finished product, the producer
of any raw material or component part, and any person who puts his name, trademark, or other
distinguishing feature on the product. Council Directive 85/374/EEC, supra note 41, art. 3(1).
In addition, an importer of the product is treated like a producer, as is a retail seller who cannot
identify the producer following inquiry by an injured consumer. Jd. arts. 3(2) and 3(3).
57. Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, art. 12(3): "Damage resulting from defects
revealed during a product's warranty/expiry duration ... shall be indemnified by the seller
(producer). Damage due to post-warranty defects shall be indemnified by producers." "Seller"
is defined as "a corporate entity or individual marketing products." Id. pmbl. Tort-like liability
for sellers was also recognized under the all-Union predecessor to this act. See USSR
Consumer Law, supra note 16, art. 11(3).
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the product has no expiration date, then both the seller and producer are
liable for injuries resulting within six months after the purchase.5" For
retail sellers, this has the effect of mandating a minimum six month
period in which they may be liable for tort-like damages. The statute
does not permit a seller to exempt itself from this liability by warranting
the product for a shorter period (or by disclaiming responsibility
altogether) in the contract; indeed, a fair reading of the statute would
seem to prohibit such exculpatory clauses.59 Although the six month
period finds precedent in the Russian Civil Code limitation period for
buyers seeking warranty-type relief against a seller, its application to tort-
like injuries expands seller liability considerably. 6W
More importantly, the retail seller cannot use the contract to limit the
types of damages recoverable during this period of exposure.6' It is not
uncommon for retailers to disclaim liability for personal injury and injury
to property - so-called "consequential damages" that can be quite
expensive.62 In effect, such disclaimers can eliminate traditional tort and
contract remedies and limit the consumer's remedy to repair or replacement
of the defective product. Because such exclusions seem grossly unfair in
many situations, legislation and judicial interpretation in many countries
have limited their effect by, for example, prohibiting disclaimers of liability
for grossly negligent breach of contract 63 or for defects causing personal
58. Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, arts. 12(3), 18(1) 30(2).
59. Id. art. 14(1) ("A contract violating consumer statutory rights shall be invalid."). Article
I also manifests an intent to make the provisions of the consumer act mandatory by prohibiting
ministries from modifying the protections through administrative decree. See infra text
accompanying notes 97-103.
60. RSFSR CIVIL CODE, supra note 18, § 247; Ior'E, supra note 18, at 86, 88. For defects
in building construction, the period was one year after the buyer took possession of the
structure. lad A suit based on product defects must be brought within six months after
presentation of the claim to the seller. RSFSR CIVIL CODE, supra note 18, § 249. Thus, since
the claim must be presented to the seller within six months after purchase, any lawsuit against
a seller of goods will have to be initiated, at the latest, no more than one year after the date of
purchase.
61. See supra note 59.
62. Section 2-719(3) of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE permits sellers to exclude
consequential damages unless the exclusion is unconscionable. Limiting damages for injury
to the person in a consumer transaction is prima facie unconscionable, but limiting damages
for property harm or other economic consequences is not. Exemption clauses are common in
Europe as well. See REICH & MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN THE EC COUNTRIES, supra
note 38, at 120-21.
63. See Law Governing Standard Business Conditions § 11(7) (1977) (F.R.G.). The Law
also prohibits limitations of remedies to repair or replacement if such remedies would be
inadequate or insufficient to compensate for losses, Id § 1 1(10)(b). Although the Law only
applies when a business uses a standard form contract, id § 1(1), this would likely include most
consumer contracts, which are seldom negotiated individually.
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injury to a consumer.(' Even with such ameliorating laws, however, the
clauses can still make it difficult to obtain compensation from the retail
seller for the full consequences of a defect. 65  The Russian approach
implicitly endorses the view that such contract provisions are not freely
negotiated and can unfairly surprise consumers. During any stated warranty
period or prior to any product expiration date, or in any event for a period
of six months, a seller (as well as the producer) must stand behind the
product and compensate consumers fully for any foreseeable injury.
The law further extends a retail seller's liability to all consumers
injured by the product, even those who had no contractual relationship
with the seller,66 thereby making unavailable the so-called "horizontal
privity" defense. 67 In many countries, if a retail seller is liable for
consumer injuries at all, only the injured buyer (and perhaps members of
the buyer's family who are injured) may claim damages. 68 Bystanders or
64. U.C.C. § 2-719(3)(1988); Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, § 2(l)(Eng.).
65. For example, if a defective oven causes a fire and extensive damage to a consumer's
home, a contract limiting the consumer's remedy against the retail seller to repair or replacement
of the oven might be enforceable. In the United States, the consumer could recover if the
limitation of remedy was deemed unconscionable, but the consumer carries the burden of proof.
See U.C.C. § 2-719(3). In Europe, statutes vary and may allow the consumer to void some or
all aspects of the limitation clause. For example, Denmark: "A contract can be cancelled wholly
or in part if it would be unreasonable or contrary to honest conduct to maintain it," and Germany:
Provisions in form contracts are unenforceable if, "contrary to the principal of good faith, [they]
are unfairly prejudicial to the party with whom the user concludes the contract." See REICH
& MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN THE EC COUNTRIES, supra note 38, at 161-63. Some
acts prohibit particular "blacklisted" contract terms. See id at 164, citing, e.g., Law Governing
Standard Business Conditions (F.R.G.) arts. 10,11; JEAN CALAIS-AULOY, CONSUMER LEGISLATION
IN FRANCE 133-34 (Michael Corkery trans., 1981)(French Commission on Offending Terms
to issue orders prohibiting unfair terms relating to scope of liability, passing of risk, payment,
guarantees, and other conditions imposed by the merchant). The European Community is
promoting legislation to prohibit unfair contract terms in all member states. Council Directive
93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 1993 O.J. (L95) 29.
66. Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, art. 12(2). Only "Consumers" as defined in the
act may bring suit against producers or sellers. The term is defined as "an individual using,
acquiring, ordering, or willing to order goods or services for personal use in the home." Id.
67. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 11-2 (3d ed.
1988). Horizontal privity is absent when a person who did not purchase the defective product
is injured, e.g., a wife poisoned by a bottle of soda purchased by her husband. Id. Vertical
privity is absent when a buyer in the distributive chain seeks redress from a remote
manufacturer, e.g., the husband suing the soda producer. In both situations, recovery is more
likely if the claim is based in tort rather than contract, although the law is by no means clear.
See id.; Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965); State ex rel. Western Seed Prod.
Corp. v. Campbell, 442 P.2d 215 (Or. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969); Debra Goetz
et. al., Special Project: Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions: An Update, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1310-17 (1987).
68. Reich, Analysis of EEC Council Directive, supra note 39, at 133-34. In the United
States, statutes may extend protection to some non-contracting users or bystanders. See U.C.C.
§ 2-318, Alternative A (warranty extends to family members and guests who may reasonably
be expected to be affected by the goods), Alternatives B and C (warranty extended to any
person who may reasonably be expected to be affected by the product). Most states have
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other product users may have no recourse against the retail seller since
they did not enter into a contract with the seller. Therefore, their only
resort would be a possible tort claim against the producer. 69 The Russian
law's liberal allowance of third party claims against the seller is
consistent with the typical consumer's expectations when a product does
not perform properly. To the average consumer, it makes no sense to say
that a seller must compensate for the buyer's injuries but not for those of
a person who borrowed the product from the buyer, or who was standing
next to the buyer when the product caused the damage.
Although the law can be criticized for making innocent sellers too
expansively liable for defects caused by manufacturers, some ameliorating
factors may soften the impact. The act provides that both seller and
producer are liable during this period, and both would likely be named
in any lawsuit.70 Moreover, under Russian civil law provisions governing
contribution and indemnification,71 sellers should be able to pass any
losses on to the responsible manufacturer. The law leaves open the
possibility, however, that producers who possess substantially more
economic power than retailers will be able to insulate themselves from
indemnity liability in their distribution contracts. This is more than a
theoretical possibility in the transition years because many manufacturers
will still be large enterprises, some possessing near monopoly power, and
many retailers will be small entrepreneurs just entering the market.72 The
adopted Alternative A, but a substantial minority have expanded liability to a broader class of
non-contracting users and bystanders. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 67, § 11-3.
69. In the United States, noncontracting parties can recover damages for personal injury
under strict tort liability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) recognizes a claim
by "the ultimate user or consumer" even though the consumer did not purchase the product
from the defendant manufacturer. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 67, § 11-3. In Europe,
judge-made law similarly recognized a tort claim by a user of the product who did not contract
with the defendant. Reich, Analysis of EEC Council Directive, supra note 39, at 134. For an
overview of this development in Europe, see REICH & MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN
THE EC COUNTRIES, supra note 38, at 93-107.
70. Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, art. 12(3). Russian civil law provides that
victims may claim full compensation from either party when two are jointly obligated, i.e., joint
and several liability. RSFSR CIVIL CODE, supra note 18, § 455; see IOFFE, supra note 18, at
165.
71. RSFSR CIVIL CODE, supra note 18, § 456; BUTLER, supra note 42, at 182.
72. Manufacturing in most sectors is dominated by one or a small number of producers, and
small and medium size firms are virtually nonexistent. CAMPBELL, supra note 11, at 219.
Over the years, industry has become increasingly centralized and affiliations among like entities
have become even more commonplace. HEIDI KROLL, BROWN UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR
FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENT BRIEFING PAPER No. 4: REFORM AND MONOPOLY IN THE
SOVIET ECONOMY 3-4 (1990); Geoffrey Burgess, Comment, Russian and Polish Anti-Monopoly
Legislation: Laws for Two Markets Compared, 18 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 193, 195
(1992). Some estimate that 20,000 to 30,000 Soviet enterprises could be considered monopo-
listic. Dmitri Maximov, Russia's Anti-Monopoly Committee: A Monopoly on Fighting
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statute hints that producer-seller relations will be addressed generally in
another law,73 but the content of such a law remains undefined. 74 Such
a law should ensure that defect-related losses are ultimately borne by the
party who caused the injury and who is in the best position to prevent
similar occurrences in the future.
From a consumer perspective, however, the two-tiered liability
scheme strikes a fair accommodation. If a defect causes injury shortly
after the purchase, the consumer can seek redress from the retail seller,
who, in most cases, will be located near the consumer's home. This
often will be less costly than pursuing the manufacturer, who may be
difficult to identify or located in a distant location. More importantly, it
also means that the consumer will be compensated by the seller if the
manufacturer cannot be located or has gone out of business. This could
be significant in the new market economy. Under the Russian Civil
Code, if a person had a claim against an enterprise that had previously
undergone a dissolution or liquidation, the consumer was to be paid by
the entity's "superior organization" in the state hierarchy or by a state
organization named in the dissolution proceeding.75 In a market
economy, the liquidation of a privately owned producer may leave no
fund or successor organization to satisfy claims. In such a case, the
consumer act now provides that the retail seller will bear the full loss if
injury occurred during its period of exposure. While this may seem
unfair to the seller, it is justifiable as a matter of risk allocation. As
between the two innocent parties, the seller is in a better position to
protect itself by, for example, choosing to buy from solvent, reputable
producers who will be around either to defend the action or reimburse the
seller if its product causes injury. Also, the seller is likely to have easier
access to information about the reputation of various producers and their
economic stability. The law can thereby serve a market developing role
as well, by creating an additional incentive for retailers to buy from
wholesalers who offer good quality rather than those whose prices are
lowest.
Monopoly, KOMMERSANT, Mar. 25, 1991, at 5, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, SPD File.
See also Richard Judy, Russia at Risk, in HUDSON COUNTY REPORT 10 (Hudson Institute, May
1993, no. 3).
73. See Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, art. 17(2).
74. The law on competition does not provide much guidance on this point. It prohibits a
business with a "dominant" market position from imposing "disadvantageous" terms on the
weaker party, but "disadvantageous" is undefined and "dominant" position is only loosely
defined. See Law on Competition and Restricting Monopoly Activity on the Commodities
Markets, art. 5.1 (March 22, 1991), reprinted in WILLIAM BUTLER, BASic LEGAL DOCUMENTS
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (1992). See generally Burgess, supra note 72, at 193.
75. RSFSR CIVIL CODE, supra note 18, § 470.
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Injuries occurring outside any warranty term, product expiration date,
or six-month statutory liability period, will be compensated only by the
producer.76 The producer's exposure is, however, limited in duration.
While in much of the United States a producer's liability for defects is
limited only by an indeterminate amount of time after which a malfunc-
tioning product is not deemed defective, 7 the Russian law states that the
defect must have caused injury within the product's stated expiration date
(for perishables) or the statutory "service life" for other products, or in
the absence of either, within ten-years after the product's manufacture.78
The ten-year repose period finds precedent in the cut-off set by the EC
product liability directive 79 and the laws of several jurisdictions in the
United States ° The "service life" of products is determined by state
agencies 8' and must be disclosed to the consumer, presumably on product
labels.82
While it can be a cumbersome bureaucratic task to determine the
expected service lives for innumerable types of products, and arbitrary to
presume a ten-year service life in the absence of such a determination, the
scheme has merit. It should assist consumers in determining when a
product is no longer expected (by government authorities, at least) to
perform safely, and could provide guidance to producers (and their
insurers) in predicting liability risks more accurately. Mandatory repose
periods also can reduce litigation time and expense, which makes sense
76. Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, art. 12(3).
77. Although definitions of "defect" in the United States use varying language, they
generally rest upon the premise that products are defective if they "fail to perform in the
manner reasonably to be expected in light of their nature and intended function." Dunham v.
Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 247 N.E.2d 401 (Il1. 1969). On the meaning of defect in
general, see Robert Bernstein, Evidence of Producer's Due Care in a Products Liability Action,
25 VAND. L. REV. 513 (1972); Reed Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does A Product
Have To Be?, 42 IND. L.J. 301 (1967); Marshall Shapo, A Representational Theory of
Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60
VA. L. REV. 1109 (1974).
78. Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, art. 12(2). The law also creates a ten-year
period of exposure for providers of services that exhibit "major" defects. k1L art. 30(3).
79. Council Directive 85/374/EEC, supra note 41, art. 11. The directive also calls for a
limitation period of three years beginning from the day on which the consumer becomes aware
or should have become aware of the damage, defect, and identity of the producer. Id art. 10.
80. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 33-1-1.5-5 (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103 (1979);
Mathis v. Eli Lilly & Co., 719 F.2d 134, 145 (6th Cir. 1983)(holding Tennessee's 10 year
limitation period constitutional). See generally Bruce L. Schroeder, Comment, Washington's
Useful Safe Life: Snipping Off the Long Tail of Product Liability?, 57 WASH. L. REV. 503,
508-09 (1982).
81. See Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, art. 5(2).
82. See id art. 8(2).
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in a country where lawyers are in short supply and will be for some
time.83 The limitation protects defendants and the courts from having to
litigate cases where evidence has been lost due to the death, disappear-
ance, or fading memories of witnesses, or the unavailability of docu-
ments. These limitation periods can result in hardship, however, in cases
involving latent injuries, particularly diseases from toxic substances such
as asbestos, where the injury is not likely to manifest itself until 20 or 30
years after exposure to the product. This unfairness could be addressed
in Russia either by extending the statutory "service life" for products
which may cause serious injury in the distant future or by special
legislation exempting certain products from the ten year limitation
altogether.14 The imposition of a ten-year period of exposure does not
necessarily mean that the producer will be held liable for injuries caused
by its products during that entire period. The consumer must still prove
that the product was defective. Some products are simply not expected
to work for ten years and would not be considered defective if they
malfunction sooner.
2. Warranty Liability
a. The Consumer's Wide Choice of Remedies
The warranty-type provisions of the Russian consumer law best
illustrate the statute's status-elevating approach to consumer empower-
ment.85 If a product proves defective, Russian consumers have a choice
among several remedies. The law covers a broad range of merchant-
consumer relations and reflects some of the most pro-consumer remedies
83. Despite recent increases in legal practitioners, Russia has one of the smallest percentages
of advocates in the industrialized world. In 1988, there were less than 27,000 advocates in the
entire Soviet Union, fewer than in pre-revolutionary Russia. In Moscow, for example, the
number of advocates remained fairly constant (about 1,000) from 1950 to 1990, while the
population increased dramatically. Eugene Huskey, Between Citizen and State: The Soviet Bar
(Advokatura) Under Gorbachev, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 95, 106-07 (1990); see also
John Quigley, The Soviet Union as a State Under the Rule of Law: An Overview, 23 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 205, 222-23 (1990)(describing the role of the legal profession in law reform).
84. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 n.14 (1971); Braswell v. Flintkote
Mines, Ltd., 723 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1231 (1984); see also id. at
535 (Swygert, J., dissenting). Cf. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103(b) (1979)(exempting
asbestos-related claims).
85. See Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, arts. 17-25. This section, entitled
"Consumer Rights Protection and Commodity Trade" sets forth the procedures for claiming
redress when a product proves defective and the consumer is not seeking damages for personal
injury or property damage. It thus parallels the warranty-type protections in Western legal
systems where the consumer is seeking some form of compensation for the reduced value of
the product itself.
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found in Western democracies. If the literal language of the act is
enforced, Russian entrepreneurs will find that most of their warranty
obligations are fixed, and consumers will find legal support for an
assortment of remedies when a product proves defective. If a product
exhibits a defect - defined as any deviation from state-imposed
standards, contract specifications, advertised properties, or "routine
requirements' '" 6 - the consumer may demand free repair of the product
from the merchant, reimbursement for repairs performed by a third party
or the consumer himself, a discount from the purchase price (i.e.,
damages for reduction in the value of the goods), an exchange for a
similar product, or cancellation of the transaction and refund of the
purchase price." The seller is not permitted to modify these statutory
rights by contract.8"
Although each of these remedies is generally available under the laws
of the United States and European nations,89 it is unusual to find a legal
system that guarantees consumers a choice among them. In many
nations, for example, the law will not mandate a right to a refund when
a product exhibits minor defects unless repair or replacement turns out to
be an inadequate remedy. Moreover, merchants have long been
permitted to contractually limit the remedy to repair or replacement even
86. For the statutory definition of "defect," see supra note 46.
87. Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, art. 17(1).
88. Id. art. 14. This was generally true under a previous law as well. See Zigurds L. Zile,
Consumer Product Quality in Soviet Law: The Tried and the Changing, in SOvIET LAW AFTER
STALIN, PART I 183, 199 (Donald D. Barry et al. eds., 1978).
89. See generally Hans-W. Micklitz, Quality of Products & Services, in REICH & MICKLITZ,
CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN THE EC COUNTRIES, supra note 38, ch. 6.
90. In the United States, for example, merchants often can limit consumer remedies to repair
or replacement so long as the exclusion is not unconscionable and the remedy does not "fail
of its essential purpose." U.C.C. § 2-719. Warranties can even be excluded altogether. Id.
§ 2-316; cf. MD. CODE ANN. [COM. LAW] § 2-316 (in consumer sales, language excluding
implied warranties or modifying statutory remedies is unenforceable; however, retail seller may
be reimbursed by manufacturer for any losses); BARKLEY CLARK & CHRISTOPHER SMITH, THE
LAW OF PRODUCT WARRANTIES 8.05 [2] (1984)(discussing the enforceability of warranty
disclaimers). In Germany, the law provides for a right to exchange or redhibition (refund), but
standard form contracts often limit the remedy to repair or replacement and allow redhibition
only if the seller is unable to repair or replace. REICH & MICHLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION
IN GERMANY, supra note 29, at 243. In the Netherlands, the right to demand a refund or
replacement is limited by the requirement that the defect be grave or serious. REICH &
MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN THE EC COUNTRIES, supra note 38, at 119. In England,
once a good has been accepted by the consumer, the merchant may insist on repair of the
defect as the consumer's sole remedy. See PETER WALKER, CONSUMER PROTECTION AcT 1987,
at 20 (1987).
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if the defect is major.9' Another unusual provision of the Russian law is
the consumer's right to demand repair of a defective product. While
many merchants would prefer repair or replacement to other possible
remedies, a statutory mandate of such a right seldom appears in the codes
of Western nations.' Even more unusual is the right to reimbursement
for repairs performed by a third party or by the consumer herself even
when the consumer has not first sought repair by the seller. This lets a
consumer bypass the seller and have the repair done by someone else at
the seller's expense.
While each of these remedies was formally recognized under the
Russian civil law,93 the consumer's election of remedies was considerably
limited. First, regulations issued by the government - principally the
Ministry of Trade and the State Commission of Standards (Gosstandard)
- restricted consumer discretion in choosing a civil law sanction.94 For
example, special rules permitted the consumer to demand replacement of
a product only if the seller had twice failed to effect a proper repair.
Exchange of an automobile could be demanded only after repair efforts
failed and a commission of experts approved the decision.95 Second,
under the civil law principle of "maximum economy," the costs of one
91. In early studies of product warranties, researchers found widespread exclusions of
coverage and disclaimers of consequential damages. See George G. Bogert & Eli E. Fink,
Business Practice Regarding Warranties in the Sale of Goods, 25 ILL. L. REV. 400, 405-06,
409, 412-13 (1930); William C. Whitford, Law and the Consumer Transaction: A Case of the
Automobile Warranty, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 1006, 1039, 1062. See also Priest, supra note 28,
at 1302. In response to these studies, several states enacted laws prohibiting or severely
limiting the right of merchants to exclude warranties or modify remedies in consumer
transactions. For an excellent comparative analysis of these laws, see Donald F. Clifford, Jr.,
Non-UCC Statutory Provisions Affecting Warranty Disclaimers and Remedies in Sales of
Goods, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1011 (1993).
92. One reason for the absence of a statutory right to repair is that the merchant may not
have the facilities or expertise to repair the products it sells. Perhaps an implied condition in
the Russian law is that the merchant must be able reasonably to meet the consumer's demand,
but nothing in the law indicates that this would be the case. Cf. REICH & MICKLITZ,
CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN THE EC COUNTRIES, supra note 38, at 119 (discussing Dutch law
granting right to demand repair only if manufacturer is able).
93. RSFSR CIVIL CODE, supra note 18, § 246; IOFFE, supra note 18, at 214-15; BUTLER,
supra note 42, at 178-79. A consumer's right to choose among remedies was also recognized
in the all-union predecessor to this act. See USSR Consumer Law, supra note 16, art. 7(3).
94. See IoFFE, supra note 18, at 217-19; BUTLER, supra note 42, at 179. Section 246 of
the Civil Code authorizes the Council of Ministers to establish a procedure for enforcing the
statutory rights. Often, however, local authorities established rules deviating from the law
without legal authority. See IoFFE, supra note 18, at 218.
95. See Zile, supra note 88, at 202. Rules also implied that the buyer had only two
remedies - exchange or refund - for some goods, thereby eliminating repair and price offset
as options. Id
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party performing an obligation had to be minimized by the other party.%
The new consumer protection law may not allow these limitations to
survive. The act prohibits the dilution of consumer rights by administra-
tive dictate. Article 1 provides that the Federation's consumer rights
legislation includes this enactment and any other "legislative acts" based
on this law.' The law further states that Ministries may not pass
"normative acts" on the subject and the Federation republics may not pass
laws less protective of consumer rights.98 The law manifests an intent to
create a self-contained body of law which cannot be modified absent
further parliamentary action. Apart from the language of the statute, an
additional reason to interpret the law literally is that the previous
administrative limitations on consumer rights were designed, in large part,
to protect the interests of state-run enterprises. 99 As these enterprises are
privatized, the government's interest in protecting them presumably will
diminish. 0°
To the extent the consumer act guarantees consumers choice among
remedies, it is consistent with a 1990 decision of the recently created
Constitutional Supervision Committee.' 0 ' The Committee considered a
constitutional challenge to several ministry regulations that diluted
96. See IoFFE, supra note 18, at 168. RSFSR Civil Code § 168 embodies this principle:
"[E]ach party must perform his duties in the way most economical for the socialist national
economy, and assist the other party in every possible way to perform his own duties." A
variant of this appears in the civil codes of other countries as a check on the "excessive" use
of individual rights and as a way of injecting morality into contractual relations. See Cheryl
W. Gray et al., The Legal Framework for Private Sector Development in a Transitional
Economy: The Case of Poland, 22 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 283, 313 (1992).
97. Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, art. 1(1).
98. Id. arts. 1(2), 1(3). In addition, article 2 has an interesting choice of law provision when
a transaction implicates the laws of more than one republic. If the consumer is seeking tort-like
damages for personal or property damage, the consumer may choose the law of the place where
the suit was filed or the law of the place where the injury occurred. If the consumer seeks
redress for a breach of other rights (warranty-type recoveries), the law of the place of purchase
applies.
99. See IomE, supra note 18, at 217.
100. This limitation on administrative decrees contrasts with the provisions regulating
service liability discussed infra, where the act makes specific reference to "sectoral service
regulations" that will supplement the provisions of the consumer act. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 145-46.
101. Order of the Constitutional Supervision Committee, Sept. 4, 1990. The Committee,
which is the rough equivalent of a constitutional court, was created in the 1988 amendments
to the Soviet Constitution. The Committee has 27 members elected for 10 year terms. KONST.
SSSR (1977, as amended 1990), art. 12b, translated in BAsIc DOCUMENTS ON THE SOVIET
LEGAL SYSTEM 3,31-32 (William E. Butler ed., 1991) [hereinafter BASIC SOVIET DOCUMENTS].
It has the power to annul acts subject to being overruled by a two-thirds vote of the Parliament.
John Quigley, Law Reform and the Soviet Courts, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 59, 64-65
(1990).
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consumer's statutory rights in the retail trade.' 2 The challenge main-
tained that the regulations, which narrowed the consumer rights to
demand exchanges and refunds as recognized under the Civil Code,
violated Article 39 of the USSR Constitution, which guaranteed citizens
the full protection of rights proclaimed under Soviet laws. The case
reflected longstanding debate in the Soviet Union over the supremacy of
Parliamentary acts versus administrative decrees. 0 3 The Committee's
order directed the Procurator to seek the termination of all administrative
regulations governing retail sales that were inconsistent with the remedial
provisions of the Civil Code. The order also called on the Parliament to
enact statutes replacing those regulations. The consumer act implements
the Committee's latter directive.
The second limitation under the Civil Code, the principle of
maximum economy or "social co-existence," required all contracting
parties to perform their duties in the way most beneficial to the planned
economy and to assist the other party in "every possible way" to perform
his own duties."°  In a consumer context, this might be used, for
example, to require a consumer to give the seller an opportunity to repair
an item before taking it to a third party, or to abrogate the consumer's
right to cancellation and reimbursement when the defect is minor and can
easily be repaired by the seller. The continuing legal effect of this
principle is uncertain, however, as the economy moves away from its
socialist heritage. The requirement that performance of obligations
promotes socialist economic principles becomes less appropriate as the
private sector grows. Nevertheless, the second aspect of the doctrine -
the general directive that one contracting party assist the other in the
performance of his duties, or at least not take action making such
performance more difficult or expensive - serves a useful purpose in the
new market economy as well. In this context, the principle operates like
the common law doctrine of mitigation of damages, which prevents a
consumer from increasing the cost of his remedy when a less expensive,
equally suitable, alternative is available. It thus makes sense for the
principle to survive in this form as a means of preventing unnecessary
102. At issue were rules of exchange for merchandise purchased through retail chains,
imported furniture purchased in government and cooperative stores, automobile and motorcycle
purchases, and shoes purchased in government and cooperative stores.
103. Former Supreme Court Chief Justice Vladimir Terebilov and other Soviet lawyers had
criticized the court system for not empowering judges to declare administrative acts that
contradict statutes unenforceable. A court could choose to apply a statute over an inconsistent
regulation in an individual case, but it could not suspend the regulation prospectively if it
recognized its illegality. Quigley, supra note 101, at 64; John Quigley, Soviet Courts
Undergoing Major Reforms, 22 INT'L LAW. 459, 463 (1988).
104. See supra note 96.
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economic hardship. Whether it does, however, may depend on whether
Article 1 of the statute will also be interpreted as overriding this
alternative source of limiting statutory consumer rights.
One of the remedial provisions that may be overreaching is the
consumer's right to return a product (other than food) in exchange for a
similar one at any time within two weeks after purchase, even if the
product is not defective. 5 The law guarantees a right to exchange goods
that simply do not suit the buyer in style or color, or that seem inade-
quate for some other reason. If an exchange is not immediately available,
the consumer is entitled to a refund. Although this right was also
recognized under previous decrees,"° it created few hardships for state
enterprises in the planned economy because consumer goods were often
in short supply and merchants could usually dispose of the returned goods
to another customer without losing revenue. As consumer goods become
more abundant, this right becomes costly to lost-volume merchants in a
market economy since the merchant may not be able to sell the returned
item to a subsequent customer. Moreover, even though many merchants
would probably offer a liberal refund/exchange policy to maintain good
customer relations without a legal mandate, some merchants might prefer
to maintain a policy that all sales are final, as is often the practice in
discount stores and second-hand shops, or that only store credit will be
given. 0 7 The law appears to remove these options.
Another right that may increase costs is a requirement that consumers
be given free loaners when they return a durable good (like a television
or washing machine) to the seller for repair or when they seek a product
replacement that is not immediately available. 08 Like a liberal exchange
policy, a practice of providing loaners to customers is not uncommon
among merchants who desire to maintain good customer relations.
Although the law will only affect those merchants who would otherwise
choose not to keep a sufficient stock of loaners on hand, those affected
will include most new sellers in the transition years when consumer
goods remain scarce and merchants are small and undercapitalized. For
many businesses this burden may not be trivial, and one wonders how
many retail sellers will be able to comply. A related burden is a
requirement that if a customer requests repair or replacement of defective
105. See Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, art. 23.
106. See IOFFE, supra note 18, at 157.
107. See REICH & MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN GERMANY, supra note 29, at 243.
108. Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, arts. 19 (repairs) and 20 (replacements
unavailable). The law provides that the government will promulgate a list of durables for
which loaners will not be mandated. Id. art. 19.
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goods weighing more than five kilograms, the merchant must either pick
up the good at the customer's residence or reimburse the customer for the
cost of delivery.t "9 For heavy products, this provision is justified as
supporting a legitimate consumer expectation. If a refrigerator breaks
down, the consumer does not expect to have to take it back to the
merchant at her own expense. Indeed, the laws of other nations"' often
provide that the costs of transporting defective goods must be paid by the
merchant. The five kilogram threshold, however, seems overly protective
and could be subject to consumer abuse.
b. The Consumer's Choice of Responsible Parties
The act continues the theme of offering consumers generous remedial
choices by providing that warranty-type claims for defective goods may
be asserted against either the seller or the producer."' The Russian civil
law had recognized direct claims against producers as well." 2  This
approach differs from the law of many nations, where the consumer is
precluded from claiming "lost value" damages directly from the producer
unless the producer gave a warranty creating privity of contract.
Compensation for the reduced value of the product itself (rather than
injury to the person or to other property) has traditionally been rooted in
contract law, and the consumer has no contractual relationship with a
remote producer. "3  While there are exceptions (e.g., France and
109. Id. art. 17(6).
110. See, e.g., REICH & MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN GERMANY, supra note 29,
at 239-40 (German Civil Code art. 476(a) imposes on seller the costs of transportation, labor,
and materials for repairs).
111. See Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, art. 17(5) ("Sellers, or producers, or their
representatives shall accept defective articles from customers and satisfy their claims .... );
art. 19 ("A product's defects shall be repaired by the producers or their representatives within
ten days, or by the sellers or their representatives within twenty days upon the presentation of
the consumer's claims."); art. 20 ([S]ellers (producers or their representatives) shall replace the
faulty article immediately or within twenty days ...."). The predecessor to this statute
adopted the same view. See USSR Consumer Law, supra note 16, arts. 6, 7.
112. See IoFFE, supra note 18, at 196. Article 77(2) of the Fundamentals of Civil
Legislation provides that where the seller is not the producer, the buyer of a defective product
may claim free repair or replacement from either the seller, the provider, or organizations
established by the producer for repair and service. Other remedies (e.g., refund, price
reduction, or reimbursement of repair costs) are available only from the seller. Fundamentals
of Civil Legislation, supra note 47, art. 77(2).
113. See REICH & MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN THE EC COUNTRIES, supra note
38, at 109-110; Reich, Analysis of EEC Council Directive, supra note 39. In the United
States, several courts have permitted recovery for "lost value" damages by consumer buyers
against remote manufacturers. See Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska
1976); Smith v. Platt Motors, Inc., 137 So. 2d 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); State Farm
Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 110 N.W. 2d 449 (Iowa 1961); Santor v. A &
M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A. 2d 305 (N.J. 1965); Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers,
557 S.W. 2d 77 (Tex. 1977). The mounting charge against the "citadel" of contractual privity
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Belgium),' l4 a consumer's only recourse often is against the merchant
who sold her the product.
This aspect of Russian law, far from a costly overextension, is an
enlightened rejection of traditional contract principles. In the modem
world of mass produced consumer products, the manufacturer is usually
the party responsible for the defect."5 If the consumer finds it more
convenient, less costly, or necessary to bypass the retailer and seek
redress directly from the producer, she should be free to do so. Western
arguments in support of retaining the contract law distinction have their
origin in commercial contract disputes, where courts were disinclined to
upset the bargain struck by the contracting parties. Their application to
consumer transactions, where the pretense of bargain is largely fictional,
has long been suspect." 6 Russian law advances the international trend
whereby manufacturers are more frequently held liable on contract-like
theories, particularly when the retail seller is insolvent or otherwise
unavailable."7 The law may be particularly helpful to Russian consumers
in the early years of the transition period, because many of the new
has been gaining force in recent years, but the majority of states still honor the doctrine,
particularly when the consumer is seeking to revoke acceptance and obtain a refund from the
manufacturer (as opposed to seeking damages for some product related injury). DEE PRIDGEN,
CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW § 13.07[2] (1986). Compare Durfee v. Rod Baxter
Imports, Inc., 262 N.W. 2d 349 (Minn. 1977) (revocation permitted against remote distribution
of automobile) with Gasque v. Mooers Motor Car Co., 313 S.E. 2d 384 (Va. 1984) (revocation
only available against immediate contracting seller). In England, remote purchasers may have
recourse against the manufacturer for purely economic loss on a negligence theory, although
the availability of this doctrine to consumers is questionable. See BORRIE, supra note 39, at
28-30; WALKER, supra note 90, at 30.
114. See CALAIS-AULOY ET AL., supra note 65, at 27; MARCEL FONTAINE & THIERRY
BOURGOIGNIE, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN BELGIUM AND LUXEMBOURG 1 263-64 (1982);
REICH & MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN THE EC COUNTRIES, supra note 38, at
109-110 (noting possible direct action against manufacturer in the Netherlands).
115. See Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305, 309 (N.J. 1965) (retail seller
is usually just a "conduit" between the manufacturer and the consumer). See also WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 67, § 11-5.
116. The injuries typically at issue in a commercial dispute involving a product defect are
the loss in value of the product itself, plus lost profits that would have resulted from use of the
product. Since the latter could far exceed the value of the product, courts are reluctant to hold
the remote manufacturer liable when it did not agree to assume that risk in the contract.
Presumably, the purchaser paid less for the product because no manufacturer's warranty was
included. See East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
Moreover, the remote manufacturer may not know the particular use intended by the ultimate
buyer, so it is difficult to protect against the risk through pricing or insurance. The rationale
breaks down in a consumer purchase for two reasons: the economic loss is usually just the
value of the product itself, so insuring against its loss is not difficult, and the consumer has no
effective bargaining power in the transaction. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161
A. 2d 69, 81-84 (N.J. 1960).
117. See, e.g., Saskatchewan Consumer Products Warranty Act, R.S.S., ch. C-30, discussed
in Louis J. Romero, The Consumer Products Warranty Act, 43(No.2) SASK. L. REV. 81 (1979).
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retailers will be operating out of temporary locations or will go out of
business shortly after beginning operations."' Many producers, however,
will be larger and more financially stable. Also, the law may create some
efficiencies since retailers who compensate consumers may be able to
obtain reimbursement from manufacturers for defects caused by the
manufacturer. The consumer act allows consumers to avoid the
middleman by placing responsibility where it belongs in the first instance.
As between the manufacturer and the retailer, the manufacturer will often
be better equipped to repair a defect at a lower cost due to economies of
scale.
The law contains some other procedural provisions that may prove
costly, or at least a nuisance, to merchants while providing the consumer
with comparatively little benefit. One provision allows consumers to
present claims against producers in the consumer's domicile and requires
remote producers to designate claim-settling representatives to resolve
disputes." 9 Producers must inform consumers of the identity of their
claim-settling representatives and must compensate these representatives
for their expenses plus ten percent.' 20 If applied literally, this could
require producers to designate agents in virtually every city of the
Federation where their customers reside.' 2' For large, state-owned
manufacturers with comprehensive distribution networks, this may not be
an extraordinary burden because they will have sales representatives
throughout the Federation performing other functions. Smaller producers
who are trying to compete with the state monopolies, however, may find
it difficult and costly to associate reliable agents in every region. These
producers could reasonably fulfill their responsibilities through less costly
means, such as requiring consumers to ship the defective product to a
central office at the producer's expense. 2 2 By requiring claim-settling
representatives throughout the Federation, the consumer act may inflict
disproportionate hardship on the new entrepreneurs to the advantage of
the old guard.
118. See infra text accompanying notes 307-08.
119. Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, art. 17(2), gives consumers a choice of
bringing the claim at the place of purchase or in the buyer's domicile. Cf. art. 16 (legal actions
to enforce consumer rights (as opposed to out-of-court claims presented to the merchant), may
be brought at the place of the consumer's residence, the defendant's residence, or the place
where the injury occurred).
120. Id. art. 17(2); art. 8(2) (must disclose addresses of entities authorized to receive
complaints and repair products).
121. See Maggs, supra note 5.
122. This assumes, of course, that the Russian mail delivery system improves its efficiency
over current practices.
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3. Service Liability
The consumer protection programs of most nations focus primarily
on the sale of goods. Comprehensive regulation of consumer services
(e.g., appliance repairs, dry cleaning, home improvement construction) is
less common, not because services are less important to consumers, but
because the quality of services is more difficult to monitor and influence
through general legislation. 2 3  For goods, the object of control is a
tangible product, often mass produced in standardized form and sold
through non-producing merchants. Product quality can be evaluated by
comparing it to other similar products. For services, the object of control
is not simply a tangible item, although a product may be the result. A
service is a variable human activity, often performed by individuals or
small businesses directly for the consumer.'24 The object of concern is
often not just the result of the service (e.g., a properly cleaned suit), but
also the way in which the service was performed (e.g., in a timely,
professional manner). Contract terms are generally more negotiable
because services are more personal to each consumer. Moreover,
standards of acceptable quality may vary widely among consumers and
producers in various service sectors. Delays in the construction trade, for
instance, may be tolerated much more readily than delays in dry cleaning
or refrigerator repair.
In the absence of general legislation protecting consumers against
delayed or defective services, consumers often must turn to the common
law of contracts or relevant civil code provisions. The safeguards
provided therein can be inadequate, however, because the rules often are
not mandatory; the provider is usually allowed to draft a contract
insulating itself from their effect. In some nations, this problem has been
addressed in part by legislation prohibiting specifically enumerated unfair
contract terms in service agreements (e.g., the German Standard Contracts
Act), thereby making it more difficult to avoid liability by contract. 25 In
123. See CALAIS-AULOY ET AL., supra note 65, at 23.
124. See REICH & MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN GERMANY, supra note 29, at 214.
125. Id. at 235. See also EC proposed directive on unfair contract terms, 1990 O.J. (C 243);
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY 19-40 (Bernd Ruster ed., 1991)(citing Germany:
Standard Contracts Act, 1977; United Kingdom: The Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act,
1973; The Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977; The Sale of Goods Act, 1979; France: Law No.
78-29 on the Protection and Information of Consumers of Goods and Services, Jan. 10, 1978;
Austria: The Consumer Protection Act, March 8, 1979; Sweden: The Unfair Contract Terms
Act, 1971; Spain: Law No. 26/84, Consumer Protection Act, July 19, 1984; Portugal:
Consumer Protection Act, August 22, 1981); see generally, CALAIS-AULOY et al., supra note
65, at 133-35; R. LOWE & G. WOODROFFE, CONSUMER LAW AND PRACTICE 126-146 (1991);
REICH & MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN THE EC COUNTRIES, supra note 38, at
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Anglo-American systems, specific unfair terms may be prohibited by
consumer laws, while others may be deemed unenforceable under the
common law principle of unconscionability.
126
The modem trend is to regulate services more comprehensively
through industry-specific control measures. Three types of regulation are
common, but each has its limitations. The government may require the
licensing of service providers in designated sectors (lawyers, doctors,
plumbers, hairdressers) as a means of ensuring that work is performed by
qualified professionals. 27  Consumers can benefit from licensing
requirements that are properly enforced, but only to a limited degree
because once the license is obtained there is no assurance that a specific
service will be performed in a satisfactory way. A second protective
device is more transaction specific - the direct regulation of certain
industries by dictating acceptable and prohibited activities. Legislation
of this type tends to target commercial sectors that historically have
provoked a high number of consumer complaints, such as correspondence
courses, travel promotions, funeral services, auto repair shops, banking
services, and insurance."' Laws are often drafted with the participation
of the target industry and consumer representatives. While effective at
times, this approach is piecemeal and leaves many service sectors
unregulated. A third type of sector specific regulation is the informal
cooperation of industry representatives, consumers, and government
regulators who agree on standard contracts, codes of practice, and
performance criteria for that industry. These "soft law" approaches have
occasionally been successful, particularly in the developed economies of
North America and Europe,'29 but there are drawbacks. The standards are
usually enforceable only on members of the industry who choose to abide
118-19.
126. See, e.g., Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, discussed in LOWE & WOODROFFE, supra
note 125, at 126-46.
127. On the merits of licensing professionals generally, see BORRIE, supra note 39, at
90-92; Ross CRANSTON, CONSUMERS AND THE LAW 365-95 (2d ed. 1984). Licensing will
clearly be an important mechanism for consumer protection in Russia. The government has
already issued decrees requiring licenses for businesses selling food and manufactured goods.
See On Measures to Protect the Rights of Customers and Prevent Speculation, Oct. 29, 1992,
in RUSSIA AND COMMONWEALTH Bus. L. REP., vol. 3, no. 14 (Buraff, Nov. 13, 1992).
128. See, e.g., REICH & MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN GERMANY, supra note 29,
at 214-16 (correspondence courses); CALAIS-AULOY ET AL., supra note 65, at 24-25 (hotels,
restaurants, camping sites, travel agencies, insurance, correspondence courses, undertakers);
FTC Rule on Funeral Industry Practices, 16 C.F.R. § 453 (1992), and Proprietary Vocational
and Home Study Schools, 16 C.F.R. § 254 (1992); IND. CODE § 24-5-7 (West 1992
supp.)(health spa services).
129. See generally BORRIE, supra note 39, at 74; BOURGOIGNIE & TRUBEK, supra note 23,
at 183-89.
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by them, thus leaving unregulated those who fail to comply out of neglect
and, even worse, the unscrupulous providers who most egregiously harm
consumer interests.' 30 Consumer interests often are under-represented in
the development of the rules, and businesses tend to focus on self-
regulation that restricts competition or limits access to the market.' And
as with piecemeal legislation, entire service sectors may avoid regulation
by not agreeing to any soft law standards.
The Russian consumer protection act creates basic rights and
remedies applicable to all service providers, 132 but it also contemplates
the use of sector-specific regulations. 33  Its framework primarily
addresses the problems of delayed and defective performance of services.
If the provider does not begin the service on time or if it appears that the
performance will not be completed on time, the consumer may give the
provider a new deadline, replace the provider with someone else to
complete the job, reduce the provider's pay, or dissolve the contract and
seek damages. 34 If the consumer dissolves the contract, she need not pay
the provider for part performance.'35 If the consumer sets new deadlines
and the provider fails to meet them, the provider must pay a penalty to
the consumer under a statutory formula. 36 Moreover, the consumer may
dissolve the contract at any time for no reason, even if the provider is
complying with the agreement in all respects, so long as she pays "the
provider fee for the work done" prior to the termination and compensates
130. See BORRIE, supra note 39, at 75; BOURGOIGNIE & TRUBEK, supra note 23, at 184.
131. BOURGOIGNIE & TRUBEK, supra note 23, at 184. Soft law approaches are least likely
to succeed when no independent enforcement mechanism exists to monitor compliance, as is
often the case. See Thierry Bourgoignie, The Need to Reformulate Consumer Protection Policy,
7 J. CoNs. POL'Y 307 (1984). They can also fail when membership in the trade association is
optional and exclusion carries no economic penalty in the marketplace. The association may
have strong pro-consumer guidelines, but with little practical effect. See BORRIE, supra note
39, at 75.
132. Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, arts. 26-38.
133. See, e.g., id. arts. 27, 28, 29(3), 31 and 38.
134. Id. art. 29.
135. Id art. 29(3). The law provides, however, that sectoral service regulations will set
forth "relevant payment specifics." Id. It remains to be seen whether these regulations will
require payment for part performance. In some sectors, such as home construction, consumers
should be required to pay something if the builder performed substantially before breaching the
agreement.
136. The penalty is computed as follows: for services performed at an hourly or daily rate,
three percent of the rate per day or hour; in the absence of a service rate, three percent of the
contract price. Id. art. 29(4). A penalty of three percent of the contract price is relatively
inconsequential, however, unless it is compounded periodically. Nevertheless, the law does not
provide for compounding the penalty in situations where the service fee is a flat rate and not
a daily or hourly charge. The penalty may not exceed the contract price. Id. Other penalties
may be found in sectoral service regulations. Id. art. 31. See also infra text accompanying
notes 279-88.
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for the provider's "direct losses."'' 37
Remedies for defective services are equally liberal. The consumer
may demand free repair of the service, a reduction in price, free
performance of a comparable replacement service (e.g, another shirt
cleaned free of charge) or reimbursement for expenses paid to a third
party who corrected the defect. 38  As with the provisions concerning
defective goods, the statute creates a six month warranty period for
discovering defects (two years for building construction), which can be
extended by contract warranty.139 For "major defects," however, the
provider is liable during the entire life expectancy of the service (as
determined by other laws), or if none has been established, for ten years
after the consumer accepted the service."4 Once defects are brought to
the attention of the provider, they must be corrected within twenty days
unless the contract or a specific sectoral regulation shortens the period.' 41
While these rules favor the consumer liberally, they do not substan-
tially modify consumer rights under the Russian civil law. 42 As with the
civil law guarantees concerning defective goods, however, these rights
were previously limited by special sector-specific rules, often set forth in
model contracts approved by republic ministries. 43 Since these contracts
typically favored the state-operated service provider, the civil law
guarantees were largely fictional. For example, the state contract for the
home construction sector provided that consumers must assert claims for
defective work within five months after completion, even though the civil
law provided a three-year period for discovering defects in building
construction. '44
The consumer act does not offer much guidance on whether such
deviations are still possible. The statute refers several times to sectoral
service regulations that will supplement the rights stated in the consumer
act. 45 Yet article 1 states that government ministries and other depart-
ments may not pass normative acts on consumer rights, and that the
137. Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, art. 32.
138. Id. art. 30.
139. id. art. 30(2).
140. Id. art. 30(3).
141. Id. art. 31.
142. See RSFSR CIVIL CODE, supra note 18, §§ 350-67 (rules governing the "work
contract"); IOFFE, supra note 18, at 252-57.
143. See loFrE, supra note 18, at 256-57. Service contracts for the domestic needs of
consumers are often governed by model contracts for particular trade sectors. Those contracts,
which effectively superseded Civil Code provisions, often omitted civil law protections favoring
the buyer. Id.
144. Id.
145. See supra note 133.
(Vol. 14:739
Empowering the Russian Consumer
constituent republics may not restrict the rights granted under the
consumer act.'46 Since Article 1 applies to both goods and services, this
may mean that the practice of limiting consumer rights through adminis-
trative dictate is supposed to end in both the goods and services sectors.
A reasonable interpretation may be that statutory rights regarding
defective services can be supplemented, clarified, or extended by sectoral
regulations, but cannot be diluted or weakened by administrative means.
The principle of maximum economy may be relevant in limiting a
provider's liability for delayed or defective services. 47 Read literally, the
statute gives consumers an unrestricted choice of several remedies when
services are delayed or defective. In some circumstances, the costs of the
remedy would far exceed any injury received. For example, if the breach
is minor and can be corrected by the provider, allowing the consumer to
cancel the contract or retain the services of a substitute provider could be
extremely disruptive. In a state-run economy, this problem was more
theoretical than practical because the consumer often had no effective
alternative source for the service. Even when contracts were cancelled
and the consumer was able to find another provider, the service would be
performed at the same fixed tariff and under roughly the same proce-
dures. Any monetary injury thus would be minimal." In a private
economy, differences in prices could be large, and the remedies provision
could be abused by consumers who abandon the original provider as soon
as a problem arises and seek to recoup the full cost of replacement
services. Indeed, if the consumer and the substitute provider know that
the original provider must compensate for the cost of completion, there
is little incentive to negotiate a low price for the replacement work.
The statutory right to cancel a services contract at any time, and for
any reason - even if it is being performed in a timely and proficient
manner - can also cause substantial hardship in a market economy,
unless the provider's recovery for losses includes not only "direct
losses,"'49 but also the full range of contract damages. There will be little
economic incentive for consumers to honor a contract after learning that
another provider is willing to perform the service less expensively. If
"direct losses" are limited to out-of-pocket expenses like the cost of
materials already purchased for the job, and exclude lost profits expected
146. See supra text accompanying note 97.
147. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
148. Likewise, if the substitute service was performed by someone working illegally in the
"shadow" economy, any extra expense incurred would be uncollectible from the state
enterprise.
149. Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, art. 32.
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under the agreement,' the value of the contract to the provider is
substantially diminished. To guard against the uncertainty created by this
right, providers may be reluctant to commit resources to long-term
consumer service contracts. Alternatively, they may demand high down
payments before beginning work or raise prices to offset losses from
contracts terminated by customers prematurely. In either case, the
consumer ultimately bears the cost. The provision may reflect the
practical reality that service providers generally do not seek lost profits
from consumers who terminate contracts and often limit their demands to
the value of the worked performed prior to termination. Even so,
allowing consumers to terminate service contracts at will makes planning
difficult for service providers who would like to rely on the consumers'
commitments.
II. IMPROVING THE MARKET-REGULATING PROVISIONS OF THE
RUSSIAN CONSUMER ACT
A. The Liberal Model of Market Regulation
Laws that help markets work more efficiently should be primary
objectives in a consumer protection program because they can both
increase consumer welfare and promote economic growth. Under the
neo-classical, liberal approach to consumer protection, a principal function
of government is to eliminate market conditions that inhibit consumers
from making the most economically efficient purchasing decisions.'
Programs fitting this model include: the elimination of monopolies
through privatization; competition laws that allow enterprises to compete
aggressively for sales; the reduction of tariffs that artificially increase the
price and implicitly distort the value of goods; the control of misleading
advertising that misrepresents the value of goods and services; the
mandating of critical disclosures on product labels or in consumer
contracts so consumers can base buying decisions on more complete and
accurate information; the institution of product grading programs (e.g.,
meat products stamped "Grade A Quality") so consumers can engage in
comparative shopping more easily; the enactment of laws prohibiting
fraud or high-pressure sales tactics so consumers may enter into
150. Damages for lost profits were recoverable under Russian civil law. RSFSR CIVIL
CODE, supra note 18, § 219; IOF, supra note 18, at 178-79, 307-08.
151. See MAYER, supra note 31, at 65-66; Sylvia Lane, The Rationale for Government
Intervention in Seller-Consumer Relationships, 2 POL'Y STUD. REV. 419 (1983). See generally
ROGER M. SWAGLER, CONSUMERS AND THE MARKET (2d ed. 1979).
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transactions willingly; and the creation of consumer education programs
to assist consumers in making the most efficient purchasing decisions. 52
Much consumer protection under the liberal model is aimed at increasing
competition and overcoming information barriers. This creates an
environment where freedom of contract is genuine and free trade is
promoted. The theory is that well-informed consumers who are offered
sufficient market alternatives will spend their money rationally, and the
unscrupulous or inefficient sellers will either improve their products and
services, or go out of business when sales decline. 53  The Russian
government has enacted several laws and decrees designed to help
markets operate more efficiently. Privatization laws are the most
prominent example."5
B. A Critical Analysis of the Russian Law's Approach
The consumer protection act contains only a few market enhancing
provisions, but two areas of primary focus - label disclosures and
regulation of misleading advertising - are particularly important. For
many consumers, the primary sources of information about products,
apart from the sales pitch of the merchant and the word of other
consumers who have used the product, are product labels and advertising
claims. 155  Yet the provisions of the consumer act addressing these
subjects are only brief outlines of general themes, and much more work
needs to be done to make them effective. More troublesome, however,
are the act's references to government programs that could impede the
152. David Cayne & M.J. Trebilcock, Market Considerations in the Formulation of
Consumer Protection Policy, in CONSUMER LAW 30-31, 34 (lain Ramsay ed., 1992); Claus
Offe, Alternative Strategies in Consumer Policy, in CONTRADICTIONS OF THE WELFARE STATE
220 (John Keane ed., 1984); BOURGOIGNIE & TRUBEK, supra note 23, at 8-9; MAYER, supra
note 31, at 65-70.
153. William Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer Transactions,
1973 Wis. L. REV. 400, 403.
154. See Vladimir Andreev, The Privatization of State Enterprises in Russia, 18 REV. CENT.
& E. EUR. L. 265 (1992) (analyzing Russia's Law on Privatization and the operation of the
privatization program); Olga Floroff & Susan Tiefenbrun, A Legal Framework for Soviet
Privatization, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 849 (1991) (reviewing laws that promote free enterprise). For
a review of privatization laws in Russia through September 1992, see Kaj Hober, The New
October Revolution: Launching the Russian Privatization Program, SURV. E. EUR. L., Oct.
1992, at 1. Cf. Jeffrey Sachs, Privatization in Russia: Some Lessons from Eastern Europe,
AM. ECON. REV., May 1992, at 43 (critique of privatization in Poland).
155. See REICH & MICKUITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN GERMANY, supra note 29, at 243.
The mislabeling of products has been a frequent source of frustration for Russian consumers
in the early years of market reform, especially the pirating of Western brand names and
misrepresentions concerning the country of production. See, e.g., LYUX Fashion Center
Advertises a Fake, CHESTNOYE SLovo, Nov. 17, 1991, at 1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
SBE File (20,000 counterfeit "Levi's" jeans sold).
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development of consumer markets. These programs include a continuing
role for government-mandated product and service standards that interfere
with market based decisions by regulating product quality directly via
administrative dictate. Thus, the act foreshadows a continuance of the
state's heavy hand in setting mandatory standards where none are
justified, a policy that could needlessly restrict consumer choice among
varied products and services. This section examines how each of these
three market-influencing features of the consumer act might be improved
to benefit consumers in the early years of market transformation.
1. Product Label Disclosures
The disclosure directives in the Russian statute 156 create a general
framework for labeling requirements, but much more needs to be done
before consumers will realize any benefit. These sections set forth a
laundry list of information that must be disclosed on product labels or in
other conspicuous written material, leaving the details to be worked out
in subsequent legislation. The consumer act contemplates that these laws
will focus on specific product groups and will provide the details for
manufacturers to disclose the following types of information: ingredient
lists, weights and volume, calorie content, the presence and amount of
harmful substances (compared with lawful tolerances), price terms and
conditions, warranties (if any), instructions for effective and safe use,
service life and expiration period, addresses of entities authorized to
repair or replace defective products, warnings for potentially hazardous
materials, and compliance with any mandatory certification require-
ments. 157
The aforementioned types of disclosure are standard fare in most
consumer protection schemes.'58 Mandating the form and content of basic
156. The principal provisions addressing information disclosure are in the Law on Consumer
Rights, supra note 2, arts. 6-10. Some of the information directives are unexceptional:
producers must make their corporate names and locations known to consumers; traders must
have signboards stating their specialization company name, business hours, and address. Id.
art. 7. Others are more vague and could be subject to abuse - e.g., sellers, producers, and
providers must inform consumers of their "business techniques" and "routines," id., and
consumers may demand information about a business' "mode of operation and output." Id. art.
6. General demands of this sort can, at the very least, become a nuisance and if applied
literally could threaten to devalue important trade secrets and other competitive advantages.
There comes a point at which information about a business is no longer relevant to a
consumer's purchasing decision, but is being demanded only for purposes of harassment or
economic espionage. The consumer law does not place any limits in this regard.
157. Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, art. 8.
158. In the EC, labelling legislation exists in two forms. In some countries, a single act of
legislation delegates the task of regulating product disclosures in all sectors to a particular
agency or agencies. See REICH & MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN THE EC COUNTRIES,
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disclosure, in theory at least, allows consumers to make more intelligent
purchasing decisions. Businesses tend not to object strongly to such
disclosure legislation because implementation costs are usually low.'59
Moreover, disclosure can reduce the likelihood that unscrupulous traders
will mislead consumers and lure them away from more forthright
competitors. Disclosure laws are thus supported by merchants who want
to ensure that all are competing under the same basic rules.'60 Although
studies show that in more developed, highly competitive economies
consumers read mandatory disclosures less carefully since the differences
among competing products are often marginal, 16' in less developed
economies, where product content and quality can vary widely, disclo-
sures are taken more seriously. 62 Even in more competitive economies,
producers are kept honest by the consumers who do read labels as sellers
compete for the business of that marginal group. 63 An additional benefit
of product disclosure in a new market economy is cultivating the
supra note 38, at 29-30 (describing, e.g., Belgium: Act on Commercial Practices, July 14, 1971
(granting regulative authority to the King to ensure market fairness); Denmark: Act on
Marketing Practices, June 14, 1974 (general power given to the Minister of Commerce; prior
to issuing regulations, the Ministry must consult relevant businesses and consumer organiza-
tions); United Kingdom: Trade Descriptions Act of 1968 (as amended in 1972)(empowers the
Department of Trade to ensure that goods are marked appropriately; under duty to encourage
trade associations to prepare codes of practice for their members); France: Act No. 78/23 On
the Protection of Information to Consumers for Products and Services, Jan. 10, 1978 (delegates
regulatory powers to competent ministries)). In other nations, special laws on particular
subjects or market sectors (e.g., food, drugs, cosmetics) define the scope of authority more
narrowly. See BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY, supra note 125, § 19.02(2) (describing,
e.g., Germany: Ordinance on the Identification of Foodstuffs, Jan. 25, 1972, amended Dec. 22,
1981; Ordinance on the Indication of the Nutritional Value of Foodstuffs, Dec. 9, 1977; the
Marketing of Additives Ordinance, Dec. 16, 1977; The Ordinance on Cosmetics, Dec. 16,1977;
The Textile Labelling Act, Aug. 25, 1972). The Russian consumer act does not name the
agency that will have regulatory authority over labelling requirements.
159. See Whitford, supra note 153, at 431-32, 459-60. This is not always the case,
however. It may, for example, be costly for the seller to acquire the information that must be
disclosed. Id. at 432 n.108.
160. Indeed, most of the extensively regulated industries prefer being regulated to
competing, and actively seek regulatory outcomes that accommodate their interests. The
sheltered life of a regulated firm is more predictable than life in a vigorously competitive
market. Michael J. Trebilcock, Winners and Losers in the Modern Regulatory System: Why
Must the Consumer Always Lose?, 13 OSGOOD HALL L. J. 619, 627 (1975). See generally
GEORGE STIGLER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC REGULATION (1971).
161. See Whitford, supra note 153, at 403-04; Homer Kripke, Gesture and Reality in
Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1969); Eric Schapper, Note, Consumer
Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745, 767-68 (1967).
162. Consumers in less developed countries tend to be persistent information seekers
because product quality varies so greatly and reliable information is scarce. Prevailing practices
of traders adulterating products to enhance profits make accurate (and enforceable) label
disclosures highly valued. See Thorelli, supra note 37, at 147-48. See generally NAYAK,
supra note 7, ch. 4 (discussing the problems of food adulteration and mislabeling in India).
163. Whitford, supra note 153, at 431.
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appearance, at least, that the emerging merchant class is behaving in an
honest, forthright manner."
Mandatory disclosure can be particularly helpful in the early years of
market transformation because many Russian industries will lack effective
competition, and market incentives to disclose relevant product character-
istics will therefore continue to be weak.' In competitive markets, there
are incentives for sellers to provide relevant product information and to
expose the false claims of competitors.'6 If the seller is a monopolist,
however, it may concentrate its promotional efforts on public image
advertising to increase consumer demand because it need not emphasize
product qualities, or even price, to maintain its market position. Even in
oligopolistic markets, a seller may shun disclosure of product characteris-
tics for fear of triggering mutually disadvantageous competition when
others retaliate by doing the same. This reasoning leads to an avoidance
of price cutting as well. All may individually conclude that avoiding
certain kinds of disclosure is in their collective interest, especially when
no single firm has a decisive competitive advantage that can be exploited
with disclosure.
Moreover, large, dominant sellers may avoid disclosure when the
information would open opportunities for smaller competitors to enter the
field or increase their market share. Before the government mandated
disclosure of gasoline octane levels in the United States, for example,
only one national oil company voluntarily disclosed this information to
its customers. 67 One reason for withholding octane information was that
prominent disclosure would have made it easier for consumers to learn
that the octane levels of the large gasoline producers were roughly
equivalent to those of smaller, independent producers whose prices were
164. See supra note 12.
165. See supra note 72.
166. In a perfectly competitive economy with no restrictions on truthful advertising, it might
be argued that mandatory disclosure laws are unnecessary. If the information is important to
consumers (i.e, relevant to the purchasing decision) and makes the product more attractive, the
seller will disclose it. If the information is important but makes the product less attractive, the
seller's competitors will disclose it through comparative advertising. Only unimportant
information, or facts too complex for consumers to process, would be held back. Even in a
perfectly competitive economy, however, mandatory disclosures can ensure that the same
information is disclosed in the same manner by all market participants, thereby facilitating
comparative shopping. See, e.g., Council Directive 79/112, 1979 O.J. (L 33) 1 (food labeling:
product name, ingredients, quantity, durability, storing conditions, producer, origin, and use);
Council Directive 89/395, 1989 O.J. (L 186) 17 (ways of disclosing food additives and
perishability dates). See generally George Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL.
EcON. 213 (1961); Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation
of Advertising, 90 HARV. L. REv. 661, 663-67 (1977); Whitford, supra note 153, at 428.
167. Pitofsky, supra note 166, at 665, citing STATEMENT OF BASIS AND PURPOSE FOR TRR
REQUIRING POSTING OF MINIMUM OCTANE RATINGS 4, 9-10 (1971).
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lower. Since the smaller producers had insufficient resources to advertise
this fact effectively to the public, mandating disclosure of octane ratings
fostered price competition industrywide.' 6  All of this suggests that
consumers in Russia could benefit from mandatory disclosure in many
noncompetitive industries, and that regulators may want to consider
requiring additional disclosure in targeted commercial sectors beyond the
very limited requirements set forth in the consumer act.' 69
The Russian lawmakers' decision to enact a general framework
disclosure law, with more specific regulations governing particular
products to follow, is consistent with the mandatory disclosure programs
of other countries. 7° In the modern world, the immense variety of
available consumer goods makes it virtually impossible to create a
detailed labelling statute of general applicability. The most effective
disclosure regulations emerge when knowledgeable industry representa-
tives, consumer organizations, and government regulators can agree on a
low-cost method for making specific disclosures that give consumers
enough information, in an easily understood format, to facilitate
comparative shopping and safe use of the product.' The objective is to
provide information relevant to the purchasing decision without overload-
ing the consumer with details that will dilute the effect of the most
relevant terms.
The principal defect in the Russian framework disclosure law is that
it permits the details of product-related disclosure to be decided by the
separate republican governments within the Federation rather than central
Russian authorities.'72 This may reflect a compromise designed to quell
168. Pitofsky, supra note 166, at 665.
169. Possible candidates include information concerning the durability of light bulbs, 16
C.F.R. § 409.1 (1992), tar and nicotine content for cigarettes, fuel efficiency of automobiles,
16 C.F.R. §§ 259.1, 259.2 (1992), efficiency of electrical appliances and furnaces, and the
performance characteristics of tires. See Pitofsky, supra note 166, at 664. If too much
information is put on a label, however, the label begins to resemble a fine print contract and
the consumer will. probably ignore it. See Whitford, supra note 153, at 443-44.
170. See REICH & MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN THE EC COUNTRIES, supra note
38, at 29.
171. As Russian regulators begin to create these product-specific disclosure requirements,
they should be careful to ensure that any disclosure requirements are compatible with
international norms on the same subject, particularly EC directives. Compatibility will make
it easier for Russian producers to export their goods without modifications to the substance of
disclosures on product labels, although translations or multiple language disclosures will often
be necessary. Harmonization with the laws of other nations will also help open the Russian
market to imports of foreign goods by eliminating one of the potential obstacles to free trade.
See infra text accompanying notes 238-40.
172. Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, art. 8(1).
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regional dissatisfaction with authority of the federal government, 73 but it
is one area where uniformity is highly desirable. The republics should
coordinate, if not consolidate, their efforts. Most labeling laws in the
United States are mandated by federal law, 174 and for the past twenty
years the EC has been working to harmonize disclosure laws as a key
component of its effort to eliminate trade barriers among member
states.175  One of the principal objectives of disclosure legislation is to
make it easier for consumers to compare similar products marketed in
their region. If inter-republic commerce is to be promoted, and consum-
ers are to get the maximum benefit from this legislation, the information
should be standardized, in content and form, for products manufactured
and sold anywhere in the Federation.
2. Advertising and Other Representations
The other significant provision of the consumer act that fits the liberal
model is a tentative provision dealing with misleading information and
advertising. The law provides that consumers have recourse against a
purveyor of misleading or incomplete information in three situations: (1)
if the product does not exhibit the advertised characteristics the consumer
may revoke the sale and claim a refund; (2) if the consumer cannot use
the product "as intended" she may demand an "exhaustive explanation"
from the seller and revoke the sale if the explanation is not provided; and
(3) if the consumer or her property is injured as a result of a misleading
or incomplete statement she may recover her damages. 176
The significance of these declarations is their implicit acknowledge-
ment that advertising messages and omissions in disclosures can create
implied promises of product quality enforceable under the law. The first
and third declarations restate some of the remedies for breach of warranty
and product liability, respectively, when a product deviates from
173. It may also reflect Constitutional concerns over the relative powers of the Federation
and its autonomous republics.
174. See Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-61 (1988); BOURGOIGNIE
& TRUBEK, supra note 23, at 14. An additional reason to federalize consumer protection laws
is that some republics may be reluctant to enact strong legislation for fear of losing businesses
to other republics where regulations are less rigorous. Cf. id. (describing the problem generally).
175. See Council Directive 79/112, 1979 O.J. (L 33) 1, as amended by Commission
Directive 83/463, 1983 O.J. (L 255) 1; Council Directive 89/395, 1989 O.J. (L 186) 17
(establishing minimum advertising and labeling requirements for EC foodstuffs); Council
Directive 79/581, 1979 O.J. (L 158) 19, as amended by Council Directive 88/315, 1988 O.J.
(L 142) 23 (establishing selling price and unit price labeling requirements for EC foodstuffs);
Council Directive 90/496, 1990 O.J. (L 276) 40 (establishing nutrition labeling requirements
for EC foodstuffs). See generally Consumer Policy, EuROSCOPE (Coopers & Lybrand, Feb. 20,
1992) available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Eurscp File.
176. Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, art. 10.
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advertised properties.' They thus have the effect of incorporating
advertising claims into the contract with the consumer.
The significance of the second declaration is less clear. It is not
apparent what benefit a consumer derives from receiving an explanation
of the reasons for a product not performing as he believed it would. If,
for instance, a misleading advertisement caused a consumer to believe
mistakenly that a vacuum cleaner would pick up small stones, a detailed
explanation of how the advertisement was made and the mechanical
reasons for the failure will hardly be satisfying. The law does not state
that the explanation must satisfy the consumer or some impartial arbiter,
but only that one be promptly provided. This provision could be more
narrowly interpreted, however, as requiring the merchant to inform the
consumer about the proper use of the product (i.e., explain the operating
instructions) upon demand. This is hardly an unreasonable burden, but
mandating it under the law seems unnecessary in a market economy
where customer satisfaction is the key to success. While inadequate
explanations may have been a problem in the centrally planned economy,
merchants in an open market will want to maintain good customer
relations and will gladly explain how to use a product upon request.
Moreover, because the consumer act gives buyers a liberal right to return
even nondefective goods for no reason within two weeks after pur-
chase, 78 merchants will, whenever possible, provide explanations to
prevent a return during this period. The law would appear to benefit
consumers only in situations where the period for return has expired and
the merchant does not know how to operate a product she sells. In such
a case, the law permits the consumer to demand a refund, thereby placing
the risk of ignorance on the seller, and encouraging merchants to better
understand the operation of their inventory.
More comprehensive legislation on misleading advertising is clearly
needed. Other nations typically have more expansive regulatory
frameworks dealing with deceptive advertising, 79 and, while their
177. The Russian law is thus similar to Luxembourg legislation that essentially makes
advertising part of the sale contract and permits recission or price reduction if those terms are
breached. See Thomas Trumpy, Consumer Protection and Product Liability: Europe and the
EEC, 11 N.C. J. INT'L & COMM. REG. 322, 325-26 n.12 (1986).
178. See supra text accompanying note 105.
179. See, e.g., Council Directive 84/450, 1984 O.J. (L 250) 17 (directing harmonization of
EC member state laws concerning misleading advertising). Liability for using false or
misleading representations is imposed under the law of most European countries. See, e.g.,
Marketing Practices Act, No. 1418 (1975), as amended by No. 233 §§ 3, 6
(1980)(Swed.)(omission of material information may lead to court ordered disclosure;
intentional violations result in fines or imprisonment); Marketing Practices Act, No. 297 § 2
(1974)(Den.); REICH & MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN THE EC COUNTRIES, supra note
38, at 40-64.
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programs differ, they generally address the same core issues. At a
minimum, the law should define what types of representations are subject
to control. Not all advertising and promotional messages need be
considered guarantees of quality. The law may cover only claims made
privately by salespersons, or it could also include representations made
publicly through mass media; it could apply only to affirmations made in
writing and not to oral statements or pictorial displays; it may cover
innocent misrepresentations, or be limited to negligent or intentional
deception; it might govern statements of fact but not of value or opinion,
or explicit but not implicit messages. 8° The EC directive on misleading
advertising, for example, includes a broad definition of covered represen-
tations.' 81 This expanded the scope of advertising laws in some member
states which have had to adjust their legislation accordingly. 82
A related issue is the extent to which comparative advertisements
should be permitted. If they are factual, comparative advertisements can
help consumers evaluate the relative merits of competing products. In the
early years of the Russian market economy, comparative advertisements
may be particularly useful as entrepreneurs try to establish a market
presence. Large enterprises that control a market sector will have the
resources to dominate advertising media to maintain their positions. Until
a challenger's product or service has acquired a reputation in the
community, comparisons with the stronger competition may be one of the
most effective ways to inform consumers and increase sales. In North
America, comparative advertising is common, but in Europe it has often
been restricted on grounds that it is either inherently misleading or
180. Legislation in EC countries generally provides that the statement must contain some
factual content and must be made in the course of business. Some variations exist, however.
German law generally prohibits misleading claims, whether made in public or private, in
writing or verbally. See REICH & MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN THE EC COUNTRIES,
supra note 38, at 44. The controlling United Kingdom statute does not apply to claims with
ambiguous meaning, or claims of value or availability of goods. Id. at 44-45. The
Luxembourg statute concerns false representations about the nature, origin, method of
production, quality, destination, or conditions of sale. Id. at 44. In Germany, Belgium, and
Luxembourg, negligence is not necessary for an injunction, but is required if damages are
sought. Il at 47.
181. The Directive states:
"Misleading advertising" means any advertising which in any way, including its
presentation, deceives or is likely to deceive the persons to whom it is addressed or whom
it reaches and which, by reason of its deceptive nature, is likely to affect their economic
behaviour or which, for those reasons, injures or is likely to injure a competitor.
Council Directive 84/450, art. 2(2), 1984 O.J. (L 250) 17, 18. See LowE & WOoDRoFnE, supra
note 125, at 286-91 (discussing directive in the context of British advertising regulation).
182. See Norbert Reich, Protection of Consumers' Economic Interests by the EC, 14
SYDNEY L. REV. 23, 36-38 (1992).
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constitutes an unfair appropriation and use of a competitor's trade mark
or name.
183
A recently adopted Russian law on unfair competition addresses this
issue in part by prohibiting advertisements that "incorrectly" compare the
products of another, but that key qualifying term is left undefined.' 8" A
proposed EC directive on comparative advertising attempts to create some
objective criteria and may prove useful, particularly in determining
whether use of a competitor's trade name or mark is inappropriate.
Under the proposal, use of another's name or mark cannot "cause
confusion in the market" or "capitalize on the reputation" of a competi-
tor. 8 5 These are both legitimate concerns in Russia as well. Businesses
must be confident that the money and effort they devote to establishing
a recognizable trade name or mark will not benefit a competitor who uses
the symbols in an advertisement designed principally to misappropriate
the goodwill of the product without making an informative comparison.
A comparative advertisement should only be allowed. if its dominant
effect is to provide accurate information that promotes a more rational
purchasing decision. The EC proposed directive may be overbroad,
however, by limiting lawful comparative advertising to claims that do not
"discredit, denigrate or bring contempt upon a competitor."'8 6  If
interpreted literally, this could be used to challenge most comparative
claims because their principal purpose is usually to discredit or denigrate
another's product in comparison with one's own. Similar language in the
183. Cf. REICH & MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN THE EC COUNTRIES, supra note
38, at 53 (asserting that comparative advertising is prohibited or limited in most EC countries).
The laws of England and Ireland only prohibit comparative advertising if it is defamatory, and
in Denmark comparative advertising is lawful if it conforms to standards of truthfulness and
fairness. Id. Concern about misappropriation of a competitor's trade mark or name stems from
legislation in many countries that prohibits the use of another's trademark or name in the
course of trade. See Council Directive 89/104, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1 (directing partial
harmonization of EC member states' trademark laws). For a discussion of comparative
advertising on the United states, see Paul T. Hayden, A Goodly Apple Rotten at the Heart:
Commercial Disparagement in Comparative Advertising as Common-Law Tortious Unfair
Competition, 76 IOWA L. Rav. 67 (1990); in Europe, see Reich, supra note 182, at 38-39.
Even in the United States, explicit comparative advertising on television was restricted until
relatively recently because of network rules preventing advertisers from using the name of their
competitors. See Comparative Advertising - NBC Guidelines [1969-1983 Current Comment
Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 'If 50, 196 (Jan. 16, 1974) (allowing comparative
advertising in NBC under certain circumstances); Comparative Advertising - ABC Principles
[1969-1983 Current Comment Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50, 205 (Mar. 18,
1974)(allowing comparative advertising on ABC under certain circumstances).
184. See Law on Competition and Limitation of Monopolistic Activity in Goods Markets,
art. 10 (Mar. 22, 1991), reprinted in BUTLER, supra note 1, at 229, 235. The law also prohibits
the "arbitrary" use of another's trademark or name. Id
185. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive, 84/450 Concerning
Misleading Advertising, art. 1(3), 1991 O.J. (C 180) 14, 15.
186. Id. art. 3.
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British Code of Advertising Practice was interpreted expansively to
prohibit an advertisement by a charity because it denigrated the flower
industry by suggesting that monetary donations be made instead of floral
tributes. 187
Experience has shown that it is difficult to define an "unfair"
comparative advertisement or a term like "misleading" information
narrowly enough to give adequate notice of prohibited conduct. A
considerable problem with drafting general standards is that advertising
often conveys ambiguous messages, and its effects depend on the various
inferences consumers draw from the representations. Generic definitions
of unfair or misleading advertising, such as those in the EC directives,
tend to be vague and give businesses little notice of the point at which an
advertisement goes beyond being merely persuasive, rhetorical, or clever
and becomes unlawfully misleading or unfair to a competitor) 88 Even
truthful advertising can be misleading when it places undue emphasis on
selective information or provides only tangentially relevant information
that has little connection with the product. Consequently, most advertis-
ing is misleading to some but not all consumers. A law that seeks
generally to define misleading information or unlawful comparative
advertising for all industries and for all consumers, as in the EC
directives and in many national laws, runs the risk of inhibiting legitimate
marketing practices, unfairly punishing entrepreneurs through selective
enforcement of the law, and ultimately restricting the flow of information.
The regulation of advertising is bound to be problematic in Russia for
cultural reasons as well. The social and economic impact of modem day
advertising perhaps best magnifies the differences between capitalist and
socialist ideologies. Critics of Western advertising practices have long
maintained that advertising "brainwashes" consumers into purchasing
commodities they do not really want or need, exploits the human frailties
of hope, anxiety, and insecurity, and generally fosters rampant
187. See CRANSTON, supra note 127, at 60.
188. In drafting more detailed regulation of advertising and marketing practices, Russian
authorities should be mindful of EC policies. Consumer laws that directly or indirectly affect
imports are not compatible with EC law unless they are necessary for the protection of "public
health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the defense of the consumer" and less
restrictive means would not serve the same purpose. See infra notes 239-43 (general discus-
sion). This rule has been applied to advertising and marketing restrictions that affect the
volume of import sales. See, e.g., Case 152/78, Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E.C.R.
2299, 2315-17 (alcohol advertising). See also KRAMER, supra note 38, at 16 (discussing this
case). While this does not mean that Russian advertising law must track the EC directive, to
encourage trade relations with the EC, Russian advertising laws should avoid restrictions on
foreign traders that do not exist in EC countries.
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materialism. 189 For citizens reared in the socialist traditions of promoting
collective harmony and enduring self-sacrifice for the betterment of
society, these influences may be strongly resisted.
Yet despite these difficulties, it is important that laws give Russian
advertisers, agency enforcement authorities, and judges guidance by
setting forth some standards, especially since Russian consumers,
businesses, and decisionmakers have had relatively little experience in
this area. One alternative is to reject over-inclusive general proscriptions
in favor of more specific guidelines addressing the problems that actually
surface in particular sectors of commerce as they evolve. Waiting has its
costs, however. The consumer act already provides that businesses must
compensate persons who are injured by misleading or incomplete
information, and Russian civil law provides that a business may recover
damages if its reputation is injured by defamatory statements.19°
Merchants who push the limits of conventional advertising norms or
"incorrectly" compare their products to those of their competitors thus run
the risk of incurring substantial liability until more precise standards
develop.
The difficult task for Russia is framing a set of legal controls that
recognize a cultural resistance to Western-style advertising techniques but
do not unduly inhibit marketing freedom and the free flow of informa-
tion. Approaches that involve consumers and businesses more directly
in the regulatory process may be more appropriate mechanisms for
striking this balance as compared with traditional, direct government
regulatory control. Forms of "self-regulation" may better reflect public
attitudes about the acceptable limits of advertising proprieties and may be
more responsive to frequent changes in public mores as the market
matures. In Great Britain, for instance, consortiums of business leaders,
consumer representatives, and media organizations are the principal forces
in policing print and broadcast advertising through a system of prescreen-
ing and complaint resolution. One of the principal methods of control is
the cooperation of media participants who have undertaken not to publish
or broadcast advertisements that do not comply with standards established
189. See CRANSTON, supra note 127, at 44.
190. See Fundamentals of Civil Legislation, supra note 47, art. 7 (1991), reprinted in LEGAL
MATERIALS, supra note 1. Damages for injuring a business reputation with defamatory
statements may include moral damages. Id. art. 7(1). The defendant has the burden of proving
that the statements were true. Id. art. 7(1). See also Law on Competition and Restricting
Monopoly Activity on the Commodities Markets, art. 10 (1991), reprinted in BUTLER, supra
note 1, at 234 (unlawful to distribute "false" or "distorted" information likely to damage a
business reputation).
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by the group.'9 ' This has the advantage of preventing any injury to the
public or a competitor before it occurs.
Industry self-regulation has several advantages that may make it
useful in Russia. By encouraging businesses to police themselves, self-
regulation conserves already scarce public resources. It can also result in
enforcement more quickly than court or agency proceedings, where delays
are often attributable to greater procedural guarantees that are justified by
the seriousness of the available sanctions. Having a fast enforcement
mechanism may be important in Russia as advertising norms develop
rapidly during the transition years. Self-regulation can also be more
flexible since standards are applied in a practical and common sense
manner, and disputes are often resolved through negotiation. This is in
stark contrast with the rigid, legalistic manner common to the courts and
other tribunals where sanctions can be severe and decisions carry
precedential weight. Some also maintain that businesses bring a more
positive, less combative attitude to peer group resolution forums where
they are not confronted with government force.'92 In a country not
accustomed to private litigation of commercial disputes, these are
important considerations.
There are drawbacks to self-regulation in any country, however, and
they may be magnified in Russia during the early years of market
transformation. Business associations are tempted to use self-regulation
as a means of maintaining the status quo and insulating members from
competition by those who challenge established positions.' This could
be particularly problematic in Russia because many major media outlets
are still state owned or controlled, and the larger advertisers will likely
be state-owned enterprises or recently privatized firms with substantial
market power. With a self-regulating consortium heavily influenced by
an alliance of monopolists and oligopolists, the possibility of discrimina-
tion against smaller competitors - especially those using comparative
advertising or provocative messages to establish a market presence
191. For advertisers other than radio and television broadcasters, the Advertising Association
established a Code of Advertising Practice and an Advertising Standards Authority to supervise
and enforce the code. Its chairman is an individual from outside the advertising industry, as
are two-thirds of its members. Television and radio advertising is subject to regulation by the
Independent Broadcasting Authority. See CRANSTON, supra note 127, at 48-54 (describing this
system in detail). In Germany, the German Advertising Council coordinates an advertising self-
regulation program. It has members from industry, the media, and the advertising profession
but no direct consumer representation. The council hears complaints from any source but has
no enforcement power except to request voluntary compliance. See BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
IN GERMANY, supra note 125, § 190213][a].
192. See, e.g., CRANSTON, supra note 127, at 59.
193. See id. at 60.
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cannot be ruled out. Moreover, business associations, by their very
composition, tend to be reluctant to impose sanctions against fellow
members. If minimum resources are devoted to enforcement efforts, the
codes become mere window-dressings creating illusory rights. 194 The
problem can be compounded by the absence of a strong consumer voice
in establishing advertising standards and policing their enforcement.
Since forceful consumer organizations may be undeveloped in Russia for
some time, 95 advertising codes developed through self-regulation
programs may end up reflecting prevailing industry practices and ignoring
legitimate consumer concerns. Implementing such programs might
therefore be delayed until an effective consumer voice has developed.
3. Mandatory Product and Service Standards
a. Differences with other Provisions
The sections of the Russian consumer protection act previously
discussed in this article are pro-consumer in the sense that they recognize
a body of rights and remedies for individuals who are harmed by the
conduct of merchants. If not diluted by subsequent legislation or
administrative dictates, consumers will have an arsenal of legal weapons
to assert if a transaction yields unsatisfactory results. Although consum-
ers may pay higher prices to merchants and service providers whose costs
increase from complying with these laws, the practical effect of the
legislation on the development of the Russian economy is likely to be
marginal. For the most part, the provisions only apply when a product
has proven unsatisfactory or a service has been performed improperly,
and the issue is essentially deciding who should be responsible for the
resulting economic injury and how to distribute the loss.
Other provisions of the law, however, have a greater potential for
affecting economic growth in the transition years. These are the product
and service standards and mandatory certification procedures which are
present in every nation to varying degrees. 96 They have proven to be
effective, and often necessary, when market forces, together with market
enhancing devices like mandatory disclosures, will not sufficiently protect
194. Cf. id. at 61 (discussing these two elements, but not linking them causally).
195. See infra text accompanying notes 329-32.
196. See generally REICH & MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN THE EC COUNTRIES,
supra note 38, at 133-34 (describing product and service standards in the EC); R.G. Lawson,
The Safety of Goods: Some Comparative Assessments, NEW L.J. 863 (1982)(describing the
United Kingdom's consumer safety law system).
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consumer welfare." Nevertheless, they are only justified under certain
conditions. Some goods, like food products, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals,
chemicals, children's toys, and unusually dangerous products, can pose
substantial risks to consumer health if not manufactured properly. Even
though firms that make defective products should eventually go out of
business as a result of product liability litigation and a diminished
reputation for quality even without mandatory standards, the collective
welfare of consumers certainly can be enhanced by standards that prevent
injury before it occurs.19  Moreover, information disclosures alone
cannot sufficiently apprise consumers of many risks because the relevant
information is often too technical for consumers to evaluate and use as
a basis for distinguishing between competing products.'99 Also, even if
the information is understandable, the risk may seem so remote that it is
unlikely to affect the consumer's purchasing decision. 2°°
Some basic standards for relatively expensive, infrequently purchased
consumer durables (televisions, refrigerators, etc.) can be justified on
slightly different grounds. While these products may not pose imminent
health and safety risks, their relative quality (as compared to a compe-
titor's product) either cannot be readily observed prior to purchase or
cannot be evaluated with the aid of disclosures. The relevant information
may be hidden from view, such as the inferior construction of a cooling
element, or difficult to understand in a label description or warning. A
197. See generally BoURGOIGNIE & TRUBEK, supra note 23, at 9; REICH & MICKLITZ,
CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN GERMANY, supra note 29, at 110, 131; Martin Cave, Market
Models and Consumer Protection, 8 J. CONS. POL'Y 335 (1985).
198. Preventing injury is economically justified in many instances because there is no
guarantee that money will fully compensate for the physical and emotional injury. See Paul
Burrows, Consumer Safety Under Products Liability and Duty to Disclose, 12 INT'L REV. L.
& ECON. 457, 460 (1992). The case for product standards is weakest when the consumer can
reasonably determine quality by inspecting the goods before purchase. If most consumers will
readily detect product flaws, mandatory standards are likely to impose unnecessary costs not
offset by greater social benefits. See Cave, supra note 197, at 340; Phillip Nelson, Information
and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. EcON. 311 (1970) (calling goods of this sort "search
goods" because the consumer can obtain all relevant information by inspecting the product).
Many health and safety related characteristics of a product, however, will not be readily
observable (e.g., toxic chemicals in cosmetics or highly flammable children's clothing).
199. See BOURGOIGNIE & TRUBEK, supra note 23, at 9; Cave, supra note 197, at 348.
Moreover, if consumers are poorly informed, or if they misperceive product risks because they
are unable to interpret available information, they cannot demand appropriate insurance against
losses associated with those risks. See ASCH, supra note 20, at 57.
200. Mandatory tolerances for food additives are an example. Some consumers would not
be discouraged from using a product with an additive that created a very slight risk of harm
if the product otherwise was highly desired. The additive might nevertheless be banned if the
collective harm to the population at large exceeds the cost of imposing the ban (e.g., higher
price for the product because a less harmful substitute costs more). See Council Directive on
Food Additives, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 32.
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consumer's experience will be the principal source of information, but
this knowledge will be acquired only after the consumer has made a
large, long term expenditure. 20' Although the case for standards is not as
strong for this class of goods since manufacturers of poor quality
products will eventually acquire a tarnished reputation, standards may
nonetheless be justified because the degree of economic injury to
consumers can be high before the manufacturer either improves the
quality or is forced from the market due to declining sales. Although the
same market failure may exist for some inexpensive goods that are
bought frequently, the resulting economic injury is likely to be less severe
because knowledge gained through the buying experience costs little and
can be used often in future purchasing decisions. For expensive one-time
purchases, minimum standards (at least for the fundamental characteristics
of the product) may be an effective way to enhance quality.
Mandatory standards can also help consumers in important, but
indirect, ways. Some standards help preserve the environment. 202 Others
promote commerce by making related products more compatible (such as
requiring equal size screw heads or metric dimensions for component
parts), or making international trade less difficult, as the EC has
attempted to do by coordinating product standards among member
nations.0 3 Often it is in the interest of trade associations to agree on
standards voluntarily with little or no government involvement.204  In
other cases (e.g., basic safety characteristics or environmental protection)
government directives or incentive programs (e.g., pollution taxes) may
be necessary because without such programs, firms (acting individually
201. See Cave, supra note 197, at 342, 348.
202. See Zigurds L. Zile, Implementation of Environmental Law in the USSR, in SOVIET
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THEORY AND POLICY 259 (George Ginsburgs ed., 1989).
203. In 1985, the EC Commission's White Paper on Completing the Internal Market gave
urgent priority to standardization programs. Some of the main obstacles to free trade are the
differences in the legal requirements for manufactured goods. The EC has therefore
emphasized coordination with the two umbrella European standardization organizations,
European Committee for Standardization (CEN) and European Committee for Electrical
Standardization (CENELEC), in its efforts to harmonize standards among member states. The
Commission has also promoted representation by consumers on international standard setting
bodies. See Consumer Policy, supra note 175, §§ 3.2, 4.1.
204. This is particularly true when the standards promote uniformity - e.g., standard width
railroad track or uniform clothing sizes. Standards can reduce unnecessary and confusing
variety, enhance interchangeability of products, and create economies of scale since a producer
can make fewer products in larger quantities. See BOURGOIGNIE & TRUBEK, supra note 23, at
78; DAVID HEMENWAY, INDUSTRYWIDE VOLUNTARY PRODUCT STANDARDS 21-43 (1975).
While these same principles supported the expansion of mandatory standards in the Soviet
Union, one of the advantages of voluntary standards is that they are more likely to change in
response to shifts in market demand. For a description of voluntary standards programs in the
EC, see Norbert Reich & Lesley Jane Smith, Issue Editors' Forward, 7 J. CONS. POL'Y 11
(1984).
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or through trade associations) will have insufficient economic motive to
prevent public harms.205
b. Implications from the Past
While product and service standards play important roles in any
economy, they carry a great potential for obstructing Russia's economic
growth during the transition years if not implemented judiciously. The
provisions foreshadow, in at least three instances, continued government
involvement in managing consumer markets in ways that can inhibit their
development. First, the law endorses a certification procedure for
products intended to promote consumer safety and health or those which
are determined to be potential consumer or environmental hazards. 206
Gosstandard-Russia (the state committee for standardization) will continue
to select the products subject to certification requirements, formulate the
rules for certificate compliance, create the certification standards, and
perform various administrative and enforcement tasks.7 Where
certification is required, the marketing of uncertified products is
banned.2"8 Second, the law refers several times to "mandatory standards"
that sellers must satisfy for products even if the product is not subject to
mandatory certification. Sellers must produce and market such goods in
compliance with the standards and must disclose their compliance on
product labels or other printed materials.2' Third are the "service sector
regulations" discussed above, which create, on a sector by sector basis,
various standards on contract terms such as performance deadlines,
payment provisions, and mandatory repair procedures.10 If Russian
regulators fundamentally alter past practices of controlling product
characteristics and service performance, the consumer rights declared in
205. The costs of most environmental pollution are borne by the public at large and, unless
the damage is traceable to a particular firm or group of firms, compensation for the collective
injury will not be made by the polluters. If the risk of tracing is small, there is little incentive
for the firm to reduce pollutants voluntarily. Similarly, mandatory standards for toxic
ingredients may be necessary when the likelihood of causing harm is small and individual firms
perceive a minimal risk of tracing injury to their product.
206. Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, art. 5(5).
207. Id art. 40. Gosstandard has been performing certification and standardization functions
since at least 1968. Through a network of field offices, laboratories, and inspector stations
throughout the Federation, Gosstandard issues product standards, sets quality levels, and
enforces the mandates. Zile, supra note 88, at 190. The consumer law envisions a similar role
in the future. Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, art. 40.
208. Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, art. 5(5).
209. See also id pmbl. ("defect" defined to include even minor deviations from standards);
art. 4 (sellers "shall market goods and services in conformity with standards"); art. 8 (generally
requiring written disclosure of information, including product standards).
210. See supra text accompanying notes 133-50.
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the act will be substantially undermined.
It is by no means certain that Gosstandard will dictate product and
service standards where none are justified. Yet in a government that for
decades has been ideologically committed to centrally planning virtually
every aspect of production, the likelihood of a significant and immediate
change from the status quo seems remote.2 ' Mandatory standards
previously issued by Gosstandard numbered from 20,000 to 30,000.
Ministries and departments directing production in particular economic
sectors issued 40,000 to 50,000 more. Republic councils adopted up to
10,000 standards, and local regulatory agencies were responsible for over
150,000 technical conditions for miscellaneous products within their
jurisdiction. Many of these standards focused on insignificant features
of product design or appearance, and paid relatively little attention to
legitimate safety concerns. 21 3 Moreover, standard-setting bureaucrats
seldom targeted world class quality, and settled for levels of performance
that were merely "socially necessary" and attainable under Soviet
production methods.1 4 The result is an enormous assortment of product
standards that, if followed, will ensure continued consumer dissatisfaction
with output quality.
Divorcing the bureaucracy from this heritage will be difficult because
many of the individuals currently serving in government regulatory
positions held similar posts in the days of central planning. 2 5 Those who
set product and service standards may be reluctant to permit entrepreneurs
the freedom to experiment with innovative products and services
deviating from the norm. They are not accustomed to relying on market
forces, or the enforcement of warranty and product liability laws, as the
principal means of improving product quality. They may also be
susceptible to pressure from managers of state-run enterprises who prefer
211. Indeed, a wide-reaching certification scheme has already begun. See Phased
Introduction in 1992 of Mandatory Certification of Goods (Works, Services) - RF Government
Decree No. 508, July 22,1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, SOVLEG File. The decree
requires manufacturers to hand over a registered copy of a "Declaration of Safety" when
delivering goods to a supplier. The decree covers foods, cosmetics, household chemicals,
goods that come into contact with food and water, pesticides, fertilizers, children's products,
"household engineering products," and "goods whose use involves contact with unprotected
parts of the human body." Id.
212. See Zile, supra note 8, at 264-65.
213. Id at 265.
214. Id at 271.
215. See Valentin Logunov, We Are Close to War Communism, RossinsKAYA GAZETA, July
22, 1992, at 1, 2, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, SPD File (interviewing Ruslan
Kasbulatov, Chairman of the Congress of People's Deputies: "[G]overnment structures are 'now
saturated with the same bureaucrats .... On the one hand, we draft market economy laws, but,
at the same time, on the executive level, we often destroy the new market structures and
introduce command methods of economic management"').
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the continuation of standards that insulate today's monopolists from
effective competition.
This legacy of central planning is especially significant because, for
the foreseeable future, the task of deciding standardization issues will be
performed by central authorities. In the United States and Europe, many
standards are set by trade associations, professional and technical
organizations, and independent testing laboratories, rather than govern-
ment agencies.216 These voluntary standards may eventually be adopted
by the government and made mandatory, yet enforcement generally relies
on industry self-policing. 2 7  In Russia and other former state-run
economies, the government has been setting detailed production and
service standards in most economic sectors for decades. This process
may continue at least until the private sector matures and the influence
of consumer groups causes trade associations to emerge that are
216. There are more than 400 private organizations involved in setting standards in the
United States. Some organizations, such as the American Society for Testing Materials and the
American National Standards Institute, were formed for the sole purpose of establishing
standards for various industries. Trade associations, like the American Petroleum Institute and
the National Electrical Manufacturers Associations, write standards for their own industries in
addition to serving other interests of members. Professional organizations, such as the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, advance the interests of their members by
promoting approved standards. Underwriters Laboratories, the most notable testing organization
in the United States, evaluates safety characteristics of products, reports to consumers, insurers,
and other interested persons, and develops standards for a variety of safety-related products.
See BOURGOIGNIE & TRUBEK, supra note 23, at 76-78; U.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
STANDARDS AND CERTIFICATION 18-25 (1978). The Consumer Product Safety Commission
was originally conceived as a primary standard setting body. In 1981, however, the Consumer
Product Safety Act was amended to direct the Commission to rely on voluntary standards
wherever they would adequately reduce the risk. As a result, the Commission has issued
relatively few product safety standards, some of which have been overturned by the courts.
See AsCH, supra note 20, at 133; CRANSTON, supra note 127, at 31-62 (describing numerous
voluntary codes of practice approved by the Office of Fair Trading in England); REICH &
MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN GERMANY, supra note 29, at 164-66 (describing how
industry standards are established in Germany).
217. BOURGOIGNIE & TRUBEK, supra note 23, at 78. While manufacturers may not be
legally bound to comply with these standards, pressure can be exerted by the state, for example,
by making compliance a condition for awarding government contracts. See REICH &
MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN GERMANY, supra note 29, at 164-65. Self-regulatory
measures can involve a public-private partnership, as Germany did by establishing the Deutsche
Institut zur Normgeburng (DIN) in 1975. Under a contract between the German government
and the standardization body, the state was granted seats on the managing board. A "DIN"
label on a product would certify that the product complies with DIN standards. The "DIN
tested" label would signify that the product has been tested by the Standards Testing Agency
and is subject to regular control. The DIN was criticized, however, because its standardization
committees were disproportionately represented by industry members to the exclusion of
consumer groups. Many believe that the resulting standards reflected the economic interests
of industry rather than health and safety concerns. Id. at 165-66. Cf. supra text accompanying
notes 191-95 (advantages and disadvantages of advertising self-regulation).
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competent to create and police standards effectively. 218
The tendency to adopt unnecessary control measures may be nurtured
by two pervasive cultural conditions as well: the lack of citizen experi-
ence with the rule of law as a market regulating tool, and a lingering
distrust of capitalism as the central organizing principle of economic
activity. In democratic, capitalist societies, regulation of consumer
markets depends to a large extent on individuals exercising their
economic and legal rights.219 By purchasing products and services,
consumers create economic incentives for businesses to improve quality.
By seeking legal redress when a transaction produces injury of some
kind, consumers cause costs to increase for those who produce inferior
goods. If this self-policing is to be successful, citizens must have respect
for the rule of law and must be able to rely on its enforceability.2 0 In
a democracy, citizens are not passive recipients of government dictates,
but are central participants in a system that ensures the effective
functioning of both the economy and the government. To learn these
societal roles, Russian citizens may have to experience a "cultural
enlightenment" of sorts. They must realize that their rights do not depend
on the controls imposed by central authorities, but on laws which create
the rules of the capitalist game and a citizen's own active participation in
policing these laws.22'
In Russia and other former Soviet states, this reliance on law as
218. In addition to self-regulatory measures, the inefficiencies of mandatory government
standards can also be reduced by the use of "performance" standards that manufacturers may
satisfy in any manner, as opposed to standards that specify product materials and the way in
which it must be made. Performance standards have the advantage of transferring the burden
of product design to manufacturers, reducing regulatory control, and minimizing the adverse
effect standards can have on competition. For a general discussion of the strengths and
weaknesses of business self-regulation, see CRANSTON, supra note 127, at 31-62.
219. See Fiss, supra note 5, at 908, 916-17.
220. For a general discussion of the changing role of law in Soviet society, see Mark R.
Beissinger, The Party and the Rule of Law, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 41 (1990); Leon
Lipson, Piety and Revision: How Will the Mandarins Survive Under the Rule of Law?, 23
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 191 (1990); Quigley, supra note 83; Gordon B. Smith, The Procuracy,
Citizens' Rights and Legal Reform, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 41 (1990); Peter H. Solomon,
Jr., Judicial Reform Under Gorbachev and Russian History, in THE IMPACT OF PERESTROIKA,
supra note 8, at 15.
221. Mikhail Gorbachev argued repeatedly that perestroika would succeed only if
accompanied by a fundamental restructuring of attitudes toward self and autonomy,
supplementing "monitoring from above" with "monitoring from below." See Lars T. Lih,
Gorbachev and the Reform Movement, 86 CURRENT HIST. 309 (1987). See also ROBERT W.
CAMPBELL, THE SOCIALIST ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION 224 (1991) ("[T]here is little civic
sense, no political tradition or political culture, no sense of self reliance among the population
as a whole .... There is little understanding or acceptance of the impersonal forces that
dominate a market economy."); Susan Eva Heuman, Transforming Subjects into Citizens: A
Historical Perspective on the Gorbechev Legal Reforms, in THE IMPACT OF PERESTROIKA, supra
note 8, at 23, 27; Ignatieff, supra note 12, at 810.
Summer 19931
Michigan Journal of International Law
protection against the unscrupulous practices of merchants may be
undeveloped for some time. For three generations, the central organizing
principles of Russian society were the acceptance of state supremacy and
the subordination of law to the will of those in power.' The Communist
Party was the primary source of policy and government, and courts
served as a vehicle for ensuring that citizens would be loyal supporters.2'
As the Party placed itself above the law, laws were invoked by the
central authorities as a means of guiding society toward the communist
ideal.2' A positive experience with a new legal system which provides
an orderly means to a just end may convince the Russian people that law
is a weapon of consumer empowerment as well.
The Party also cultivated a perception that individuals should act with
a unity of purpose to further common societal goals.22 5  Capitalism
represented the soulless, heartless individualism that the Russian should
resist. 6 This ideology resulted in many citizens resenting individuals
who engaged in private economic activity. Beginning in 1965,
however, ownership of personal property was more openly recognized
222. See Solomon, supra note 220, at 21; MARK W. JANIS, SOVIET LAW AND ECONOMY XI
(Olimpiad S. loffe & Mark W. Janis eds., 1986); Quigley, supra note 83, at 207-08.
223. OLIMPIAD S. IOFFE, SOVIET LAW AND SOVIET REALITY 13-14 (1985); see Peter
Barenboim, Keynote Address, INT'L BAR NEWS (Fall 1992) (observing "a harmful tradition of
allowing laws to exist separately from real life," and "life was a matter of not respecting
laws"); Quigley, supra note 83, at 207; Igor N. Belousovitch, The New Soviet Parliament:
Process, Procedures, and Legislative Priority, 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 275, 275-76 (1990).
224. RENE DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY
153 (1978); IOFFE, supra note 223, at 2; Hermann, Gorbechev's Search For the Rule of Law,
FINANCIAL TIMES, June 20, 1988, at 20 (posters in courthouses proclaimed, "Law is what is
good for the Party").
225. See Harold J. Berman, Gorbachev's Law Reforms in Historical Perspective, in THE
IMPACT OF PERESTROIKA, supra note 8, at 3, 4, 10, 12; infra notes 270, 271.
226. See Ignatieff, supra note 12, at 811-12 ("The shallowness of democratic culture, the
hostility towards individual initiative, especially in its capitalist forms, do constitute obstacles
to Russia's peaceful return to Europe.")
227. EKLOF, supra note 9, at 121; CAMPBELL, supra note 11, at 216; Stanislaw Pomorski,
Notes on the 1986 Law on Individual Labor Activity, in THE IMPACT OF PERESTROIKA, supra
note 8, at 143, 151. This mistrust was due in part to the fact that, for many citizens, private
enterprise was associated with illegal, underground activity tainted with corruption and criminal
behavior. JONES & MosKoFF, supra note 7, at 130. See also Ignatieff, supra note 12, at 812.
A survey by the Russian Institute of Applied Politics showed that these views are widely held
- only 15 percent had a positive view of domestic entrepreneurs and 62 percent believed the
increasing gap between rich and poor is impermissible. Commercial middlemen were
commonly referred to as black marketeers and swindlers. Konstantin Ivanov, Those Who Made
It Big, WE/MBI, Jan. 25-Feb. 7, 1993, at 6. Another poll showed that a solid majority of
Russians condemned "speculation" (76.2%), "resale goods and services" (61.7%), and "resale
of agricultural goods on the market" (74%). See Soviet Public Opinion Polls, NEW OUTLOOK,
Summer 1990, at 25.
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and families were permitted to engage in small scale farming.' The
1977 Constitution, and more recent legislation, even allowed for some
individual labor activity.' Nevertheless, the pursuit of profit from
sources other than one's own labor (or the labor of family members) was
officially forbidden for three generations. 23° The Constitution proclaimed
that citizens could not use property as a means of deriving "unearned
income" or be employed to the "detriment of the Soviet society," and
citizens were guaranteed freedom from having their labor exploited by
others.23 Officially designated "economic crimes," while not consistently
enforced, included "private entrepreneurial activity as a commercial
middleman" and "speculation," arguably the hallmarks of market
economies.232 Underlying these laws was a belief that one of the most
morally pernicious results of capitalism is a consumer preference for
material gain and a corresponding impoverishment of the spirit.
Saturation of the market with goods whose abundance and quality exceed
that which is "socially necessary" was viewed as contributing to the
moral decay.233
c. Prospects for the future
The lack of experience with law as a market regulating force, coupled
with lingering reservations about capitalist ideals, may lead Russian
regulators to resist granting businesses the freedom to produce goods and
perform services without substantial government involvement. Especially
if widespread consumer problems begin to surface in unregulated sectors,
the regulator's natural tendency may be to regain control over production
and marketing decisions, and thus unwittingly retard the economic
development that can ultimately improve the consumer's condition.
The temptation to overregulate in the name of consumer protection
228. See Katlijn Malfliet, The Economic Function and Purpose of Personal Property and
Its Legal Implementation, in SOVIET LAW AND ECONOMY, supra note 222, at 79, 87-88.
229. See Law on Cooperative Societies in the USSR, 22 Vedomosti SSSR, item 355 (1988),
amended by 19 Vedomosti SNO SSSR, item 350 (1989); 26 Vedomosti SNO SSSR, item 489
(1990) in BAsic SOVIET DOCUMENTS, supra note 101, at 355. The Law on Cooperatives was
lauded by some as "perhaps the boldest liberalizing legislation on the economy ... under the
Gorbachev leadership." 111 RADIO LIBERTY REs. BULL. 8 (Mar. 15, 1988).
230. See Pomorski, supra note 227, at 149.
231. KONST. SSSR art. 14 (amended 1990), in BAsic SOVIET DOCUMENTS, supra note 101,
at 7. See Malfliet, supra note 228, at 97.
232. See UK RSFSR, art. 153 (private entrepreneurial activity as middleman), art. 154
(speculation) in LEGAL MATERIALS, supra note 1. For a table of Russian economic crimes, see
Leonard Orland, Perspectives on Soviet Economic Crime, in SOVIET LAW AND ECONOMY, supra
note 222, at 169, 179.
233. See Zile, supra note 88, at 186 (discussing views of an unnamed Soviet writer).
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is important to resist in any nation, but the costs can be particularly
severe in an emerging market economy. Government mandates on
matters that might otherwise be left to the discretion of entrepreneurs can
be economically inefficient and stifle creativity. Compositional standards
that prescribe a method of preparation and product contents restrict the
variety of goods marketed. This deprives consumers of the choice to buy
goods which are less expensive, though perhaps qualitatively inferior.
Compositional standards may also discourage innovation and thereby
support existing monopoly conditions, render products substantially
homogeneous, and limit price competition by creating a common baseline
for production costs.
2 34
All this comes at a time when Russian businesses already face
numerous difficulties. Enterprises encounter restricted availability of
capital resources, chronic raw material shortages, inefficiencies in
transportation and distribution networks, aging plant equipment, and an
ever decreasing amount of discretionary income in the hands of the
consuming public.235 Government-imposed mandates that fix or increase
costs, or inhibit innovation for businesses that are just beginning to
develop critical entrepreneurial skills, can only delay economic growth by
adding to these burdens. If the additional costs are high enough, the
better run businesses may eventually leave the region for more hospitable
regulatory environments.236 The less successful will fail.
As smaller operators begin to test their entrepreneurial skills, and as
large state enterprises are dismantled through privatization programs,
experimentation and creativity should be encouraged.237 Innovation has
risks, however, and more consumers may be affected by defective
products or services produced under free markets, at least until the
inefficient or unscrupulous merchants either change their ways or fail. If
regulators have the patience to wait until markets mature, and if
consumers can effectively enforce the consumer protection act against
234. See CRANSTON, supra note 127, at 323-24.
235. See EKLOF, supra note 9, at 86; IoFFE, supra note 223, at 11.
236. Regulations that increase costs cause merchants in competitive industries to either
increase prices, reduce quality in nonregulated areas or withdraw from the market. See David
Cayne & M.J. Trebilcock, Market Considerations in the Formulation of Consumer Policy, in
lAIN RAMSAY, CONSUMER LAW 1, 14-15 (1992).
237. See Zile, supra note 88, at 187 (criticizing Russian standardization for not ensuring
higher quality and guaranteeing "a mere sameness at a permissible minimum level").
Improving the poor quality of Soviet consumer goods has, of course, been frequently cited as
one of the reasons for promoting economic reform. ABEL AGANBEGYAN, THE EcONOMIC
CHALLENGE OF PERESTROIKA 4-5 (Michael B. Brown ed., 1988); Chebrikov Decries Abuses
of Openness 39 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS (summarizing articles from PRAVDA (Sept. 11,
1987) and IZVESTIA (Sept. 12, 1987)).
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merchants supplying defective goods and services in the interim,
economic prosperity may be more quickly realized.
Excessive regulatory conditions can also have an adverse effect on
trade and foreign investment. There are inherent conflicts between
protecting consumers and encouraging trade. On the one hand, open
borders can cause consumers problems. Products made in other countries
may be manufactured under less restrictive consumer protection laws and
could enter the domestic market posing unknown risks. Moreover,
obtaining redress from foreign firms that harm Russian citizens may be
difficult. On the other hand, consumers can benefit from the removal of
trade barriers, especially in the transition period.238 Imports and direct
foreign investment can be critical in supplying desperately needed
consumer goods until domestic production can satisfy demand. More-
over, imports and foreign investment can increase competition in
industries that currently exhibit monopolistic characteristics by offering
consumers a choice of products, thus making it easier to privatize the
monopolists and eventually lower prices. Mandatory certification
procedures and product standards that effectively restrict products sold in
Russian markets can reduce imports, discourage foreign investment, and
ultimately hurt the consumers the laws were designed to protect.239 If this
problem is addressed by making the standards inapplicable to foreign-
made goods, domestic producers are comparatively disadvantaged by
being tied to production standards that may raise costs and impede
modifications of products to reflect changing market demands. Russian
exporters can also be affected if the regulations make Russian products
more expensive or less attractive in markets abroad.2 °
Another reason to proceed cautiously in this area is the prospect of
Russia joining the EC at some point in the future, or at least seeking
closer economic ties. Economic integration with the EC could bring
substantial benefits to Russian consumers in the form of a greater number
and variety of products and, due to an expanded export market, more job
238. See generally BOURGOIGNIE & TRUBEK, supra note 23, at 2-3.
239. Many U.S. exporters expressed concern about efforts in the EC to accelerate the
harmonization of standards that could impede their access to the European market. Some
exporters worry that U.S. products conforming to current international certification standards
will be excluded from EC markets when new European norms are established. See SUBcOMM.
ON INT'L EcONOMIC POL'Y AND TRADE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPORT
ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S 1992 EcONOMIC INTEGRATION PLAN 21-23 (Comm. print
1989).
240. Unless a Russian producer is making a product solely for export, it will have to comply
with standards governing goods intended for domestic consumption. If those standards increase
the producer's costs, prices on the items exported will have to increase to maintain the same
profit margin. If the producer makes different products for export only, it may lose economies
of scale. See BOURGOIGNIE & TRUBEK, supra note 23, at 3.
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opportunities with local producer-exporters and higher wages. Member-
ship in the EC has its costs, however, including compliance with Article
30 of the Treaty of Rome, which prohibits member states from enforcing
laws that have "an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions on
imports." 241 Article 30 not only pertains to direct bans and quotas on
imported products, but to any regulation that increases an importer's costs
or inhibits its opportunities on the domestic market. 2 National consumer
protection laws among EC member states can be held inapplicable to
imported goods if the laws are deemed to restrict their lawful sale.u 3
Thus, if a member state were to adopt a product standard that, for
example, fixed a mandatory proportion of wheat flour in bread, the law
may be struck down under Article 30 and held not to apply to bread
importers whose product was lawfully manufactured under the less
restrictive laws of another EC country. The result would be that domestic
producers of bread would have to comply, but importers would not,
placing domestic enterprises at a competitive disadvantage. 2'2 As a
practical matter, however, many importers may choose not to incur the
expense of challenging the legality of the law under the Treaty, and
would simply avoid the inhospitable market.u In either case, the
domestic economy and it citizenship suffers.
241. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community [EEC Treaty], art. 30. For
a discussion of the effect of Article 30 on the importation of consumer goods, see Harry L.
Clark, Note, The Free Movement of Goods and Regulations for Public Health and Consumer
Protection in the EEC: The West German "Beer Purity" Case, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 753 (1988).
The Russian government has been actively pursuing closer ties with the E.C. in recent months.
See EC's Talks with Russia, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 1993, at A10.
242. In the famous Cassis de Dijon case, Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG v. Bundesmo-
nopolverwaltung, 1979 E.C.R. 649, the European Court was asked to decide whether German
legislation prohibiting the sale of potable spirits with a wine spirit content of less than 32
percent violated Article 30. Even though the law applied to all products, domestic or imported,
the Court held that its effect was to prevent the importing of goods lawfully produced in other
EC nations where different standards are imposed, and therefore the law could not be applied
to importers. See also Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837 (national
laws having the effect of handicapping imports could be the equivalent of quantitative restric-
tions).
243. A consumer protection regulation that restricts trade is compatible with Article 30 only
if there is a genuine threat to the consumer and the regulation is no more restrictive than
necessary to counter that threat. Jules Stuyck, Free Movement of Goods and Consumer
Protection, in CONSUMER LAW IN THE EEC 77, 92 (Geoffrey Woodroffe ed., 1984).
244. It is lawful to demand higher standards of domestic producers because that does not
restrict imports. Goods produced in the domestic market, in effect, can be discriminated
against. See Case 237/82, Jongeneel Kaas v. Netherlands, 1984 E.C.R. 483.
245. Importers prefer clear rules telling them what they can do, rather than court challenges
to set aside rules telling them what they cannot do. Indeed, the uncertain application of Article
30 to laws restricting imports has led some commentators to conclude that Cassis de Dijon, far
from being a step toward a unified European market, has actually dissuaded cross-border trade.
See Stephen Weatherill, Consumer Safety Legislation in the United Kingdom and Article 30
EEC, 13 EUR. L. REV. 87, 96, 99 (1988).
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The Russian government should therefore proceed judiciously in
deciding which products and services require mandatory certification, and
which product standards should continue.2 6  Several models from
international consumer protection efforts have emerged over the past
twenty years.47 The EC has adopted a substantial amount of community
legislation on consumer issues in the past decade4 s There are at least
three advantages in coordinating domestic consumer protection legislation
with international standards. First, international accords often are
compromise approaches that have sought to balance the interests of more
246. With respect to mandatory product standards, many consumer concerns can be
addressed with labelling requirements rather than the more restrictive mandatory content
standards. As a result, the European Court has been reluctant to uphold product standards as
justified for consumer protection purposes unless important health or safety concerns are at
issue. See Case 788n79, Gilli, 1980 E.C.R. 2071 (Italian prohibition on vinegar not derived
from wine); Case 261/81, Walter Rau v. Smedt, 1982 E.C.R. 3961. In one of the few cases
where a restriction was upheld on consumer protection grounds, the Court upheld Dutch
legislation that prohibited promotions of free gifts with encyclopedia purchases. The measure
was approved because it prevented the consumer from being misled about the actual price of
the product. See A.C. Evans, Economic Policy and the Free Movement of Goods in EEC Law,
32 INT'L & Com'. L. Q. 577, 593 (1983). Laws truly protecting public health have a greater
chance of surviving an Article 30 challenge, although the standard is rigorous. National
authorities may not place the burden on the importer to prove that the product is safe. Case
174/82, Sandoz, 1983 E.C.R. 2445, 2465. The European Court of Justice has employed a rule
of proportionality. For example, if a food additive is authorized in one member state, another
state may not prohibit its import if international scientific research finds that the additive does
not present a substantial risk to public health and the product meets a real consumer need. See
Case 247/84, Motte, 1985 E.C.R. 3887, 3906. In addition, the member state must establish a
petitioning procedure that is readily accessible to traders. See Ministere Public v. Muller, 2
C.M.L.R. 469, 484 (1987).
247. International consumer protection initiatives gained momentum in the 1970s. Prior
efforts were rather vague and tentative due to a lack of understanding about market dynamics.
Legislation also lacked effective public and private enforcement mechanism. See OECD,
CONSUMER POLICY DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS: MAIN DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS
21-22 (1983); OECD, ANNUAL REPORTS ON CONSUMER POLICY IN OECD MEMBER
COUNTRIES (1983). In 1985, the United Nations adopted guidelines for consumer protection.
The guidelines set forth six areas of consumer need: (1) protection from health and safety
hazards, (2) protection of economic interests (e.g., product quality, fairness of contract terms,
and deceptive marketing practices), (3) access to information, (4) education on consumer rights
and market principles, (5) availability of consumer redress, and (6) creation of effective
consumer organizations. Consumer Protection, G.A. Res. 39/248, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess.
106th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. AIRES/39/248 (1985). See David Harland, The United Nations
Guidelines for Consumer Protection, 10 J. CONS. POL'Y 245-66 (1987).
248. In 1975, the EC adopted its first consumer protection program. See Council Resolution
on Preliminary Program of the European Economic Community for Consumer Protection and
Information Policy, 1975 O.J. (C 92) 18. The program was renewed in 1981. 1981 O.J. (C
133) 24. In 1989, the Council adopted a resolution relaunching consumer protection policy.
1989 O.J. (C 294) 32. The European Commission adopted a three-year plan of action in 1990.
See Consumer Policy, supra note 175, § 2. Pursuant to these programs, the EC has initiated
consumer protection legislation on a wide variety of subjects, including product standards,
product safety, unfair contract terms, dangerous substances, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, food
labelling and additives, toys, tourism, financial services, and consumer information. See
generally id.; KRAMER, supra note 38.
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developed countries (which generally have favored more rigorous
consumer protection standards) with those of developing economies
(which tend to favor more liberal approaches). As a result, international
consumer protection programs tend to address the most pressing
consumer protection issues and suggest remedies in a minimally intrusive
manner or in a way that will facilitate economic growth rather than hinder
it.249 Second, multi-national approaches are often drafted in language of
general applicability, leaving to the discretion of individual nation states
or international standard setting organizations the task of filling in the
details.250 Third, since international declarations have influenced national
legislation throughout the world,25' compatibility with international norms
can make Russia more accessible to international markets for both exports
and imports.
Although mandatory standards for many products in Russia may be
unnecessary and counterproductive, some aspects of the current standard-
ization system could be useful in the transition years, and could even
enhance the development of consumer markets. A voluntary product
grading system, for example, modified from the one already in existence,
249. At the EC level, most consumer protection measures have typically taken the form of
Directives, which have required unanimous consent among member nations. Countries resist
rules that exceed domestic standards because of the potential for negative effects on exports
and unemployment. As a result, Community legislation on consumer issues tends to satisfy the
lowest common denominator. See KRAMER, supra note 38, at 44. In a transition economy
where economic growth is of paramount importance, it may make sense to focus initially on
measures that compromise some consumer interests to promote prosperity and employment
opportunities.
250. The EC policy on standards, for example, promotes the issuance of general framework
directives for groups of products, such as heavy machinery or construction equipment. The
European standards bodies (CEN and CENELEC) are then responsible for adopting standards
that meet the criteria of the directives. Products that meet the requirements may be sold in any
EC country. See 1985 O.J. (C 136) 28; Consumer policy, supra note 175, § 4.1. The EC often
adopts so-called minimum directives that permit member states to adopt or retain more stringent
rules. Examples include consumer credit, misleading advertising, product liability, lead content
in automobile fuel, pharmaceutical products and liability insurance for automobiles. These
directives are intended to raise the level of consumer protection community-wide to an
acceptable, minimum level. See KRAMER, supra note 38, at 47-48.
251. In the EC member nations, a variety of national consumer protection laws exist, yet
there is a high degree of similarity. See generally BOURGOIGNIE & TRUBEK, supra note 23,
at 22. General consumer protection laws include Trade Practices Act of 1971 (Belgium);
Marketing Practices Act of June 14, 1974 (Denmark); Consumer Protection Act 38 and
Consumer Ombudsman Act (Jan. 20, 1978) (Finland); Law of July 21, 1983 on consumer
safety (France); Law on the Regulation of General Conditions of Sale (1976) (Germany);
Consumer Information Act of 1978; Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act of 1980
(Ireland); Fair Trading Act of 1971 (Italy); Consumer Protection Act of Aug. 25 1983
(Luxembourg); the Product Control Act of June 11, 1976 (Norway); The Supply of Goods and
Services Act of 1982; Consumer Safety Act of 1978 (United Kingdom). Thomas Trumpy,
Consumer Protection and Product Liability: Europe and the EEC, 11 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 321, 333 (1986). See generally EUROPEAN CONSUMER LAW (Thierry Bourgoignie ed.,
1982).
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could provide consumers with useful information about a product's
quality.252 In the 1980s, Soviet products were given either a "Grade One"
rating, which indicated compliance with certain mandatory standards, or
a "Highest Grade" rating, which satisfied the "highest achievements of
domestic and foreign science and technology. 21 3 Continuing this system
under voluntary conditions would render complex information communi-
cable and allow consumers to learn, at a glance, whether the product was
produced according to the former standards, to higher requirements, or
without regard for any government sanctioned criteria. 4  Products
carrying the "Highest Grade" label should be goods marketable interna-
tionally and presumably would be in high demand for those who could
afford them. As the economy strengthens and disposable incomes
increase, one would expect these types of goods to obtain an increasing
market share and "Grade One" goods to decline in popularity. More
enterprises would then seek to enhance output quality to receive the
higher grade.
Even though Russia already has a large quality-control bureaucracy
to administer such a grading program,2 5 turning it into an effective
system is a difficult task. In the past, individuals responsible for
certifying graded products frequently performed their tasks superficially,
and the grading system was notoriously unreliable.2 6 Moreover, any
grading system is a magnet for corruption, perhaps more so in a market
economy where a higher grade could justify a higher price and larger
profits. Since grading can involve subjective value judgments, mistakes
252. See Zile, supra note 8, at 265-66. On the economic benefits of grading systems in
general, see Cayne & Trebilcock, supra note 152, at 31-32.
253. Initially, there was a third level, "Grade Two," which applied to products not governed
by standards or covered by standards that had become obsolete. This level was removed in
1984. See On Certification of Industrial Output According to Two Categories of Quality, BNA
1984 No. 8, 3-13. In 1985 another adjustment was made. The "highest grade" was eliminated
for light industry products and, in its place, the letter "N" (for "novinka" (innovation)) was
given to novel products and products of enhanced quality. Zile, supra note 8, at 266.
254. The Danish Institute for Informative Labelling, a government supported organization,
licenses the use of its "DVN" label for products conforming to certain minimum standards.
The Underwriters Laboratory in the United States serves a similar function for selected product
lines (e.g., electrical appliances). See Louise Wesswick, A Comparison of Consumer Affairs
in Scandinavia and the U.S., in 29TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN COUNCIL ON
CONSUMER INTERESTS, supra note 37, at 294, 295. The voluntary use of certification marks
is also used throughout much of Europe. REICH & MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN
GERMANY, supra note 29, at 64-67.
255. Zile, supra note 8, at 266-67.
256. "[O]utput quality is assessed, so to speak, by the eye." Zile, supra note 8, at 267,
quoting B. Migachev, Glavnaia rabota-Kachestvo, KOMMUNIST 1987 No. 1, 27.
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and illegal conduct can be difficult to uncover.257 To be effective, the
system must be credible and should be administered by a pluralistically
composed, independent agency. The overriding objective must be to
convey reliable, distilled information in a readily apparent format that will
help consumer markets work better. This, in turn, will improve quality
through increased competition, not by the failed approach of government
fiat. Allowing a voluntary grading program to continue would give this
existing bureaucracy a more useful market enhancing function in the
changing economy.
III. ESTABLISHING ADEQUATE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
The provisions of the Russian consumer act will have little practical
meaning without mechanisms which allow consumers to seek a quick,
inexpensive, and fair resolution of disputes. Traditional approaches to
enforcement focus on three areas: (1) individual action through citizen
claims pursued in the courts or other forums; (2) collective actions by
consumer organizations; and (3) government prosecution of criminal and
civil consumer protection laws. Although the Russian consumer act
outlines an enforcement framework involving each of these mechanisms,
and includes several provisions designed to encourage compliance with
the law, the enforcement scheme suffers from a heavy reliance on
traditional court enforcement by individuals. Unless fundamental changes
are made to ease the burden on individual enforcement and promote
consumers' collective interests more efficiently, few practical benefits will
be realized from the consumer law.
A. Individual Enforcement Through Courts and Other Dispute
Resolution Tribunals
Citizens' experience with law can have a profound influence on their
attitudes toward consumer protection. Consumers in a market economy
generally do not expect government to directly control the commercial
activities of entrepreneurs. Rather, they realize that businesses are given
freedom to conduct their operations as they choose, limited only by the
legal rules that purport to ensure basic fairness. When a merchant breaks
the rules and refuses to offer a voluntary remedy, consumers look to the
law for redress, and can pursue remedies through private action in the
courts or other tribunals. As new abuses of the market expose gaps in
257. See, e.g., Private Cat Meat, Russ. PREss. DIG., Feb. 27, 1992, at 1 available in LEXIS,
Europe Library, RCBLR File (inspections frequently fail to detect dog and cat meat sold in
markets).
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the existing law, consumers may put pressure on legislators to enact
further protective legislation.
Consumers in all nations often find it difficult to obtain redress
through conventional judicial proceedings.258 Not only are they usually
unfamiliar with the law, their claims (absent severe personal injury) often
involve small amounts of money so litigation costs can easily exceed the
amount of the claim. Thus, consumers tend to abandon their claims
rather than pursue an economically unprofitable course.259 On the other
side, businesses are typically "repeat players" in legal controversies.
They have more expertise in legal matters and possess economies of scale
that allow for more efficient litigation. They also have an incentive to
litigate for the creation of precedent as well as for immediate gain; as a
recurrent litigant, they are willing to expend resources to influence the
making of legal rules. Thus, even when a consumer initiates a legal
action, success can be difficult to achieve.2
Despite the numerous difficulties consumers face in relying on the
courts to protect consumer rights, enforcement by individual consumers
through private actions has been important in common law systems where
judges have enforced or even created consumer rights when legislatures
have delayed taking remedial action.26' Judicial decisions can have a
wide reaching precedential effect and thus can inure a benefit to the
public at large even though the decision is based on the facts in a
particular case. Court actions are effective in part because judges and
juries are presented with real fact situations and actual injury to individu-
als. This stands in contrast to the hypothetical debates undertaken in
legislatures or government agencies when they decide issues of public
law. The availability of class actions and generous fee-shifting provi-
sions, as in the United States, has also encouraged private enforcement
by making litigation more cost effective for consumers.262
258. For a comparative survey of consumer difficulties obtaining justice, see Mauro
Cappeletti and Bryant Garth, Access to Justice: The Newest Wave in the Worldwide Movement
to Make Rights Effective, 27 BuFF. L. REV. 181 (1978).
259. See BORRIE, supra note 39, at 36-39.
260. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc. REV. 95, 95-102 (1974); Marc Galanter, Afterwork:
Explaining Litigation, 9 LAW & Soc. REV. 347, 360 (1975).
261. See BORRIE, supra note 39, at 23-24; BOURGOIGNIE & TRUBEK, supra note 23, at
37-38.
262. See BoURGOIGNIE & TRUBEK, supra note 23, at 38-39. Often consumer class actions
are expressly authorized in consumer statutes. See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1640(a)(1988) (limiting liability in class action to the lesser of $500,000 or one percent of
the net worth of the creditor); IND. CODE § 24-5-0.5-4 (Supp. 1992) (authorizing class actions
in deceptive sales act). Class actions can be difficult to sustain in practice because they
generally can be used only when neither individual suits nor joint actions by small groups of
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1. Private Enforcement in Russia
Despite their cognitive appeal, private judicial actions seem unlikely
to play a major role in guaranteeing Russian consumer rights. Certain
characteristics of the Russian judicial system reduce the effectiveness of
private actions. Decisions by courts carry little precedential weight, so
any collective benefits of a consumer victory will be diluted. Moreover,
the court system is presently ill-equipped to resolve consumer disputes.
During the Soviet regime, judges in the people's courts commanded little
respect, seldom decided cases involving merchants, and were not trained
263in commercial laws and practices. The state arbitrazh system, which
resolved commercial disputes between state enterprises, frequently
decided cases on political grounds or in a manner that furthered the
central economic plan. Thus, its resources are of limited use in the
general courts.26  In addition, lawyers in Russia are still relatively
scarce,265 so obtaining effective assistance of counsel may be difficult for
some time. Further class actions, as well as contingent fees, have not
been recognized, and the consumer act does not contain fee-shifting
provisions.266
injured consumers are practical, and there must be common questions of law and fact among
class members. This is often the case in consumer cases, however, where the legality of a form
contract may be at issue. Class relief is rare in Europe, but the concept has generated some
interest among lawmakers. See OECD, CONSUMER POLICY DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS:
MAIN DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS, supra note 247, at 31-32; MAYER, supra note 31, at
146.
263. Judges are not well paid, court buildings are ill-equipped and in deteriorating condition,
and there is a high turnover in clerical personnel because salaries are low. These factors
relegated judges to low prestige and increased their dependence on the Party apparatus.
Quigley, supra note 101, at 68. Even though the judicial system is undergoing reform, see
infra note 267, judges still suffer from inexperience and unfamiliarity with the law. See Peter
Barenboim, Keynote Address, INT'L BAR NEWS Aug./Sept. 1992, at 33. (judges are either young
and inexperienced or from the old system and lack experience in new legislation; many
decisions are highly debatable).
264. Olimpiad S. loffe, Soviet Law and the New Economic Experiment, in SOVIET LAW AND
ECONOMY, supra note 222, at 6.
265. Until the mid-nineteenth century, Russia lacked a professional class of lawyers, a
professional legal literature, a comprehensive body of legislation, or an autonomous court
system. Berman, supra note 225, at 11. According to the Soviet Minister of Justice, "[Iln the
conditions of legal reform, we will require in the next few years at least 50,000 [advocates]."
Parkhomovskii, Advocates and Bureaucrats, IZVESTIA, Aug. 27, 1988, at 3, quoted in Eugene
Huskey, Between Citizen and State: The Soviet Bar (Advokstura) Under Gorbachev, 11
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 95, 108 n. 57. See supra note 83. A growing and politically active
bar in Russia is taking hold, however. See Quigley, supra note 83, at 222 (discussing the
formation of a Union of Advocates whose stated goal was to promote a "socialist state under
the rule of law").
266. These conditions are generally true throughout most of Europe. The contingent fee
system does not exist, and claimants normally pay their own litigation costs. There is little pre-
trial discovery in civil cases and punitive damages are generally unrecoverable. All of these
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Not only is Russia's legal system ill-equiped to resolve consumer
complaints on a large scale, the Russian people are simply not inclined
toward litigation. For most of this century, citizens generally did not
expect the courts to dispense justice fairly. The Soviet judicial system
(now undergoing reform)267 was notoriously inefficient, and often
corrupt.268 Citizen complaints about the administration of justice ranked
second only to complaints about housing shortages.269 It may be years
before citizens learn to view the courts as trustworthy guarantors of their
rights. They may therefore be reluctant to initiate consumer complaints
in the courts, even when they have sufficient knowledge and financial
resources to do so. Moreover, socialism stressed collective effort over
individualism, and conciliation over confrontation.27° Litigation tends to
be a competitive, aggressive undertaking. Consumer lawsuits are contests
between individuals, and they generally result in winners and losers.
From a cultural perspective, the Russian people may find litigation less
appealing than other forms of dispute resolution. 271
factors make litigation an unattractive consumer enforcement mechanism. See BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY, supra note 125, at 19-92. The situation is slightly better in
England and Ireland, where pre-trial discovery is available and the losing party may have to
pay the litigation costs of both parties. Id.
267. In 1988, amendments to the Soviet Constitution prohibited "[a]ny interference in the
operation of judges ... in the administration of justice ... " KONST. SSSR, art. 155; translated
in Law of the USSR: On Amendments and Adaptations to the Constitution (Fundamental Law)
of the USSR, 15 REV. SOCIALIST L. 76 (1989). See also BASIC SOVIET DOCUMENTS, supra note
101, at 167-214 (translated USSR laws on court organization, status of judges and constitution-
al supervision); Quigley, supra note 101, at 70-73 (describing old and new systems for
selecting judges, and summarizing the law on judicial status).
268. Indeed, the entire judicial system, as well as the police and procuracy, was employed
principally to support and strengthen the regime in power. IoFFE, supra note 223, at 12.
Historically, judges were selected from the Party's nomenklatura list, and their activities were
supervised by Party administrative organs. Decisions were often based on behind-the-scenes
Party interference. Beissinger, supra note 220, at 51. According to the Chief Justice of the
USSR Supreme Court, "under the guise of organizational guidance, the Ministry of Justice has
interfered in literally all aspects of the activity of the courts." What Kind of Court Do We
Need?, PRAVDA, July 16, 1989, at 2, quoted in John Quigley, Law Reform and the Soviet
Courts, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L 59, 66.
269. Solomon, supra note 220, at 15, 18. See Peter B. Maggs, Law, in THE SOVIET UNION
TODAY 339 (James Cracraft ed., 2d ed. 1988). In a June 1987 speech at the Party Conference,
Gorbachev criticized the legal system for being "largely oriented not on democratic or
economic but on command-style methods..." EKLOF, supra note 9, at 71.
270. See Berman, supra note 225, at 12. Berman characterizes Soviet law as "parental,"
emphasizing loyalty, discipline, and social conscience, rooted partly in Russian history and
culture but guided by the Communist Party. Id. See also id. at 4 (discussing "Russian cultural
need for unity and a common destiny"); Id. at 10 (individual rights subordinate to interests of
socialism).
271. See Heuman, supra note 221, at 26-27 ("a concept of citizen's rights comparable to
what emerged in Western Europe during the French Revolution had never developed in Tsarist
Russia .... Law [must] gain a stature basic to the rights of the individual and the society
rather than being secondary to political and ethical considerations."). The lack of a strong legal
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The consumer protection statute recognizes some of these difficulties
by creating incentives for consumers to file claims. The law follows the
modem trend in consumer legislation by giving individuals the choice of
commencing legal actions in their place of residence, in the defendant's
place of residence, or in the location where the injury occurred.27 It also
states that the court may waive filing fees in consumer cases.2 '
Available remedies are liberal and include actual as well as "moral"
damages.2 74 Actual damages under civil law would include not only out-
of-pocket losses, but also loss of future income such as lost salary from
being unable to work.2" Lost earning potential is based on actual past
income for those who are employed; for those who do not hold jobs, such
as minors, compensation is at the rate for unskilled labor unless the
person can demonstrate a greater earning capacity. 76 Moral damages are
not defined in the statute but would include non-property "pain and
suffering" and other psychological damages, but probably not punitive
damages.2 7 Moral damages are not mandatory and may be awarded at
the court's discretion, though the statute provides no guidance on the
criteria for imposing them.27
The law also creates two statutory penalties that are paid directly to
consumers. If a seller of goods delays in the repair or replacement of a
defective product, or delays in providing a mandatory "loaner" while
repairs are being made, the merchant must pay the consumer one percent
of the product's purchase price for each day of delay. 9 If a provider of
services fails to meet contract deadlines, the provider must pay the
consumer three percent of the daily or hourly rate for each day or hour
of delay, or three percent of the total contract price if there is no periodic
tradition in Russia - beginning with tsars' unwillingness to subordinate their divine right to
the rule of law - supported the view that law was a Western phenomenon less relevant to the
Russian people. See Solomon, supra note 220, at 21.
272. Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, art. 16.
273. IU
274. /M. art. 13.
275. RSFSR Civil Code, supra note 18, § 459.
276. Id. § 465. If a person dies as a result of another's wrongful act, compensation for lost
maintenance is paid to her dependents, again based on the person's expected future earnings.
If the victim is the defendant's employee, however, the employer pays no damages and the
victim (or his dependents) receive only the state pension amount unless they can prove that the
defendant was at fault. In one celebrated case, a bus fell into a river, killing the driver and
passengers. While the dependents of the passengers were awarded damages in excess of the
state pension under the no-fault liability doctrine governing "dangerous activities," see supra
note 48, the dependents of the driver received only the pension because they could not prove
fault.
277. See IorFr, supra note 18, at 307; see also BuTLER, supra note 42, at 182.
278. Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, art. 13.
279. Id. art. 21.
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rate for the service."o
In addition to these penalties recoverable by the consumer, if a
merchant fails to "voluntarily" satisfy a consumer's claim in any respect,
a court may order the merchant to pay the local government a fine equal
to the value of the claim.sI As with the moral damages allowance, the
law gives no guidance as to the circumstances that justify the imposition
of a fine when a merchant contests a consumer's claim. The statute, read
literally, allows a court to impose a fine even if the merchant has a
tenable position and contests the claim in good faith. While this may
seem unfair, it creates an added incentive to cooperate with the consumer
and serves a deterrent function similar to the imposition of attorney's fees
upon losing merchants under the consumer statutes of many other nations.
Such statutes often provide that the consumer may recover fees even if
the merchant disputes the claim in good faith.2"2
The provisions for moral damages and penalties are clearly designed
to make it more economically attractive for consumers to bring legal
actions.2"3 Since compensation for non-property harm was not recognized
under Russian civil law until recently,2" the recognition of moral
damages is an expansion of traditional consumer remedies, which
280. Ld. art. 29(4).
281. kIt art. 11(6).
282. See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1988); see also Magnuson-Moss
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (1975). Most state consumer protection laws also provide for the
award of attorney's fees to prevailing consumers. J. SHELDON, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE AcrS
AND PRACTICEs § 8.6 (2d ed. 1988). In many instances, the consumer can recover attorney's
fees even if the case ends in a favorable settlement rather than a court judgment. See James
v. Home Constr. Co., 689 F. 2d 1357 (11 th Cir. 1982). Many state laws, however, provide that
fees may be awarded to the "prevailing" party, which could be the merchant. See, e.g., IND.
CODE § 24-5-0.5-4(a) (1992). This can be a significant disincentive to bringing a private
action. J. SPANOGLE ET AL., CONSUMER LAW 803 (2d ed. 1991).
283. The penalty provisions are particularly important because the most common means of
obtaining redress is the consumer complaining to the merchant and seeking voluntary refund,
repair, or replacement. See Arthur Best & Alan R. Andreasen, Consumer Response to
Unsatisfactory Purchases: A Survey of Perceiving Defects, Voicing Complaints and Obtaining
Redress, 11 LAw & Soc: REV. 701, 725-30 (1976); see also H. Laurence Ross & Neil 0.
Littlefield, Complaint as a Problem Solving Mechanism, 12 LAW & SoC. REV. 199 (1977).
While many merchants will accommodate the consumer to facilitate good will and repeat
business, the consumer is usually at the mercy of the merchant, who knows that the likelihood
of a court suit, or even a complaint to the Better Business Bureau, is remote. Fines and
penalties can offset this inequality of power and provide an additional incentive for voluntary
compliance.
284. Traditionally, moral or intangible damages, like pain and suffering or loss of reputation,
were not recognized under Russian law. IoFFE, supra note 18, at 307; BUTLER, supra note 42,
at 182. In 1991, the Soviet legislature modified this to permit the recovery of moral damages
in cases where the defendant was at fault. See Fundamentals of Civil Legislation, supra note
47, art. 131. See also Declarations of Human Rights and Freedoms, Vedomosti SSSR, Issue
No. 37, Item No. 1083 (1991), translated in LEGAL MATERIALS, supra note 1, item no. 3.
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otherwise could be quite small. The Russian social insurance system
pays for most medical care and pensions for those who cannot work.
Thus, if a product defect causes substantial personal injury, or even
disability, the actual out-of-pocket loss to the consumer might be
minor.25 The opportunity to recover for non-property injury, like pain
and suffering, should encourage consumers to bring legal actions against
merchants who sell defective goods, thereby increasing incentives to
produce safe products and redistributing income from those who cause
the suffering to those who endure it.
Four categories of statutory penalties already existed for various
violations of law in Russia: (1) penalties payable to the injured party in
addition to actual damages; (2) penalties that guaranteed minimum
recovery but reduced recovery for actual damages by a like amount; (3)
penalties that were recoverable instead of actual damages at the injured
party's discretion; and (4) penalties that replaced actual damages and
foreclosed their recovery.286 The penalties in the consumer act fall into
the first category, which is the most generous for the claimant. Their
payment does not eliminate the consumer's choice of other remedies and
does not reduce any compensation for actual damages.
The provisions for penalties in the consumer act are a welcome
legacy of the planned economy. In a system where production materials
often were in short supply, state enterprises were more interested in
securing performance of the obligation than receiving compensation for
losses caused by nonperformance.287 If scarce goods were not delivered,
actual losses might be difficult to prove and, even if collected, substitute
goods might be unavailable. Penalties served to create additional
incentives to perform in the first instance. Consumers likewise are more
interested in prompt performance of a merchant's obligations, and in
voluntary compliance with the law, than in obtaining monetary compensa-
tion for unlawful conduct. Especially in the transition years, this will
continue to be important as many consumer goods remain in short supply.
Monetary damages will not keep food cold if a defective refrigerator is
285. While social insurance would compensate most victims, it was set at a rate slightly
lower than actual earnings to encourage the bringing of suits. BUTLER, supra note 42, at 180.
The monetary incentives for bringing suit should be greater in a market economy as wages
increase and the disparity between the pension and lost earnings grows for individuals
employed in higher paying fields.
286. See IoFFE, supra note 18, at 193-95; BUTLER, supra note 42, at 177; RSFSR CIVIL
CODE, supra note 18, § 189. Penalties and liquidated damages can be stipulated by law or
contract. Id § 188. If the state considered the obligation especially important, the penalty was
prescribed by law. Some statutory penalties were fixed in amount, while others compounded
(for example, 3% per day for late payment). IoiFE, supra note 18, at 195.
287. See loFFE, supra note 18, at 191-92.
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not promptly repaired. Statutory penalties may encourage more timely
service by creating an additional incentive for a merchant to comply
voluntarily.288
While the consumer act promises generous remedies, it leaves intact
other aspects of the civil law compensation scheme that can reduce the
damages recoverable by a person who is injured by the actions of
another. One such doctrine links damage recovery to the defendant's
financial ability to pay.289 If an individual or small business does not
have the means to satisfy a large damage award, the award can be
reduced to an affordable sum. From the government's perspective, this
may have made economic sense in a planned economy. If the defendant
was a state operated business, reducing the damage award saved the
enterprise money. If the defendant was an individual who could only
satisfy a large award by using the remainder of his life earnings,
enforcing the award might make the defendant a ward of the state
drawing on the state pension funds.2'
In a market economy where individuals and businesses are operating
for their own personal gain with their own funds at risk, insolvency laws
are usually the means by which the law reduces large damage awards.
A bankruptcy decree may reduce the award (and all other debts propor-
tionately) or may establish a deferred payment plan that treats similarly
situated creditors equally.29' While the civil law concept of reducing
damage awards based on ability to pay could be retained even when a
functioning bankruptcy system develops, it would seem redundant and
could result in unfairness. If general creditors weaken the position of a
business by enforcing claims, or by taking security shortly before a
consumer obtains a large judgment in a product liability action, the debtor
288. The availability of a minimum damage recovery has been an important factor in the
level of voluntary compliance with consumer laws such as the Truth in Lending Act in the
United States. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e)(1988). A successful consumer litigant under the Truth
in Lending Act may also recover court costs and attorneys' fees, which provide even greater
incentive for private enforcement. 15 U.S.C. § 640(a)(3)(1988).
289. RSFSR CIVIL CODE, supra note 18, § 458.
290. Procedures for compensation vary depending on whether the plaintiff qualifies for
social insurance and whether the defendant paid social insurance premiums on behalf of the
plaintiff. See id. §§ 460, 461,463. If the plaintiff receives social insurance death or disability
benefits, the tort-feasor who caused the injury must reimburse the government pension fund.
Id. § 463.
291. See DANIEL R. COWANS, COWANS BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.13 (1986).
With limited exceptions, most judgments arising out of tort or contract in the United States are
discharged in bankruptcy proceedings. Id. §§ 5.69, 6.6. The creditor's amount of recovery on
the debt will depend on the priority status of the claim under the law. Generally speaking,
creditors who have perfected liens on the debtor's property have priority over general creditors.
If assets are not available to satisfy fully the claims of general creditors, they share pro rata.
See id §§ 12.22, 12.35.
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will be unable to pay the consumer, while the other creditors' positions
are unchanged. In a bankruptcy, the prior creditors may lose their
preferred position and be forced to share equally in the reduction of their
claims. 92
Despite the incentives for private action set forth in the consumer act,
the fact remains that most consumer injuries are small, and Russian
consumers, like consumers everywhere, are not likely to pursue their
rights through traditional private actions. The Russian governments
(central, republic, or local) should consider adopting a more "consumer
friendly" enforcement scheme. Mediation or arbitration boards - run by
local governments, trade unions,-or even associations of local business -
may be able to resolve minor disputes more quickly and informally. If
properly designed, these boards can also offer a higher level of expertise
in consumer matters compared to most judges in the courts of general
jurisdiction.
The Public Complaints Board in the Nordic countries provides a
working model. 293 A complaints board develops expertise by dividing
into sections that correlate with particular industries historically prone to
consumer complaints such as motor vehicles, insurance, or electrical
appliances. 294 Membership includes consumer and commercial representa-
tives in each department, plus individuals experienced in the law or those
with judicial experience. 29 This creates the appearance, at least, of
292. One of the central policies of bankruptcy law is the proportionate treatment of similarly
situated creditors. "Preferences" are acts favoring one or more existing creditors over the
others. The policy of equal treatment of creditors would be defeated if the debtor could chose
among creditors and then file for bankruptcy, or if one creditor obtained a lien on the debtor's
property shortly before bankruptcy. In the United States, bankruptcy law permits reaching back
in time to invalidate certain asset transfers made prior to filing a bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C.
§ 547 (1986); COWANS, supra note 291, § 10.7.
293. For a description of the board and statistics on its operations, see BERNADETTE
DEMEULENAERE, SWEDEN'S SYSTEM TO RESOLVE CONSUMER DISPUTES ch..2 (1983). See also
DONALD B. KING, CONSUMER PROTECTION EXPERIMENTS IN SWEDEN 19 (1974); Wesswick,
supra note 254, at 294, 296. In the United States, alternative fora for resolving consumer
disputes have become more popular since Congress enacted the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act
in 1975, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-11 (1975). The Act provides that if a seller establishes an
informal dispute settlement procedure complying with Federal Trade Commission rules, the
consumer must avail himself of that procedure before bringing suit in court. Manufacturer-
sponsored settlement procedures became commonplace in resolving disputes over defective
automobiles as states passed "lemon laws" in the 1980s that incorporated the FTC rules. See
Robert D. Honigman, The New "Lemon Laws": Expanding UCC Remedies, 17 UCC L.J. 116
(1984).
294. By decree in 1980, the complaints board in Sweden was divided into ten divisions:
travel, motor vehicles, electrical appliances, boats, textiles, laundry, footwear, furs, insurance
and miscellaneous. DEMEULENAERE, supra note 293, at 17.
295. Consumer representatives in Sweden are chosen from trade unions, consumer
organizations, or the National Swedish Board of Consumer Policies - the government
authority on consumer policy. Industry members are usually chosen from trade associations
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offering a balanced view. In Sweden, the Board hears cases by written
petition of a consumer under simplified procedures and charges no fee for
the service.296 Although the decisions of the Board are only non-binding
recommendations for resolving the claim, the recommendations are often
followed because they are influential in any subsequent court action on
the claim.297
A variation of the complaints board used in England may be viable
in Russia after the private sector matures. The Office of Fair Trading,
together with various trade associations, has negotiated codes of practice
and arbitration procedures to resolve consumer complaints. Arrangements
are made for low cost arbitration, usually on the basis of documents only,
with a national, independent arbitration association.29 Disputes are
resolved without the consumer or the entrepreneur losing a day's work.
Such an informal dispute resolution system has obvious advantages over
litigation. Procedures are simpler and less cumbersome, and decisionma-
kers try to mediate a settlement in order to avoid the lengthy litigation
process.29
There may, however, be hidden costs. Decisionmakers in arbitrations
and other informal tribunals may have inadequate legal training and often
seek a rough sense of justice rather than adhering to the law.'0 Since the
Russian consumer act creates a generous assortment of consumer rights,
this may work to the claimant's disadvantage. Nevertheless, since
consumers are often unrepresented by counsel in small matters, they find
it difficult to argue the technical application of the law anyway, so the
"rough justice" aspect of informal dispute resolution may ultimately favor
consumers more often than not. To the extent this deficiency is deemed
significant, it can be remedied by making the decisions nonbinding on the
parties. The informal resolution would be a prerequisite to suit in the
in the subject industry. Id.
296. The consumer usually initiates the complaint by telephone call. Most complaints are
resolved by advice given over the phone. If the consumer decides to request a resolution by
the board, she completes a short pre-printed form, simply stating the alleged facts and request-
ing a particular remedy. If the written request is deemed not frivolous, the board will send the
complaint to the merchant, who may then reply. The reply is forwarded to the consumer, who
may file a counter-reply. Often the exchange of correspondence results in a settlement. Id. at
26-30, 33.
297. Id. at 36-38. The compliance rate is also high because trade associations (with
government encouragement) put pressure on members to cooperate. One study showed
compliance exceeding 75 percent. Id, at 37-38.
298. See BORRIE, supra note 39, at 38-39.
299. See Weyman I. Lundquist, Alternative Dispute Resolution as a Settlement Strategy in
the Wake of Perdue v. Crocker National Bank, 43 Bus. LAw 1095 (1988).
300. See Stephen Mindell, Report on 1986 Changes in Laws Affecting Consumer Protection,
196 N.Y. L.J. 1 (Aug. 21, 1986).
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courts, and would likely resolve a large percentage of claims while
leaving the consumer the option of bringing a court action at a later date.
Nevertheless, deciding cases solely on the basis of documents can
prejudice consumers. While it saves time and money for the parties and
decisionmakers, studies show that oral presentations allow consumers to
present their case more completely, to rebut the merchant's contradictory
information, and to supply missing materials that are relevant to the
decision. Oral testimony also deters decisionmakers from deciding cases
without thorough study, and serves to remove any appearance of
manufacturer bias or secrecy. 30' This could be an important benefit as
Russia attempts to instill confidence in the market and in consumer
dispute resolution forums generally.
A better alternative is a small claims court that has jurisdiction to
resolve matters involving small amounts of money. Like a public
complaints board, procedures in a small claims court are simplified, but
the ruling is made by a judge after receiving both written and oral
evidence. The decision is usually binding on the parties, with a limited
right to appeal.3 2  Unlike informal private mediation or arbitration
proceedings, however, small claims proceedings - which are a matter of
public record - have the advantage of providing a greater opportunity
for the government to publicize consumer victories and thereby extend
the benefits of the decision to the public at large.30 3 In a country where
class actions are not allowed, and court decisions carry little precedential
weight, publicizing consumer victories can be the principal means of
empowering consumers collectively through individual initiative.
If the procedures in a small claims court are readily understandable,
and the amount in controversy is low, the consumer will usually not need
the services of an attorney. Although the existing trial court proceedings
in the first level Russian courts have generally not been complicated in
the past, consumers might benefit from a small claims tribunal specifical-
ly designed to resolve minor consumer problems.3' The jurisdiction of
301. Id.
302. Small claims acts place a limit on the amount in controversy. See BORRIE, supra note
39, at 38 (500 British pounds); see DEMEULENAERE, supra note 293, at 59 (8,900 Swedish
Crowns in 1982). Wisser v. Kaufman Carpet Co., 458 A.2d 119 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1983) (treble damages under Consumer Fraud Act denied because amount would exceed $1,000
jurisdictional limit). Formal rules of evidence generally do not apply.
303. See lain Ramsay, Consumer Redress Mechanisms for Poor Quality and Defective
Products, 31 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 149 (1981).
304. Studies have shown that small claims courts generally serve consumer interests well,
although the benefits can be diluted where creditors have access to the court as a swift means
of collecting consumer debts. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONSUMER JUSTICE, REDRESS OF
CONSUMER GRIEVANCES 13-14 (1973).
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the small claims judge could be limited to particular categories of claims
(e.g., disputes between consumers and merchants, service providers, or
landlords), which would assist judges in acquiring expertise in specific
areas of law. To encourage settlements, the small claims judges could
mediate the dispute and not merely sit in the traditional role of an
impartial decisionmaker. °5 Since the amount in controversy will be low,
a small claims law could provide for only a limited right of appeal.
Appeal would be allowed, for example, only when the appellate court
deems the case important for precedential value, when new evidence has
surfaced after the hearing, or when the judge clearly relied on an
incorrect interpretation of the law.306 This can further reduce costs and
ensure a faster resolution of the claim.
2. Potential Complications
A defining characteristic of new market economies is the rapid expan-
sion of small, transient businesses that operate on sidewalks, open air
markets, or in other temporary locations. 37  Traditional consumer
remedies like those envisioned by the consumer act, or even less formal
dispute resolution forums, may not be effective against these merchants.
If a consumer attempts to return defective goods for repair or exchange,
the merchant may be gone; if a lawsuit is filed, service of process may
be difficult; if a judgment is obtained, it may be impossible to collect.
This is a minor problem in more developed economies because consum-
ers' contact with transient merchants is relatively infrequent and usually
involves small amounts of money. In the evolving market economies of
the former Soviet states, however, this could lead to widespread consumer
dissatisfaction in the transition years because consumers may have as
much contact with these new, transient merchants as with more perma-
nent business establishments.
Resolving this problem may require a more creative solution. Local
305. See, e.g., Swedish Small Claims Act § 6, discussed in DEMEULENAERE, supra note 293,
at 69 (noting that the court must attempt to form a settlement unless there are special reasons
to the contrary). Most cases are settled before judgment. Id. at 71. Mediation and compro-
mise, however, might result in "watering down" a consumer's rights under law. To expand the
public benefits of a private action, the small claims court might be given authority to publicize
a "blacklist" of habitual offenders. See Ramsay, supra note 303, at 144.
306. See Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure § 22, discussed in DEMEULENAERE, supra note
293, at 77.
307. Soviet leaders often express frustration at the abundance of peddlers and decry the
emergence of "bazaars" as the most visible sign of free markets. See Valeri Vyahutovich, A
Change of Leader, or Change of Course?, WE/MBI, Jan. 11-24, 1993, at 1-2. Western
observers, on the other hand, see the explosion of sidewalk vendors as a healthy symbol of
envigorated entrepreneurial initiative. See Judy, supra note 72, at 8.
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authorities could require the licensing of transient merchants and periodic
renewal of those licenses. To obtain a license renewal, the merchant or
her agent could be required to appear in a designated office at an
appointed day and time every other month. Dissatisfied consumers could
then appear at that time to register their complaints before a mediator.
The consumer's receipt for the product or service would set forth the
location and time of the merchant's scheduled appearance. The draw-
backs to this approach, a variation of which was proposed to the
Bulgarian government, 3°s are that it requires a modest bureaucracy and
regular enforcement efforts (to make sure licensed merchants are
providing the receipts and showing up at the hearings, and that unlicensed
merchants do not continue to operate), but its implementation could give
consumers confidence that effective remedies are available when a
product fails. It may also increase the incentives for merchants to
improve the quality of their goods and services and thereby minimize
time spent resolving consumer complaints.
3. The Importance of Educating the Public
Even the most easily accessible dispute resolution schemes cannot
succeed unless consumers are aware of their rights and know how to
pursue them. Consumer education is therefore a critical part of any
private enforcement scheme, and here the consumer act is silent.
Consumer education is especially important in former communist
countries where consumers' experience with free markets has been limited
and, consequently, a market culture lies undeveloped. While Russian
citizens may know the basics of socialist economics, they may be
confused and frustrated by the fundamentals of market exchange and
entrepreneurial behavior for some time.3" Education can assist consum-
ers in better understanding their changing economy, influence their
expectations concerning the strengths and weaknesses of market
economies, and promote greater knowledge of the laws that have been
enacted to protect their interests. Education can thereby help ease some
of the dissatisfaction that is bound to exist until the economy is operating
more efficiently.
308. See Concept Paper on Consumer Protection for Bulgaria, A.B.A. CENT. & E. EUR.
L. INITIATIVE, Nov. 25, 1992, at 9.
309. A market culture might be characterized by two major features: a willingness to accept
the outcomes of market decisions as the result of the impersonal interaction of market forces,
rather than imposing moral judgments on the forces at work; and a system of business ethics
that resists extortion, bribery, fraud and other illegal conduct. Both are lacking in Russia today.
See JONES& MOSKOFF, supra note 7, at 131.
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Consumer education in school curricula is mandatory in some
nations. ° Critical concepts need not be taught as separate subjects but
can be incorporated into instruction on economics, ecology, political
science, communications, journalism, and other subjects.3 '1  Important
messages to convey include the theoretical operation of market forces,
the role consumers and consumer organizations play in policing market
behavior, the appropriate mechanisms for obtaining redress for personal
and economic injury, and the function of advertising and the mass media
in market activity. In addition, during the transition years, general
instruction in business ethics could -provide a moral foundation for
tomorrow's entrepreneurs. Perhaps equally important, it could also help
overcome widely held beliefs that private enterprise is necessarily
associated with speculation, consumer deception, exploitation of the
working people, and extortionate practices.
Effective educational programs outside the schools may be more
difficult to design and implement. Many individuals have little interest
in consumer protection issues until they have been victimized by an
unfair contract or otherwise injured by an unscrupulous business practice.
To counter this tendency, many nations have initiated adult consumer
education programs through the broadcast of television and radio
shows, 31 the publication of consumer magazines 31 4 and the distribution
of short pamphlets, buying guides, or even comic books written in easily
understood language.31 5 These may be sponsored by a government
310. See MAYER, supra note 31, at 143.
311. In a national survey conducted by the Opinion Research Group and sponsored by the
Consumer Federation of America, 91% of consumers favored mandatory instruction in high
school on money matters and consumer credit management. CONSUMER CREDIT, INSTALLMENT
CREDIT GUIDE (CCH), Report No. 629, at 3 (Apr. 29, 1992).
312. See JONES & MOSKOFF, supra note 7, at 131 (quoting a Russian folk saying: "If you
want to sell something, you have to cheat."). See also supra notes 225-33. Overcoming this
perception will be difficult. Since runaway inflation has wiped out the savings of most Russian
citizens, today's private investment is largely being undertaken by former black market
millionares, corrupt officials, or individuals who cashed in on lucrative arbitrage opportunities
in recent months. See Judy, supra note 72, at 10-11. ,
313. In France, for example, the National Institute of Consumption was allocated 24 minutes
of prime-time television each week to discuss consumer protection matters. MAYER, supra note
31, at 143.
314. Consumer magazines like Consumer Reports in the United States, Which? in England,
and Stiftung Warenkest in Germany contain a wealth of information about consumer products,
test results, and related matters. Their circulation, however, tends to favor more affluent, highly
educated consumers who are avid information seekers and has limited effect on the lower social
classes. See id. at 143; see generally HANS B. THORELLI ET AL., THE INFORMATION SEEKERS
(1975).
315. Thorelli, supra note 37, at 152. For example, in Denmark the government funds the
Home Economics Council, which disseminates consumer information in periodicals, booklets,
daily and weekly press reports, radio and television programs, as well as direct contact with
Summer 19931
Michigan Journal of International Law
agency responsible for consumer protection, like the Federal Trade
Commission in the United States, or by consumer organizations with
government financial support.316 At the local level, consumer advice
centers, like those used in Great Britain, can provide individualized
information on the quality of products sold locally, as well as guidance
in resolving post-purchase complaints.3 7
B. Amplifying the Consumer's Voice Through
Consumer Organizations
All of the redress mechanisms discussed above - private action in
the courts and various forms of informal dispute resolution - suffer from
one fundamental weakness: Their outcomes depend significantly on the
relative competence and power of the parties to the dispute. These
mechanisms isolate the individual's complaint, which often will seem
small and hardly worth pursuing, and ignore the larger collective injury
to consumers in the aggregate. By fragmenting consumer interests, these
dispute resolution mechanisms thus attack only the "tip of the iceberg,"
and the bulk of consumer injury remains undisturbed below the surface.
To truly empower the Russian consumer, the focus should shift to
encouraging collective activity that will increase the competence of those
representing consumer interests and correct the imbalance of power.
Class actions and consumer organizations can further these goals.
While the consumer act does not permit class actions per se, it does
envision a role for collective action through consumer associations. By
consolidating their interests and financial resources, consumers can
amplify their voice and more effectively enforce the laws designed for
their protection. Because consumer organizations are "repeat players,"
they can generate strong technical and financial support. Like large
merchants, consumer organizations have an incentive to pursue relatively
small claims in order to establish rules that will benefit consumers
collectively.
consumers. Much information is provided to school teachers for classroom use, and the
Council arranges lectures in schools, shopping centers, and town centers. Wesswick, supra note
254, at 294-95.
316. See, e.g., BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, ANNUAL REPORT
TO CONGRESS ON TRUTH IN LENDING FOR THE YEAR 1970, at 14-16 (1971)(following
enactment of the Truth in Lending Act, the Federal Reserve Board engaged in an extensive
campaign to educate consumers about their rights under that credit disclosure law).
317. See LowE & WOODROFFE, supra note 125, at 5. The British model has been followed
in Hong Kong and Portugal. See IOCU NEWSLETTER, March 1986; IOCU NEWSLETTER,
July-Aug. 1986. In Norway, consumer counseling committees operate in every county. See
infra note 355.
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Consumer organizations can be privately run or government assisted.
In the past twenty years, well organized nongovernmental consumer
groups have litigated issues of great significance and have actively
participated in the political process in North America. Organizations
with greater government support represent consumers throughout much
of Europe. In the United Kingdom, the National Consumer Council acts
as a consumer advocate, combining lobbying and research efforts to
protect consumer rights.319 In the Netherlands, private consumer
organizations are compensated by the government when they are
consulted on policy issues,32' and in Germany the Association of
Consumers receives substantial government funding for its participation
in legislative affairs.32'
Another collective benefit provided by consumer organizations is the
testing of products to evaluate their safety and quality. The most
successful of these programs are the Consumers Union in the United
318. The organization of consumer groups in industrialized countries can be viewed on a
continuum, with the degree of government involvement as the variable. In the United States
and Canada, consumerism was a grass roots phenomenon that spawned influential organizations
like the Consumers Union (U.S.) and the Consumers Association (Canada) without much
government funding. At the other end of the continuum are the Scandinavian countries, where
consumer ombuds represent consumer interests at a high level of government. See MAYER,
supra note 31, at 141-42; Lawrence E. Rose, The Role of Interest Groups in Collective Interest
Policy-Making: Consumer Protection in Norway and the United States, 9 EUR. J. POL. RES. 17
(1981). In the United States, some efforts have been made at the federal level to provide
taxpayer funding for consumer representation, e.g., the Magnuson-Moss Warranty - Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act provided that under certain circumstances consumer
organizations could be compensated for participating in FTC rulemaking proceedings. Pub. L.
No. 93-637, § 202(a), 88 Stat. 2193, 2157 (1975). Other federal agencies, such as the
Consumer Product Safety Commission, have funded consumer participation under implied
grants of power. See BOURGOIGNIE & TRUBEK, supra note 23, at 37.
319. The National Consumer Council's principal function is to represent consumer interests
with government policymakers. It does not deal with the complaints of individual consumers.
Other government-sponsored consumers offices include the Department of Trade and Industry
(through the Under Secretary of State for Industry and Consumer Affairs) and the Office of
Fair Trading, the statutory guardian against unfair and deceptive practices. In many English
cities, Consumer Advice Councils advise consumer on various matters as well. See LOWE &
WOODROFFE, supra note 125, at 3-5. In 1978 the Consumers in the European Community
Group was formed in the United Kingdom as an umbrella organization of the most important
British consumer associations. The group publishes statements and reports on consumer
activities in the EC. KRAMER, supra note 38, at 39.
320. See MAYER, supra note 31, at 142, citing Koopman, Consumer Policy in the
Netherlands (June 26, 1986)(unpublished document, Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs).
321. The Association of Consumers is an umbrella organization centered in Bonn that
coordinates the activities of groups claiming to represent consumer interests. It serves primarily
to give consumers a meaningful voice in political affairs and advises the government at the
national and European level. See REICH & MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN GERMANY,
supra note 29, at 5. At the Community level, the EC Commission has consulted with six
consumer organizations: three trade unions, the European Secretariat of the International Union
of Family Cooperation, the European Community of Consumer Cooperatives and the European
Bureau of Consumer Unions. See KRAMER, supra note 38, at 36.
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States, the Consumers' Association in the United Kingdom, and Stiftung
Warentest in Germany. 322 These organizations publish magazines that
give consumers comparative evaluations of products and provide
information about current legal developments affecting consumers. In
addition, these national umbrella organizations provide funding for and
coordinate the activities of regional and local consumer groups. They
also hold conferences that help consumer advocates identify issues and
323
set legislative priorities.
The Russian consumer act recognizes consumer organizations as
juridical persons for several purposes. They are granted standing to bring
legal actions on behalf of members, though the available remedies may
be limited to injunctive relief such as requiring the offending producer to
inform consumers via the media about a product defect. The act does not
authorize organizations to obtain money damages on behalf of consumers
as a class. Nevertheless, the law does foster some collective benefits by
providing that court decisions will have resjudicata effect, binding courts
in future civil litigation by individual members who were injured by the
conduct challenged in the collective action.3u Consumer organizations
are also allowed to "participate" in the policy-making decisions of
legislative committees and state agencies that set product standards or
otherwise take actions affecting consumer rights, though the extent of
participation is left undefined.3 5
The act also permits consumer organizations to conduct independent
product testing and research.326 Organizations may be reluctant to
exercise this authority, however, unless the civil law recognizes a
qualified immunity for reasonable exercise of judgment in publishing
conclusions about product performance and quality. Article 7 of the
322. See MAYER, supra note 31, at 136; BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY, supra note
125, § 19.05[3]. Stiftung Warentest in Germany historically has received from 40 to 60 percent
of its revenue from the government, liL In the United Kingdom, the Consumers Association
(a nongovernmental consumer group) publishes a widely circulated testing magazine called
Which?. See LowE & WOODROFFE, supra note 125, at 5. In Norway, a government-sponsored
product testing publication reaches 20 percent of all households. In the United States only 3
to 4 percent receive Consumer Reports, the magazine published by Consumers Union. MAYER,
supra note 31, at 143. National testing groups in Europe have formed the European Testing
Group to test products jointly and share data. KRAMER, supra note 38, at 37.
323. MAYER, supra note 31, at 136.
324. Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, arts. 43-44. Article 43 states that consumer
organizations may bring suits in defense of rights of consumers, but it does not set forth the
available remedies. Article 44 more directly addresses the rights of a consumer organization
in a lawsuit, but it states only that courts must require offenders to inform consumers about the
outcome and that court decisions will be binding in actions brought by individual consumers.
325. 1d. art. 43.
326. Id.
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Fundamentals of Civil Legislation provides that a juridical person whose
business reputation has been injured can recover actual and moral
damages, unless the person who made the statements proves them to be
true.327 Because testing groups occasionally make mistakes and frequent-
ly publish critical value judgments about products, the law could have a
chilling effect on test reporting. Consumer organizations in other nations
often receive immunity from liability when the testing procedure and
reporting are neutral and objective even though the statement was
incorrect. 3
2
Despite the general authority granted Russian consumer organizations
in the act, they may find it difficult to guard the collective interests of
consumers, especially in the early years of their existence. Consumers
have differing interests, priorities, economic circumstances, and views of
morality. They consume different goods and services at different times
from a variety of sellers and providers.329 In all democratic nations, this
makes it difficult for a broad-based consumer organization to build a
consensus and offset the influence of business interests whose concerns
and resources are more concentrated.3 3° In Russia, this may delay the
development of influential, grass roots organizations with the ability to
represent consumers effectively on a broad spectrum of issues.
More problematic, however, is the lack of money. Consumer
organizations everywhere find it difficult to raise money, in large part due
to a "free rider" problem. When a consumer organization successfully
obtains a policy change (through negotiation, litigation, or lobbying
efforts), the change benefits many consumers, even those who are not part
of the organization and did not contribute to the effort. This psychology
makes it difficult for consumer groups to attract dues-paying members.33'
As a result, completely private consumer organizations have flourished
327. Fundamentals of Civil Legislation, supra note 47, art. 7(1). Article 7(3) provides that
the victim of an erroneous statement has the right to publish its reply in the same medium;
Article 7(6) provides for recovery of actual as well as moral damages from mistaken represen-
tations about an individual or business. I&
328. For example, under German tort law, testing results are regarded as value judgments
and therefore not actionable if the procedure of the testing bureau was knowledgeable, neutral,
objective, and professional. BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY, supra note 125, § 19.05[3].
329. See BOURGOIGNIE & TRUBEK, supra note 23, at 10-11.
330. OFFE, supra note 22, at 220, 228. Milton Friedman used the example of the ever-
escalating licensing standards and minimum fee structures in the barber industry. Few
individual consumers have a sufficient level of interest to mount an effective lobbying
campaign against regulatory measures that increase the cost of a haircut. The licensed barbers
in a state, whose livelihoods are at stake, devote considerable energy to protect their economic
interests. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 143 (1962).
331. See generally OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 12-14 (1971); Trebilcock,
supra note 160, at 619, 625.
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in only a few nations. They have typically done so by offering individual
benefits to their members, such as subscriptions to magazines that contain
product testing data and other evaluative information about consumer
goods and services. Profits from the magazines go in part to collective
lobbying and litigation efforts.332
Russian lawmakers should consider funding consumer organizations
to some extent, at least in the first few years of their existence. Because
the efforts of consumer groups can benefit the public at large, it is
appropriate to allocate general tax revenue to such organizations, just as
other public goods, such as food and drug testing bureaus, road construc-
tion, and national defense, are funded by taxes. For the same reason,
professional and trade associations require the payment of dues when
collective efforts benefit all members, yet individual constituents are
naturally willing to let someone else pay for the service.333 There is some
evidence that in other countries, modest subsidies to consumer associa-
tions have yielded high payoffs.334 Although the Russian state budget is
already severely strained, allocating at least seed money to consumer
organizations may prove to be a worthwhile investment.
To some extent, government funding runs the risk of compromising
the independence of the organization. As government departments find
their regulatory policies called into question, and as influential state-run
enterprises begin to confront consumer organizations on a regular basis,
government officials who can influence funding decisions may begin
directly or indirectly pressuring the organizations to temper their activities
or shift priorities. Protecting against this conflict of interest may require
a legislative framework designed to insulate consumer organizations from
party politics in matters of priorities, policies, personnel, and budget.335
332. By purchasing consumer magazines in their own self-interest, consumers subsidize
collective efforts that otherwise would likely remain underfunded. This helps explain why
consumer organizations like the Consumers Union in the United States and the Consumers
Association of Canada draw larger memberships than other organizations providing exclusively
collective benefits, such as public utility watchdog groups. See Trebilcock, supra note 160, at
625.
333. The nation state is the extreme example of a large group that cannot survive on
voluntary dues. Unless the group is small in number, or unless there is a direct, individualized
incentive for persons to join the group, individuals are not inclined to act to pursue common
objectives. OLSON, supra note 331, at 13-14; Trebilcock, supra note 160, at 625.
334. Thorelli, supra note 37, at 147, 153; Robert R. Kerton, Consumer Search Capital:
Delineating a Concept and Applying It to Consumers in Developing Countries, 4 J. CoNs.
POL'Y 293-305 (1980). The Consumer Association of Canada receives approximately 40% of
its operating budget from the government. Trebilcock, supra note 160, at 626.
335. See Trebilcock, supra note 160, at 639. The point here is not that consumer groups
should be isolated from the political process. Like any entity funded by taxpayers' money,
consumer organizations must be accountable for their actions. It is important, however, that
those who make accountability decisions do so with the genuine interests of the public in mind,
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C. Public Enforcement Through Government Action
Government agencies can also provide collective consumer benefits.
The consumer protection act envisions government enforcement of
consumer rights at three levels. The body primarily responsible for
ensuring that producers, sellers, and service providers do not violate the
law is the newly created State Committee for Anti-Monopoly Policy and
New Economic Structures (SCAMPNES). It is empowered to interpret
federal consumer legislation, impose fines, demand recalls, and bring
court actions against businesses for unlawful conduct.3 36 The second
bureau is Gosstandard, which formulates product standards and adminis-
ters the mandatory certification procedures discussed above. 337 It is also
empowered to seek injunctive relief and impose fines for noncompliance
with its regulations. 38 At the third level are local government organiza-
339tions.
Due to the inadequacies of private enforcement of consumer rights,
a strong government authority is often necessary to police compliance
with the law, prosecute civil claims against illegal business activity, and
issue regulations setting forth the ground rules for lawful conduct.
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of consumer protection agencies has
suffered in many countries for several reasons. Their financial and
technical resources often are too meager to deal effectively with the
myriad of consumer problems that develop, and they tend to adopt
regulations with relatively little consumer input. Agencies also work so
regularly with the regulated businesses that, in many cases, they can no
longer objectively represent consumer interests. The regulators may
ultimately be "captured" by the regulated industries who work with them
every day, resulting in policies favoring producers at the expense of
and not be unduly influenced by the state-owned or private businesses affected by the
organization's activities.
336. Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, arts. 39, 41. The law authorizes SCAMPNES
to impose a fine of up to one million rubles in two instances: (1) when a business fails to
comply with SCAMPNES demands that violations of the law be stopped; and (2) when a
business sells unsafe goods or services that harm consumers. Fines for marketing improperly
certified products may equal the value of the products sold. Businesses may appeal the
imposition of fines to the courts. Id. art. 41. See also Text of Russian Statute on State
Antimonopoly Committee, Russ. & COMMONWEALTH Bus. L. REP., Oct. 16, 1992, available
in LEXIS, Europe Library, RCBLR File.
337. Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, art. 40. See supra text accompanying notes
197, 211-15.
338. Id.
339. IdU art. 42.
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consumers.3 The collective benefits to consumers can therefore be
marginal.
The key to creating effective regulatory agencies is to organize them
in a way that allows valuable producer input but avoids the undue
influence of producers. This is difficult because businesses usually have
greater resources with which to affect regulatory outcomes, and they often
possess authoritative technical capabilities to persuade agency person-
nel."4 They also have much to lose by the adoption of costly regulatory
schemes, so their interests in any particular issue are likely to be more
concentrated than those of consumers, who generally have diverse
priorities hnd interests, as well as much more limited resources.
Producers therefore are likely to lobby more intensely for favorable
regulation and spend more money in the process. 342 This may be even
more problematic in Russia and other former Soviet states because,
during the transition years, the larger industries will either be state-run
enterprises or privatized former state enterprises that are managed by the
same personnel who operated the facility when it was state-owned.343
Since government regulators are likely to receive the arguments of these
former comrades favorably, care must be taken to correct this imbalance
and ensure that regulatory authorities are truly independent so the
consumer's voice is heard at agency decisionmaking levels.
340. See BOURGOIGNIE & TRUBEK, supra note 23, at 11; Fiss, supra note 5, at 908, 913.
Support for this view of the regulatory process comes from all points of the political spectrum,
although proposals for a cure vary from deregulation to more central planning. Compare
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 329 (1972) with Charles A. Reich, The
Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227, 1234 (1966). See Trebilcock, supra note 160,
at 620-23.
341. An excellent analysis of the inherent structural deficiencies in government protection
of the public interest appears in CAPPELErI & JOLOWILZ, PUBLIC INTEREST PARTIES AND THE
ACTIVE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN CIVIL LITIGATION (1975). See Ramsay, supra note 303, at 120
n.14.
342. See supra note 260. In addition, there is a tendency to appoint regulators whose
backgrounds, directly or indirectly, relate to the regulated industry on the theory that only they
have the requisite expertise. As a result of these political realities, laws and regulations
emerging from the democratic process tend to be pro-business. Without structural arrangements
to offset this imbalance of power, the consumer voice may go unheard. See Trebilcock, supra
note 160, at 621-22, 36; See BOURGOIGNIE & TRUBEK, supra note 23, at 10-11.
343. More fundamental concerns about the administrative regulatory process in Russia are
beyond the scope of this paper. For instance, minimum procedures for conducting regulatory
proceedings need to be established. Issues include the amount and nature of advance notice
to the public and interested parties, the right to present evidence and be heard, standards of
review of agency action in the courts, standing to appeal agency decisions. Laws should
emphasize ease of access and due process. See Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in
Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359 (1971); A.E.S. Tay and E. Kamenka, The Future
of Administrative Justice in the USSR and China, in SOVIET ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note
202, at 47, 54-67; Donald D. Barry, Administrative Justice: The Role of Soviet Courts in
Controlling Administrative Acts, in SOVIET ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 202, at 63.
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While strong consumer organizations can amplify this voice,'
Russian consumers would also benefit from government institutions
whose principal responsibility is representing consumer interests. In the
Nordic countries, this role is played by the consumer ombud, who staff
offices in cities throughout the country. 345 In the United Kingdom, the
Director General of Fair Trading represents consumer views within the
Department of Trade and Industry.64 This approach has spread to some
former communist states. Poland, for example, appointed a consumer
specialist to the post of citizen ombud in 1987. 347 The objective in each
country is to charge a government official with both investigating and
resolving problems that affect a large number of consumers, and
representing consumer interests generally at a policy making level. Basic
functions include seeking voluntary compliance with consumer laws
through negotiated settlements, and bringing legal actions against
offending firms when negotiations fail.34 The role might even be
expanded in Russia to serve as a clearinghouse for communication with
consumers (a "media ombud") that disseminates information on consumer
problems and publicizes the decisions of small claims courts or other
dispute resolution forums. This would extend the benefits of private
actions beyond the interests of individual claimants. 349
SCAMPNES may ultimately function in this capacity. The agency
is intended to be the central watchdog of the marketplace, with its
principal responsibilities including the development of competitive
markets, the limitation of monopoly power (performed in part by
monitoring privatization programs), and the prevention of unfair competi-
tion practices, in addition to its role as protector of consumer rights. 350
344. In the United Kingdom, for example, a Consumer Standards Advisory Committee
represents consumers on standard setting bodies and ensures that product standards serve the
public interest. See Lawson, supra note 196, at 863, 864.
345. In the 1970s, the four Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden)
established the office of consumer ombudsman, a supervisory body for controlling the
marketing of goods and services. Although the ombuds serve similar functions in the four
nations, differences in jurisdiction and enforcement powers exist. See generally Kjersti Graver,
A Study of the Consumer Ombudsman Institution in Norway with Some References to the Other
Nordic Countries : Background and Description, 6 J. CONS. POL'Y 1 (1986).
346. See LowE & WOODRUFF, supra note 125, at 3.
347. Ewa Letowska, The Fast Block's First Government Ombudsman, INT'L HERALD TRiB.,
Jan. 8, 1988, at 5.
348. See Graver, supra note 345, at 1-2. In Norway and Finland, the ombud may issue
injunctions in cases of urgency. In Sweden and Finland, the ombud may also bring an action
in the Market Court to levy a fine. Id See also KING, supra note 293, at 3-15 (1974).
349. See Ramsay, supra note 303, at 147.
350. Text of Russian Statute on State Antimonopoly Committee, supra note 336, T 3, 4;
Law on Competition and Limitation of Monopolistic Activity in Goods Markets (Mar. 22,
1991) translated in BUTLER, supra note 1, at 229.
Summer 1993]
Michigan Journal of International Law
SCAMPNES thus has broader authority than the consumer ombuds in
Europe, whose power is generally limited to the protection of consumers'
economic interests such as the regulation of pre-contractual advertising
and marketing practices, the supervision of contract terms to prohibit
unfair standard contracts, the prevention of unfair trade practices, and (in
Sweden) the prohibition of unsafe products.35' Moreover, unlike the
Nordic consumer ombuds, SCAMPNES has authority to impose
substantial fines for noncompliance with consumer laws without prior
judicial proceedings.352 The agency thus has the legal authority not only
to be a strong advocate for consumers who bring complaints, but also to
serve as an educator and catalyst to build a strong consumer movement.
It remains to be seen whether it will exercise this authority or focus its
resources predominantly on the anti-monopoly dimension of its mission.
In the early years of market reform, one suspects that finding ways to
foster competition will likely be the agency's highest priority, and
consumer protection measures will receive far fewer resources.
At the local level, municipal governments may ultimately serve the
primary role of both assisting individual consumers who have been
injured by a merchant and promoting the collective interests of consum-
ers. The law, in very general terms, directs local governments to
establish organizations that will consider consumer complaints, engage in
consumer counseling, examine merchant contracts for compliance with
the law, collect product information for Gosstandard, and report defective
products to federal authorities.353 The law also empowers local govern-
ments to "sue unfair producers," though it does not define unfairness or
set forth the sanctions for noncompliance.3 4  The act does not state
whether local governments may seek compensation on behalf of a class
of injured consumers, or whether remedies will be limited to injunctive
relief as they are for consumer organizations.
Pursuant to this broad authority, local governments could implement
many of the programs suggested above. The experience of each locality
will dictate the form of oversight.355  If local governments have the
resources and inclination to create strong consumer protection institutions,
the decision to delegate this power in lieu of creating another large,
351. See Graver, supra note 345, at 3-7.
352. Law on Consumer Rights, supra note 2, art. 41.
353. Id. art. 42.
354. Id.
355. In Norway, for example, each county establishes a Committee for Consumer Affairs,
which receives complaints from consumers and inquiries about product availability and quality.
In the United States, some states have a similar network of local consumer assistance bureaus.
See Wesswick, supra note 254, at 294, 297 (discussing New Jersey program).
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central bureaucracy could be one of the better choices made by the
drafters of the consumer act.
CONCLUSION
Although the consumer act was conceived in the Soviet era of central
planning, it does a fair job of creating a set of rules consistent with
consumers' general expectations in market transactions. As a framework
law, it is a good beginning and has much in common with the consumer
protection programs in other nations. By reducing the influence of
unaccountable government ministries that previously diluted the legal
rights of consumers under the Civil Code, the act is a significant step in
the long march to government by rule of law.
The special difficulties facing Russian consumers are formidable,
however. Overcoming them in the early years of economic and political
transformation will be made more difficult by the institutional and
cultural legacies of the previous era. Highly concentrated industries with
dominant market power will continue for the foreseeable future; huge
government bureaucracies, accustomed to directing a planned economy
for the better part of this century, may resist letting go of the reigns and
risking the inevitable abuses and unfairness characteristic of capitalist
freedom; and the Russian people, hampered by their lack of experience
with free markets and the rule of law as a market regulating force, may
find it difficult to assert their rights effectively in the courts or other
forums when those abuses surface. These conditions will make it
difficult for Russian consumers to benefit from the promises of the
consumer act during the early stages of economic reform.
Much needs to be done to address these concerns, fill gaps in existing
legislation, educate consumers about their legal rights and responsibilities,
and make the law meaningful to the individual. Much depends on the
decisions of governing bodies at the federal, republic, and local levels,
who must convince Russian citizens that the the rights set forth in the act
will be respected and effectively enforced. Yet, at the same time, the
emerging entrepreneurial class must be assured that if consumers take
advantage of the law's generous remedial provisions in a manner that
increases costs without offsetting benefits, the interests of merchants will
be recognized as well. They must also be convinced that past practices
of regulating product and service quality by government fiat will
fundamentally change, and that market regulating mechanisms, like
labelling and advertising laws, will be designed to benefit consumers by
helping markets work more efficiently.
In short, legislators and administrators during these critical transition
years must ensure that consumer rights are taken seriously, but that
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economic development is not sacrificed at the altar of consumer
protection. Care must be taken to strike an appropriate balance between
empowering the Russian consumer and encouraging much needed
entrepreneurial initiative. Only time will tell how the government
accommodates these competing interests, and whether the consumer
protection act is a blueprint for truly empowering Russian consumers, or
yet another set of promises unfulfilled.'
